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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE recent search for "Alternative Dispute Resolution" techin-
ques is fundamentally a reassessment of civil procedure, includ-
ing acceptance of the proposition that some disputes are unsuitable
for judicial resolution. The most useful way to approach the subject of
alternative dispute resolution - an approach followed by the Villa-
nova Law Review in its 1984 Symposium - is to synthesize intellec-
tual capital developed in diverse specialties: traditional civil
procedure, labor relations, civil case management, community action,
law and economics, and family law. Villanova Law School and the
dispute resolution community are fortunate that such a distinguished
group of experts agreed to share their thoughts on this important sub-
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ject. This article is meant to be a conceptual "umbrella" for the excel-
lent and more narrowly focused articles that follow it in this issue.
Because of the article's length, I offer a summary of my key con-
clusions now:
1. "Alternative" dispute resolution techniques should be
understood as promoting out-of-court or pretrial settlement
of claims and should be evaluated according to their effi-
cacy in achieving this objective equitably. Evaluation of dis-
pute resolution procedures requires an understanding of the
dynamics of dispute settlement through negotiation.
2. Society should prefer alternatives that function as ad-
juncts to the court system, except for defined classes of dis-
putes that occur within the framework of economic or social
interdependence sufficient to provide incentives to resolve
disputes privately.
3. When private institutions are not available, society
should prefer alternatives involving changes in existing judi-
cial procedures rather than introduction of entirely new
types of governmental institutions or procedures.
4. The role of small claims courts should be enhanced
rather than diminished by the creation of new, parallel
institutions.
Much useful thinking and experimentation has been accom-
plished in recent years. Programs of arbitration and mediation have
received more publicity than equally important research into dispu-
tant behavior, and proposals for changes in court rules. The student
of dispute resolution should understand developments in all these
areas.
A. The Lure of Litigation
Civil litigation is a means of involving the coercive power of the
state in a private dispute. It is a way to alter bargaining power, and as
such, is attractive to the weaker party in a two-party dispute. It also is
a way to legitimize the exercise of superior power, and thus can be
attractive to the stronger party in a two-party dispute.
I taught a seminar last Fall in Dispute Resolution. The students'
papers addressed fifteen different procedures intended to resolve dis-
putes that otherwise might have been litigated fully in the courts.
Shortly before the semester started, one of my research assistants had
a dispute with an automobile dealer over defects in a new car. I told
him about an arbitration system sponsored by the automobile manu-
1223
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facturer through the Better Business Bureau. He attempted to utilize
this arbitration procedure and was very dissatisfied with the result.
He felt the Better Business Bureau, the dealer, and the manufacturer
gave him the "run-around." Finally he gave up arbitration, urged the
state attorney general's consumer affairs unit to investigate, and con-
tacted an attorney to prepare for filing suit.
The research assistant made a presentation to the seminar. The
students in the seminar enthusiastically suggested ways for him to
bring pressure to bear against the dealer or the manufacturer. The
students with litigation experience in their part-time and summer
jobs and those who were taking our practical course, "Trial Practice,"
proposed additional counts for his civil complaint that would raise
the ante in terms of damages potentially recoverable. Others urged
that the research assistant take out advertisements in the local news-
papers, and that he park the car in front of the dealer, with a large
"lemon" sign on it.
The seminar students found the arbitration alternative unattrac-
tive because it lacked coercive power. They liked litigation because
they perceived that filing a suit would bring more pressure to bear on
the other side. The other alternatives considered by the students simi-
larly emphasized coercion, but outside the procedural channels usu-
ally thought of as alternatives to litigation. The small part of the
discussion that focused on arbitration concerned enforcement of arbi-
tration awards. Considerable doubt was expressed as to whether the
coercive sanctions available in the arbitration process were adequate.
It may be that these law students merely were exhibiting a bias
acquired in law school that favors litigation. I doubt it. Rather, I sus-
pect the law students were expressing an instinct shared by many
American citizens: one must "sue the bastards" in order to get serious
attention paid to a dispute. In the research assistant's dispute, they
were right. When the potential defendants were threatened with liti-
gation, and with prosecution by the state attorney general, the matter
was settled.
Everyone has similar stories. About a year ago, I got a local de-
partment store to help me get a new television back from their repair
shop only after I filed suit for $1000 in small claims court. Justice
Neely in his little book on the courts relates stories about suits filed
after they proved to be the only way to get someone to talk about
solving problems. '
1. R. NEELY, WHY COURTS DON'T WORK (1983). Justice Neely serves on the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and was chief justice of that court in 1980.
Why Courts Don't Work is a wide-ranging and readable popular treatise on the reasons
1224 [Vol. 29: p. 1221
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When citizens live and interact in communities where interde-
pendence exists with personal acquaintances rather than with stran-
gers, a variety of social and economic forces make it possible to resolve
most disputes informally. When the sense of community is less and
when interdependencies exist only with strangers, it is more likely
that the power of the state must be mobilized in order to compel reso-
lution of disputes. Under this view, the increase in litigation is a con-
comitant of modern urban society, and is not due to some
inexplicable increase in quarrelsomeness of citizens or greed of
lawyers.
B. The Search for Litigation Alternatives
As "suing the bastards" has become a popular means for equaliz-
ing bargaining power in private disputes, the volume of civil litiga-
tion has become troublesome. In reaction, popular calls for
alternative means of resolving disputes have proliferated.
"Alternative Dispute Resolution" is fashionable today. The
American Bar Association has a special committee on the subject.2 A
multitude of programs at the 1983 ABA convention addressed the
topic. Experiments are being conducted in federal and state court sys-
tems.3 There is federal and foundation funding for other experiments.
The popularity of the idea has spawned a variety of entrepreneurial
efforts. "EnDispute," in Washington, D.C., concentrates on simplify-
ing complex corporate litigation and negotiating settlements.4 "Judi-
cate," in Philadelphia, offers parties to simpler suits the opportunity
why civil disputes find their way into court, the economics of settlement, and the
politics of legal reform. Generally, Justice Neely explains why civil courts tend to be
"stepchildren" of the law, and argues that the legal system should reverse its current
priorities and give resources to the minor courts. Id at 187-210.
2. The ABA Special Committee on Dispute Resolution was created out of the
Pound Revisited Conference of 1976. It originally was called the Special Committee
on Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution. See ABA, Report of Pound Conference Fol-
low-up Task Force, 74 F.R.D. 159 (1976). The ABA held conferences in 1976 and 1977.
Id. at 161. The National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice (the "Pound Revisited Conference") was held in St.
Paul, Minnesota in April, 1976. Id at 165. The National Conference on Minor Dis-
putes Resolution was held at Columbia University School of Law on May 25-27,
1977.
3. See, e.g., R. ToMASIC & M. FEELEY, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT
OF AN EMERGING IDEA (1982) (review and analysis of small claims and minor crimi-
nal dispute resolution in "neighborhood justice center").
4. For an example of an application of EnDispute, see Middleton, Storm Sel/ers."
Hawaii Victims Use EnDispule, 69 A.B.A. J. 717 (1983). The author notes that some of
the approximately 30,000 insurance claims arising from Hurricane Iwa which took
place in November of 1982 were settled by EnDispute without costly and lengthy
litigation. Id Claimants arranged either a settlement conference or mini-arbitration,
the latter of which was final and binding. Id Most conferences or mini-arbitrations
1225
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for arbitration before retired judges. 5
Fashion should not obscure the fact that the subject is not new.
Arbitration goes back to 1705 in Pennsylvania. 6 The small claims
court option has been a longstanding feature of the American legal
landscape.7 Labor arbitration and other voluntary arbitration was a
great movement in the 1920's.8 Roscoe Pound pressed for judicial re-
form for more than 40 years.9 Last and not least, the rise of the "Ad-
ministrative State" was in part a reaction to shortcomings of
traditional litigation. 10
The search for alternatives is motivated by two complaints about
traditional civil litigation. The first complaint is that the social costs
of the high volume of litigation are great and that many nuisance
suits are pursued.I' The second complaint is that the costs to the par-
were scheduled from one and one-half to three hours, depending on the complexity,
and cost between $300 and $650. Id
5. An earlier "rent a judge" program was pioneered in California. See Christen-
sen, Private Justice: Califorma s General Reference Procedure, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 79.
6. Act of 1705, ch. 150, 1 Pa. Laws (Sm. I.) 49. A statute enacted in 1810 pro-
vided for compulsory arbitration upon request of one of the litigants. Act of March
20, 1810, ch. 3219, 5 Pa. Laws (Sm. I.) 131 (current version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7362 (Purdon 1982)).
For a discussion of the history of arbitration in Pennsylvania, see Comment,
Compulsoy Arbitration in Pennsylvania - Its Scope, Efect, Application and Limitalions in
Montgomery and Delaware Counties - A Survey and Analysis, 2 VILL. L. REv. 529 (1957).
7. See Steele, The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 293.
8. For a historical perspective on the growth of labor arbitration, see R. FLEM-
ING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS (1965). The author describes how arbitra-
tion came to the hosiery industry in 1929. Id. at 9. During a joint meeting in 1929,
unionized operators and union leaders agreed to an arbitration system involving a
single impartial chairman. Id at 10. Under this agreement, all difficulties which arose
during the term of a contract and which could not be settled as a result of negotiation
were to be submitted to the impartial chairman for final and binding settlement. Id
9. See R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS (1940). In his book, Dean Pound
discussed how he had been arguing for a reorganization of the court system for de-
cades. Id at 273. While he was on the Supreme Court Commission in Nebraska from
1901 to 1903, he was bothered by the waste of judicial power and the fact that the
courts were behind in their dockets. Id Subsequently, he read a paper before the
American Bar Association in 1906 entitled "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice," in which he maintained that the court system
was archaic for three reasons: (1) its multitude of courts; (2) its preservation of con-
current jurisdiction; and (3) its waste of judicial power. Id (citing 29 REP. AM. B.A.
395 (1906)). In his book, Dean Pound generally urged central control of the court
system to reduce delay and improve efficiency. Id at 275.
10. See D. ROSENBLOOM, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LAW: BENCH V. Bu-
REAU IN THE UNITED STATES (1983). As Rosenbloom notes, "[a] main rationale for
vesting what were once judicial functions in administrative agencies was the per-
ceived advantage of such structures in terms of expertise, flexibility and speed." Id at
27.
11. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 170. Judge Neely describes how landlord-tenant
1226 [Vol. 29: p. 1221
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ties and the elapsed time before a final resolution can be obtained
cause many meritorious claims to be abandoned.' 2 The first com-
plaint originates mostly with defendants and their partisans. The sec-
ond complaint originates primarily with plaintiffs and their partisans.
C. An Agenda for Po'4y Making is Needed
Ironically the alternative dispute resolution explosion may be-
come as much of a problem as the litigation explosion unless we are
careful. Many states, of which Pennsylvania is an example, have only
in the last 15 years or so successfully consolidated and centralized
badly fragmented court systems.13 A proliferation of "alternative dis-
pute resolution" (ADR) programs can restore the fragmentation.
Moreover, we are not yet taking a comprehensive look at the prob-
lem; more is needed than diverse ideas for new forums operating inde-
pendently under their own procedures. People have been tinkering
with courts and with court substitutes for a long time and really novel
ideas are hard to find. What we need to do now is to integrate the
current dialogue about alternative dispute resolution theory with the
practical experiences of the past. We should be asking ourselves a
number of questions that have not figured prominently enough in
contemporary discussions:
1. Where does lack of congruity between dispute charac-
disputes often begin as nuisance suits. Id. After a landlord files an eviction complaint
on grounds that his tenant refuses to pay rent, a tenant will often answer by alleging
that he refuses to pay rent because the premises are in disrepair. The dispute then
must be scheduled for trial, and eviction may take up to a year, during which time
the landlord is paid no rent, but continues to incur expenses. Id
12. Id at 165. Judge Neely describes this phenomenon as follows:
Unfortunately, the people who can afford to stand in line the longest are
not necessarily the people who have the most urgent need to litigate, yet the
egalitarian tradition prohibits the sale of one's place in line to someone with
a more pressing need for court services.
Since a place in line cannot be sold or exchanged, all litigants must pay
essentially the same price for use - a price that bears no relationship to the
urgency of individual needs or the importance to the public of certain issues
Id
13. For a discussion of court consolidation efforts in several states, see Rosen-
baum, Berkson & Carbon, Implementing Court Unification: A Map for Refarm, 17 DuQ. L.
REV. 419 (1978). The authors note that there are four variations of court unification
efforts in various states. Id at 422-24. The simplest proposal calls for only two courts,
a supreme court and a trial court. Id at 422. A slightly more complicated approach
contains three separate courts: a supreme court; a trial court of general juridiction;
and a trial court of limited jurisdiction. Id. at 423. A third model has a supreme
court, an intermediate appellate court and a single trial court. Id The fourth ap-
proach has a supreme court; an intermediate appellate court; a general jurisdiction
trial court; and a limited jurisdiction trial court. Id.
1983-841 1227
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teristics and the essential characteristics of traditional civil
litigation lead to dissatisfaction? Are there certain categories
of disputes that lend themselves to resolution by procedures
other than civil adjudication in the courts? 14
2. What are the benefits and shortcomings of private dis-
pute resolution procedures? Labor arbitration, a major pro-
totype, has existed for 60 years. 15
3. What are the benefits and shortcomings of administra-
tive adjudication as a substitute for civil lawsuits in the reg-
ular courts? 16
4. What characteristics of successful ADR experiments
should be incorporated into standard civil litigation
procedures?
This article offers a framework within which integrated policy
analysis can take place. Obviously no one essay can say anything use-
ful about the full range of disagreements that occur in modern soci-
ety. The subject of this essay is a particular subclass of disputes:
private disputes likely to find their way into the courts. 17
It begins with the theoretical literature on dispute resolution and
then proceeds to classify dispute resolution techniques. The classifica-
tion effort first distinguishes between interest and rights disputes, pay-
ing more attention to rights disputes, since these are the type usually
dealt with by courts. Then dispute resolution methods are classified
according to whether they are private, administrative or judicial.' 8
14. For a discussion of one possible category, interest disputes, see notes 102-12
and accompanying text infra.
15. For a discussion of arbitration and various other private dispute resolution
techniques, see notes 113-78 and accompanying text inqfa.
16. For a discussion of disputes which are handled in administrative forums, see
notes 179-230 and accompanying text infra.
17. My interest in a comprehensive treatment of dispute resolution derives from
my experience with a variety of dispute resolution methods. I have litigated employ-
ment cases in federal and state courts, have sat as an arbitrator on several dozen
common law tort and breach-of-contract cases in the Philadelphia Common Pleas
mandatory arbitration program, was the drafter of amendments to the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act that gave exclusive jurisdiction over a broad class of cases to a
special federal court, and have drafted and helped negotiate a number of collective
bargaining agreements that contain innovative interest and rights dispute resolution
procedures.
18. The article gives little attention to another means of removing private dis-
putes from the courts: legislative reduction in disputable issues. No-fault measures
reduce the amount of litigation because they reduce the potential for disputes over
fault. No-fault divorce and no-fault automobile accident compensation measures are
mentioned, but not addressed in detail, because the emphasis of the article is on
procedural alternatives for resolving disputes rather than means to eliminate the
disputes.
1228 [Vol. 29: p. 1221
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This article identifies major experiments within each class. A major
effort is made to explain the theoretical process through which each
type of dispute resolution technique works, and to compare and con-
trast private dispute resolution methods with those of the same type
conducted by administrative agencies and by the courts. Having sug-
gested a classification of methods, the article then proceeds to identify
major legal problems associated with adoption of one or more of
these methods. It concludes with suggestions for policy changes, with
specific reference to the standards developed by the ABA for trial
courts.
II. THEORY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Meaningful evaluation of dispute resolution alternatives should
work from some theoretical conception as to how private disputes are
resolved. A body of literature on the theory of dispute resolution has
developed during the last two decades. Generally, the commentators
working in this area have sought to explain the dynamics of negotia-
tion and settlement of disputes, to explain how the positions of the
parties may be changed by litigation, and to identify the social costs
of civil litigation.
A. Types of Disputes
At the outset, one should distinguish between "interest disputes"
and "rights disputes." The civil litigation system was designed to deal
with rights disputes. Rights disputes presuppose an external principle
or standard by which the claim can be settled. Interest disputes, in
contrast, do not presuppose such a principle or standard. A simple
negligence action or breach-of-contract claim are examples of rights
disputes. Dean Hazard offers a good example of an interest dispute:
The type of dispute one gets into say, with one's friend,
when you ask: Shall we go to the game or shall we stay at
home and watch television? This kind of dispute requires a
settlement procedure of some sort, but it is not the kind of
dispute that is [suited for the courts].' 9
B. Basic Processes for Resolving Disputes
i. Definition of Terms
A discussion of dispute resolution theory can be enhanced by of-
fering some definitions of basic dispute resolution procedures.
19. See Discussion by Seminar Paricipants, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 323, 330 (1979).
1229
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Negoltalion is a process in which the parties to a dispute seek to
resolve it themselves. Negotiation is the underlying, common process
for most private disputes, and resolves about ninety percent of all civil
cases filed in federal courts. 20 The negotiation process is unlikely to be
entirely absent in any form of private dispute, though negotiations
may be suspended pending resort to other dispute resolution proce-
dures. In negotiation, a rational party will accept any offer better
than his Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). 2'
Settlement of a dispute through negotiation is possible when a "zone
of agreement" exists. A zone of agreement exists when the claimant's
BATNA is lower than his opponent's BATNA.
The availability of dispute resolution processes other than nego-
tiation affects the BATNA's of the parties in the underlying negotia-
tion, and therefore may create a zone of agreement when none would
exist in the absence of the processes. For example, if a party is certain
of obtaining a judgment of $10,000 in a trial, at a cost of $4,000, his
BATNA in settlement negotiations will be $6,000. In the absence of
any process for enforcing the claim (or some coercive power possessed
by the claimant), the claimant's opponent's BATNA would be zero.
A negotiated settlement is possible only because of the availability of
a lawsuit or some other dispute resolution procedure. The availability
of an enforcement process raises the opponent's BATNA above zero
and, if it increases it at least to $6,000 in the example given, a zone of
agreement exists.
Most alternatives to the trial offer lower costs, or a prediction of
what payoff will result from a trial. Either lower costs or better pre-
dictions affect the BATNA's in settlement negotiations. 22
Adjudication is a formal process through which parties may obtain
a third party decision about their dispute according to some pre-ex-
isting standard or principle. In the adjudication process, the parties
seek to influence the decision maker in their favor by the presentation
of logical arguments and the submission of factual proof linked to the
pre-existing standard. 23
20. Sullivan, Ach'evtng Better Settlements, LITIG., Summer 1982, at 8.
21. See R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES 101-11 (1981). The authors
point out that, in order to protect themselves from ending up with a deal they should
have rejected, negotiators establish in advance the worst acceptable outcome - their
"bottom line." Id at 102. For instance, if they were buying something, the bottom
line would be the highest price they would pay, determined by the best price they
could obtain outside the negotiations. Id See notes 83-85 and accompanying text infra
for a fuller explanation of the BATNA concepts.
22. For a discussion of the effect of cheaper, quicker, or production-improving
procedures, see notes 232-56 and accompanying text infra.
23. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudicalion, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
1230 [Vol. 29: p. 1221
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Adjudication is, of course, the protypical method of dispute reso-
lution used by courts. It also is used by other dispute resolving institu-
tions, such as arbitrators and administrative agencies. It is not,
however, the only process other than negotiation for dispute
resolution.
Arbitration is a process of dispute resolution in which a third party
makes a decision. Arbitration may be more or less formal but usually
it follows an adjudicatory model in which the disputing parties pres-
ent their case through evidence and argument. In the pure form of
arbitration, the third party decision maker is not a government offi-
cial, and the decision is binding. So-called "nonbinding arbitration"
is really fact finding.
Fact Fndng is a process in which a third party to the dispute
decides disputed facts in a nonbinding report. Fact finding usually
resembles arbitration except that a fact finder's conclusions are not
binding and an arbitrator's are. Fact finding does not directly resolve
disputes because it is nonbinding; it can promote resolution of dis-
putes by conditioning the expectations of the parties about what is
obtainable in a binding process such as arbitration or a judicial trial.
The survey results gathered in connection with a study of federal
court-annexed arbitration are interesting in this respect. Counsel par-
ticipating in this form of fact finding believed that settlement was
promoted because the fact finding report became the focus of subse-
quent negotiations, or because the fact finding solution was perceived
as reasonable. 24 Fact finding, outside the special examples of court-
annexed arbitration and public employee labor relations impasses, is
used infrequently in two-party disputes. It can be useful, however,
especially where counsel-negotiator perceptions are sufficiently close
together to provide a zone of agreement, but client perceptions are
sufficiently far apart to make negotiated settlement difficult or impos-
Professor Fuller explains that the process of argument and proof implies a pre-ex-
isting standard for decision: "The litigant must ... if his participation is to be mean-
ingful, assert some principle or principles by which his arguments are sound and his
proofs relevant." Id at 369.
24. See A. LIND & J. SHEPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRA-
TION IN THREE FEDERAl. DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Center rev. ed. 1983);
Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts.- The Philadelphta Story,
42 MD. L. REV. 787 (1983). Nejelski and Zeldin point out that arbitration hearings
generally require less time than most civil trials. Nejelski & Zeldin, supra, at 812-13.
Civil trials require the use of the Federal Rules of Evidence and other formalities. Id.
Scheduling difficulties often lead to continuances and other motions which can delay
a trial. Id at 813. While arbitrators employ the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
"guide" for the admission of evidence at arbitration hearings, arbitrators often rely
on stipulation and other practices which save time. Id at 813-14. In fact, hearings
generally take less than one day. Id at 814.
1231
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sible. In order to change client perceptions about outcomes, though,
the fact finding process must have characteristics that make it seem
legitimate. This probably explains the attractiveness of court-annexed
arbitration, and of rent-a-judge programs.
Medatzn and Conciliation frequently are used to refer to the same
process.25 In this process a third party assists the disputing parties in
achieving a negotiated resolution of their dispute. To simplify the dis-
cussion, the term mediation will be used to refer to both mediation
and conciliation. Mediation does not follow an adjudicatory model.
Instead of aiming at a decision based on evidence and argument mar-
shalled by the parties for their positions, the mediator aims at finding
a solution that serves the underlying interests of the parties. Because
mediation does not rely on proofs and argument, it does not depend
for its legitimacy on the existence of a standard or principle according
to which the dispute is to be resolved. Accordingly, it is inherently
more suitable for interest disputes than any adjudicatory process.
Mediation also is useful in rights disputes. Frequently, mediation
enhances integrative bargaining. 26 In contrast, the adjudicatory
methods of decisionmaking enforce distributive or "zero-sum" bar-
gaining.27 Eliminating the zero-sum constraint always makes settle-
ment more likely.
Because adjudication is familiar to most lawyers and mediation
is not, it is useful to elaborate on how mediation works. A mediator
performs several different functions in a private dispute: 28
25. Some practitioners, particularly in the labor field, distinguish between medi-
ation and conciliation. They consider mediation to be more active than conciliation
and more likely to involve the third party in recommending settlement possibilities.
In contrast, conciliation may be limited to a simple facilitation of communication
between the parties. For a discussion of the advantages of mediation as an alternative
to arbitration in the labor context, see Goldberg, The Mediatzon of Grievances Under a
Collecttve Bargaining Contract. An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. U.L. RFV. 270 (1982).
The author suggests that the primary role of the mediator is to assist the parties in
reaching a settlement in a mutually satisfactory manner. Id at 281. Since the inabil-
ity to settle is sometimes caused by a failure to consider various settlement possibili-
ties, an experienced mediator can bring about a settlement merely by bringing
different options to the parties' attention. Id at 285.
26. See H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 131 (1982). In-
tegrative bargaining is a form of bargaining in which one or more outcomes exist
which can benefit both parties. The mediator's role is to assist the parties in discover-
ing these potential outcomes. Id.
27. See id. at 33. Distributive bargaining is a form of bargaining in which all the
outcomes benefit one party at the expense of the other. Id. An example is a tort claim,
in which the defendant either is or is not liable for damages. If he is, the plaintiff wins
and the defendant pays. If he is not, the plaintiff loses, and bears the cost of his own
loss.
28. This list of functions draws heavily on the list offered by Professor Raiffa in
his explanation of how a third party can facilitate resolution of a two-party dispute.
See id at 108-09. The functions identified by Professor Raiffa and not mentioned in
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1. He may bring the parties together. This is a brokerage
role. Brokerage is unnnecessary when the parties have an
ongoing relation, but it may be essential when the claimant
is uncertain exactly who can take action that will satisfy his
claim. This function is emphasized by Action Line 29 and
ombudsman programs. 30 It is performed also in the com-
mon technique of the claimant's lawyer writing a letter to
the person with whom his client has a dispute.
2. Establishing an atmosphere in which negotiations can
proceed. Frequently two-party negotiations cannot proceed
meaningfully because of interpersonal tensions or lack of
structure for substantive communication. The mediator, by
serving as a neutral chairman for discussions, can reduce
these barriers by helping to set the agenda for negotiations
and by enforcing the rules for civilized debate. The civiliz-
ing element of this function is apparent from the transcript
of a simulated mediation of a landlord-tenant dispute, in
which the mediator frequently cautions, "One person speak-
ing at a time."'3 1
3. Collecting and judiciously communicating selected con-
the text relate more to acceptance of an agreement or negotiating positions by a
negotiator's constituents in a labor negotiation or an international negotiation than
in a simple two-party dispute. Id. These functions relate to holding channels of com-
munication open while the negotiators wait for a more favorable political climate for
changes in position, articulating a rationale for agreement to increase acceptability
by constituents and so on. Id. at 109.
29. For a discussion of an ombudsman program that has incorporated an action
line operation, see Ladinsky & Susmilch, Major Findngs of the Milwaukee Consumer Dis-
pute Study, in CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EXPLORING THE ALTERNATIVES
145, 168-69 (L. Ray ed. 1983). The authors describe how, in Wisconsin, the Gover-
nor's Ombudsman Program for the Aged and Disabled provides a means for the
issuing and resolution of complaints by the elderly and disabled in long-term care
facilities. Id at 168. Most of the complaints that are filed with the program come
through the program's state-wide, toll-free telephone line. Id. at 169.
30. For a discussion of recent legislation which provides for an ombudsman pro-
gram, see Note, The Department of Pubhc Advocate - Pubhc Interest Representation and
Administrative Oversight, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 386 (1977). The New Jersey State Leg-
islature created the Department of the Public Advocate (DPA) to serve the functions
of ombudsman review and public interest representation. Id at 386-88. The cabinet-
level department consists of a Division of Public Interest Advocacy (PIA), which has
the ability to represent the public interest in administrative and judicial forums, a
Division of Rate Counsel (Rate Counsel), which represents consumer viewpoints in
state regulatory proceedings, a Division of Citizen Complaints and Dispute Settle-
ment, which performs mediation and ombudsman function, and many other citizen-
oriented departments. Id at 388-89.
31. See A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MEDIATION AND THE LAW: WILL REASON PREVAIL? 10-20
(L. Ray ed. 1983).
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fidential material. 32 The function usually is performed by
the technique, familiar in labor dispute mediation, of
caucusing separately with the parties. By communicating
information about the other party's position, the mediator
can assist a party in understanding his opponent's BATNA.
An accurate perception of the BATNA's on both sides is
necessary to determine whether there is a potential zone of
agreement and to assess how much change in position would
be necessary to create a zone of agreement.
4. Helping to clarify values and derive responsible reserva-
tion prices. 33 A skillful mediator can assist the parties in bar-
gaining over interests rather than positions, as Professors
Fisher and Ury urge. 34 Professor Lon Fuller has pointed out
that mediation commonly is directed, not toward achieving
conformity to pre-existing norms, but toward the creation of
the relevant norms themselves. A clear example is where a
mediator assists the parties in working out the terms of a
contract that defines their rights and duties toward one an-
other. In such a case, there are no pre-existing rules or prin-
ciples to guide mediation; it is the mediation process that
produces the values or principles by which an acceptable
settlement is measured. 35 This is what makes mediation
more useful than adjudication in interest disputes. In both
interest and rights disputes, unrealistic demands can be tem-
pered because the mediator helps the party understand for
himself the underlying interest he wants to pursue and the
relationship between different positions and service to that
32. See H. RAIFFA, supra note 26, at 108. The author points out that, by collect-
ing and judiciously communicating selective confidential material, a mediator can
ascertain whether there is a potential zone of agreement. Id. at 109.
33. A party's "reservation price" is the lowest price for which he will settle. A
rational negotiator sets his reservation price equal to his BATNA. See R. FISHER &
W. URY, supra note 21, at 102.
34. Id at 51-53. Bargaining over interests facilitates integrative bargaining. Fre-
quently, parties can be assisted by a mediator in identifying new positions (demands
or offers) that serve their underlying interests as well or better than their old positions
and that are more acceptable to the other side.
35. See Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAI.. L. REv. 305 (1971).
As the author suggests,
[M]ediation is always, in any event, directed toward bringing about a
more harmonious relationship between the parties, whether this be
achieved through explicit agreement, through a reciprocal acceptance of
the "social norms" relevant to their relationship, or simply because the par-
ties have been helped to a new and more perceptive understanding of one
another's problems.
Id at 308.
1234 (Vol. 29: p. 1221
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 6 [1984], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss6/2
BROAD VIEW OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
interest. Interests can be redefined so that positions can be
more flexible, or so that joint gains, or "integrative bargain-
ing," 36 can take place.
Litigation is not a separate process. It is a means of invoking the
state's power to strengthen the other processes mentioned here. In the
ninety percent of civil lawsuits that are settled rather than going to
trial, the state's power has been invoked in a way that reinforces the
negotiation, mediation or fact finding processes. The filing of a law-
suit changes BATNA's and thus may produce a zone of agreement in
negotiations. Other litigation processes change expectations about
judgments obtainable after trial and thus further influence BATNA's.
For example, conferences presided over by a judge or a subordinate
court official are a form of mediation. 37 Summary trial alternatives
such as Judge Lambros' summary jury trial,38 or the Philadelphia as-
bestos bench trial,39 are forms of factfinding.
2. Courts as Instt'utons for Resolvtg Civil Disputes
Civil disputes are private and could be resolved privately. But
modern states provide institutions for resolving civil disputes. The
paradigm institution is a court. According to several legal philoso-
phers, society provides civil courts to resolve disputes that might
threaten social order if they cannot be resolved privately.4 0 In all of
36. R. WALTON & R. McKERsi, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTI-
ATIONS (1965).
37. For a discussion of the role of judges during the pretrial stage of a lawsuit,
see Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager. The New Role in Guiding a Case/rom
Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981). The author, who is Chief Judge for
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, states that, at
a pretrial conference, he attempts to get the parties to agree on at least some issues.
Id. at 786. He points out that, usually, the issues can be defined and limited in a short
period of time. Id at 787.
38. See Lambros & Shunk, The Summaty Juy Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 43
(1981). In a summary jury trial, the introduction of evidence is limited and witnesses
are not permitted to be present during the proceeding. Id Once the evidence is
presented and the judge provides a brief description of the law, the jury either
presents a consensus verdict or, if no consensus is reached, discloses anonymous indi-
vidual juror views. d The jury's verdict is completely advisory, unless the parties
choose to be bound by the verdict. Id The procedure is intended to give the parties
an insight into how a jury would view the case without the expenditure of time and
money required for a full trial. Id.
39. See Lempert, Philadelphia Court Tries to Expedite Asbestos Litigation, Legal
Times, Apr. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
40. See S. MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1982). In discussing the so-
cial functions of the law, the author notes that society tends to think of courts as
being in the business of settling disputes. Id at 5. He points out that these disputes
may be between private parties, or between a private party and government units or
officials. Id
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the answers suggested by legal philosophers, however, civil courts are
treated as institutions the use of which is optional. There is little basis
- in this part of the literature at least - for any argument that vol-
untary settlement of disputes outside the court system offends any
constitutional rights or public policy.4' Rather, courts are provided
only to handle those disputes that cannot be resolved privately and
therefore threaten social order.
Professor Raz has attempted a general classification of functions
of law that illustrates why courts might be socially desirable. Raz
identifies four primary functions of law: (1) preventing undesirable
behavior and securing desirable behavior, (2) providing facilities for
private arrangements between individuals, (3) providing services and
redistributing goods, and (4) settling unregulated disputes.42 Courts
relate to all four functions.
Raz postulates three types of legal systems, within which courts
would have different roles. Type A provides norms fulfilling all or
some of the first three functions. It does not have norms stipulating
procedures by which disputes can be settled authoritatively, i.e., it
does not have courts. "Such a normative system will guide behavior,
and in doing so will prevent many potential disputes. When a dispute
does arise, reference to the norms will often help in reaching an
agreed solution. ' '43 However, there would be no authoritative way of
deciding the correct solution to disputes governed by the norms of the
system, and there would be disputes which could not be solved by
direct reference to the norms, either because the norms are vague or
because the case is not dealt with by the norms. In other words, the
41. Id Mermin states that many government administrative agencies also par-
ticipate in adjudicative dispute-settling. Id In fact, the author maintains that private
individuals participating in labor and commercial arbitration account for a larger
number of dispute settlements per year than do all of the nation's courts. Id
42. J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 169-721 (1979). Professor Raz suggests
that the law of torts performs the first function of promoting desirable behavior. Id at
169. He suggests that the law of contracts, negotiable instruments, private property,
marriage, corporations and collective bargaining serve the second function, that of
providing for private agreements. Id at 169-70. Regarding the third function, Profes-
sor Raz maintains that the law fulfills it by providing health service, road construc-
tion and maintenance, sewage and rubbish clearing, by subsidizing the arts and
industries, and by paying social security benefits. Id at 171. Regarding the fourth
function, he suggests that the laws regulating the operation of courts, tribunals and
arbitrators fulfill a primary function in that they stipulate procedures for settling
unregulated disputes. Id at 172. He maintains that they also fulfill a secondary func-
tion by providing procedures for settling regulated disputes, i.e., cases where the law
is clear and cannot be altered by the judiciary. Id
43. Id at 173. Professor Raz notes that disputes will always exist that cannot be
settled merely by reference to the norms "either because the case is not dealt with by
the norms as they exist at the time it occurs or because the norms existing at that time
are vague concerning the issue in dispute." Id
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coercive power of the state would not be available to settle private
disputes, and interest disputes would be "unregulated," in the sense
that norms to guide their resolution would not exist.
A system of type B is similar to type A except that it includes
authorities for settling disputes and regulating their operation. A sys-
tem of type B would have courts, albeit with a strictly circumscribed
role.
These authorities, however, have only power to settle ques-
tions of fact and pronounce about the correct application of
existing norms to the case. Faced with cases not governed by
existing norms or cases with regard to which the existing
norms are vague, (i.e., interest disputes), 44 the authorities
will simply decline to make any decisions. 45
A system of type C does not provide any norms guiding the be-
havior of ordinary people and performing any of the the first three
functions. All the norms for this type of system are concerned only
with defining organs for settling disputes and regulating their opera-
tion. Sometimes the norms include norms making it a duty to bring
the disputes before the relevant organs. "When faced with a dispute
the organ may decide it in any way it likes."'46 It does not state the
reasons and is not bound to reach similar decisions in similar cases.
The organs in a type C system clearly would not be adjudicatory in
nature as that term is used by Professor Fuller and in this article. In
this system, there could be no rights disputes, only interest disputes,
but the coercive power of the state would be available to force resolu-
tion of private disputes.4 7
44. See id. Professor Raz uses the term "unregulated" to refer to the type of
disputes referred to as "interest disputes" in this paper. For a discussion of "interest
disputes," see note 19 and accompanying text supra, and notes 102-12 and accompa-
nying text ihfra.
45. J. RAZ, supra note 42, at 173. Professor Raz maintains that a Type B system
has three distinctive qualities. First, a Type B system performs at least some of the
first three social functions of the law. Id Second, it provides for the settlement of
regulated disputes. Id. A third quality of a Type B system, however, is that, like a
Type A system, it does not provide for any means of settling disputes that are not
fully regulated. Id For a discussion of what Professor Raz believes to be the four
social functions of the law, see note 42 and accompanying text supra.
46. J. RAZ, supra note 42, at 174. According to Professor Raz, when a Type C
normative system settles a dispute, it does not articulate its reasons nor is it bound to
reach similar decisions in similar cases. Id.
47. Id. Professor Raz suggests that a Type C system can also be described by
reference to three qualities. First, it does not perform any of the first three social
functions of the law, and does nothing to guide behavior in daily life; nor does it help
prevent potential disputes. Id Second, there are no regulated disputes under it. Id.
Third, it possesses procedures for settling all unregulated disputes. Id
1237
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Professor Raz asserts that real-world legal systems are a combi-
nation of types B and C. They provide for the settlement of both
regulated and unregulated disputes, though there are certain types of
unregulated disputes with which legal systems will refuse to interfere.
"Many legal systems by establishing some principle of stare dectsis
transform automatically every unregulated dispute once it is brought
before the courts into a regulated or at least a partially regulated
one."48 In other words, courts tend to transform interest disputes into
rights disputes.
Dean Hazard suggests that a society which is interested in resolv-
ing private disputes would reject a Type A system since such systems
do not have authorities for settling disputes.49 According to Dean
Hazard, a third party is often necessary to settle a private dispute.
Without such a third party, the disputants often cannot negotiate to a
conclusion. 50
Professor Fuller offers a roughly similar explanation of why a
Type A system would not serve a modern society well.5 1 He maintains
that, although courts may not be necessary to settle disputes in a
small society with relatively simple rules, they are essential in a com-
plex society such as ours.52 Since some means of resolving disputes is
48. Id A significant distinction between a Type C system and a Type B system
is that, in a Type C system, courts can settle unregulated disputes, whereas in a Type
B jurisdiction, courts can only settle regulated disputes, that is, cases where the law is
clear and cannot be altered by the judicial organ. Ad at 173-75. Thus, the difference
between Type B and Type C is that courts have the power to "make law" in a Type
C system, and they do not in a Type B system.
49. See Discussion by Seminar Partiapants, supra note 19, at 331-32 (remarks of G.
Hazard). Dean Hazard provides:
With regard to adjudication, I think the question of compulsory juris-
diction is critical ....
The compulsion comes from some third party, whether it will be mem-
bers of a private association who will use the sanction of expulsion, or the
state using the sheriff's apparatus. The compulsion is exerted because the
dispute has become a matter of third-party concern. The disputants can't
negotiate to a conclusion; unilateral coercion seems unacceptable, at least at
some point; the noise is getting loud; insecurity develops because if people
are simply allowed to walk away from such situations scot-free, it encour-
ages (or is thought to encourage) recklessness; the community is disturbed
and is willing to exert effort to do something about it.
Id
50. Id
51. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 55-56 (1964).
52. Id As Professor Fuller maintains,
It is important to note that a system for governing human conduct by for-
mally enacted rules does not of necessity require courts or any other institu-
tional procedure for deciding disputes about the meaning of rules. In a
small and friendly society, governed by relatively simple rules, such disputes
may not arise. If they do, they may be settled by a voluntary accomodation
of interests. Even if they are not so resolved, a certain number of continuing
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necessary in a complex society, Professor Fuller contends that the
most efficient means of fulfilling this function is through some form of
judicial proceeding. 53
The conclusion that a modern society needs courts to address
some private disputes does not, however, presuppose a particular pro-
cedural system for those courts. Neither does the existence of courts
imply that all private disputes ought to be resolved judicially.
Professor Raz's types B and C system are distinguished according
to whether their state-sponsored tribunals are designed to apply pre-
existing norms to disputes or to deal with disputes on an ad hoc basis,
without reference to pre-existing norms. The adjudicatory court sys-
tems in modern American society are designed primarily to apply
pre-existing norms or rules of decision to disputes brought before
them. In this respect, they represent a system predominantly of type
B. Unregulated, or interest, disputes are handled by a finding that
"no claim upon which relief can be granted" is presented. Some type
C characteristics are present, of course, in that courts have power to
develop new causes of action, and to expand existing ones to encom-
pass previously unregulated disputes. Nevertheless, adjudication is
designed primarily to deal with rights disputes.
controversies on the periphery may not seriously impair the efficacy of the
system as a whole.
I emphasize this point because it is so often taken for granted that
courts are simply a reflection of the fundamental purpose of law, which is
assumed to be that of settling of disputes ....
In a complex and numerous political society courts perform an essen-
tial function.
Id
In contrast, groups of settlers heading toward the American Western Frontier
banded together into communites and adopted "constitutions" and "bylaws" to be
effective for the journey. The laws of these transient communities had certain com-
mon features.
The bylaws of the Green and Jersey Company, for example, provided that
there be a trial at the next camping place whenever a member complained
to the captain that any of the rules or regulations had been violated, or that
any of the company have violated the rules of order, right and justice which
are evidence to all men. Trial by jury was the rule. For certain serious of-
fenses, the penalty was banishment.
D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 67 (1965). Banish-
ment was a serious sanction, given that members of the community depended en-
tirely on the association with each other for physical security during their migration.
53. See L. FULLER, supra note 51. Professor Fuller urges that,
[n]o system of law - whether it be judge-made or legislatively enacted -
can be so perfectly drafted as to leave no room for dispute. When a dispute
arises concerning the meaning of a particular rule, some provision for a
resolution of the dispute is necessary. The most apt way to achieve this
resolution lies in some form of judicial proceeding.
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C. Characteristics of Adidication
The contemporary judicial system is largely adjudicatory; it
functions in order to permit pre-existing rules of decision to be ap-
plied to facts as they are found to exist in the proceeding. The empha-
sis is on procedures that assure accuracy in finding facts. Accuracy is
expensive. For some disputes, improved accuracy is worth higher cost
to the parties or to society. For other disputes the need for factual
accuracy is not so great as to justify the expense of the procedures
designed to secure accuracy. The parties would be willing to accept a
greater risk of an inaccurate decision in exchange for lower cost.
In cases involving interest disputes, suitable pre-existing rules for
decision do not exist, and therefore accuracy is not a goal. The parties
need to be provided a procedure that facilitates development of rules
of decision that meet their needs and that each is willing to accept.
The alternative dispute resolution inquiry should begin at this
point. Assuming that society needs to provide institutions for resolv-
ing private disputes, it still must decide the cost-accuracy tradeoff for
the resolution of major classes of rights disputes, and to provide proce-
dures other than adjudication to assist in resolving interest disputes.
The outer limits of the cost-accuracy tradeoff are defined by the
concept of procedural due process, when the decisionmaking institu-
tion is provided by the state. The United States Supreme Court, in
Mathews v. Eldridge,54 held that procedural due process is flexible, in-
volving a determination of (1) the private interest that is affected by
the legal action, (2) the chance of a mistaken deprivation of such in-
terest through the procedures used, and the potential value, if any, of
additional or different procedural safeguards, and (3) the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the administra-
tive and fiscal burdens that would result from the additional or
different safeguards. 55 In this cost-effectiveness formula, the first two
54. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the respondent Eldridge received cash
benefits under the disability insurance benefits program created by the 1956 amend-
ments to title II of the Social Security Act. Id at 323. In March 1972, Eldridge was
given a questionnaire from the state agency which was monitoring his medical condi-
tion. Id Eldridge filled out the questionnaire, maintaining that his condition had not
improved. Id at 323-24. After obtaining reports from Eldridge's physician and a psy-
chiatric consultant, the state agency informed Eldridge by letter that it had deter-
mined that Eldridge's disability had ceased in May 1972. Id at 324. This
determination was approved by the Social Security Administration (SSA), which
told Eldridge in July that his benefits would terminate after that month. Id
55. Id at 335. In Mathews, the issue was whether the provision of an evidentiary
hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability benefits would
impose too great a burden on the social security system. Id at 347. The Mathews
Court suggested that the most noticeable burden would be the higher costs resulting
from the increased number of hearings and the costs of providing benefits to ineligi-
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criteria relate to effectiveness, and the third relates to cost.
Judge Friendly has offered a menu, from which elements of adju-
dicatory process can be selected: 56
1. An unbiased tribunal.
2. Notice of the proposed action and ground asserted for it.
3. An opportunity to present reasons why the proposed ac-
tion should not be taken.
4. The right to present evidence, including the right to call
witnesses.
5. The right to know opposing evidence.
6. The right to have the decision based only on the evidence
presented.
7. The right to counsel.
8. A requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of the
evidence presented.
9. A requirement that the tribunal prepare written findings
of fact and reasons for its decision.
10. Public attendence.
11. Judicial review.5 7
All of these elements are present in the traditional civil jury trial.
Some are absent or present in weaker form in more simplified proce-
dures.58 Making the cost-effectiveness tradeoff, and selecting among
the items on Judge Friendly's list, are essential parts of making the
choice among rights dispute resolution processes, whether the choice
is made by the parties to the dispute or by designers of new dispute
resolution processes.
D. Dynamics of Party Choice
An intrinsic characteristic of private disputes is that they may be
resolved privately, if neither party wants to participate in the dispute
ble recipients pending decision. Id. As the Court asserted, "the ultimate additional
costs in terms of administrative burden would not be insubstantial." Id. The Mathews
Court concluded that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination
of disability benefits and that the present administrative procedures fully comply
with due process. Id. at 349.
56. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
57. Id. at 1279-94. Judge Friendly notes that the factors which he lists as ele-
ments of a fair hearing are listed in order of priority. Id at 1278. He also suggests that
if an agency goes further than is constitutionally demanded with respect to one fac-
tor, this may provide ample justification for diminishing or even removing another.
Id at 1279.
58. For example, small claims courts and court-annexed arbitration usually dis-
pense with elements eight and nine because of the cost of recording the proceedings
and preparing a transcript, and the cost, in judge time, of written opinions.
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resolution procedures provided by society. Accordingly, if one wishes
to understand the frequency with which the parties will resort to
third-party dispute resolution procedures and when they will aban-
don their disputes or revert to private settlement, one needs to under-
stand the choices available to them. A significant amount of
theoretical literature, and some empirical literature, exists on party
choice.
1. Compel/mg Partzipazon
Some choices may be foreclosed entirely for one or both parties.
A central feature of litigation in the civil courts is that participation
by the defendant is not voluntary. This feature has important impli-
cations for the choices available to the claimant.
Professor Posner contends that, in a purely private system of dis-
pute resolution, the main difficulty is in compelling parties to submit
themselves to the dispute resolution process, particularly when a
party anticipates losing.59 He notes that this is not a problem when a
state is administering the judicial system since the force of the state
can be employed to compel submission. 60 According to Posner, one
sanction that often is successful in a private system of dispute resolu-
tion is expulsion from an organization. 61
During the early development of English civil procedure, ob-
taining participation by the defendant was a major problem. 62 To-
59. See Landes & Posner, Adaicaltwn as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235
(1979); see also Discusstn by Seminar Participants, supra note 19, at 323 (remarks of R.
Posner at the Seminar on Private Alternatives to the Judicial Process). Professor Pos-
ner maintains that judicial services can be provided privately. Id Although there
may be problems, "nonetheless one can conceive of a system at private adjudication."
Id
60. Id According to Richard Posner,
If you look at the dispute-resolution side ofjudicial services - as opposed to
rule making - the main problem is that of getting other parties to submit
themselves to the dispute-resolution process. The party who anticipates los-
ing the case is likely to refuse to submit. Where the state is administering
the judicial system, this is not a problem because the force of the state is
used to compel submission. Under a purely private system, other means of
inducing participation have to be relied on. An important one, both in
primitive society and today, is expulsion from an organization as a sanction.
And that often works.
Id
61. See id.
62. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 383-85 (5th
ed. 1956). Under Anglo-Saxon procedure, the plaintiff was required to make three
demands directly on the defendant for satisfaction as a prerequisite to access to the
courts. In the King's Court after the Norman invasion, the state became involved in
summoning the defendant, but the procedure still was cumbersome. Gradually, out-
lawry and default judgments were developed as penalties to be imposed on defend-
ants who failed to appear. Id
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day, the problem has been resolved in court procedure by the device
of the default judgment, 63 but it remains with respect to private
means of dispute resolution. Most private means of resolving disputes
operate against a backdrop of interdependence between the parties
that militates toward participation by both in resolving the dispute
outside the courts.
The social or economic interdependence between the parties that
makes private dispute resolution possible is illustrated with two exam-
ples, one relating to religious disputes, and one related to family dis-
putes. In religious courts, excommunication is the sanction that
makes it effective, and that sanction represents a serious cost to mem-
bers of the religious group.64
Professor Posner also maintains that the family provides a good
illustration of private adjudication.65 As he points out, family mem-
bers are often compelled to submit to the jurisdiction of the family by
the head of the family. 66 For example, in the modern family, parents
often provide incentives to force their children to resolve disputes. 67
The likelihood that the claimant will be more interested than the
other party in resolving, rather than abandoning, the dispute means
that selection of a dispute resolution process usually is determined in
part by the means available to compel participation by the reluctant
party. Dean Hazard suggests that certain alternatives to adjudication
may avoid this difficulty. Although adjudication may be disagreeable
to one of the parties, Dean Hazard maintains that negotiation can be
voluntary and private and can bring about results catered to the par-
ties' specific needs.68 According to Dean Hazard, another method of
63. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 55.
64. Discussion by Seminar Participants, supra note 19, at 324. Professor Posner also
discusses how private adjudication is compelled in primitive settings. See id In primi-
tive societies, such as the Yurok Indians, Posner notes that there are problems of
submission to the adjudicator, but they are generally solved through the threat of
expulsion, which carries a lot of weight in a primitive setting. See id
65. See id at 336-37. Posner points out that, under Roman law, the head of the
family had the power to order the death of his wife or his children. Id at 337.
66. See id. at 337. As Professor Posner maintains:
There is a good deal of adjudication, resolution of disputes, and laying
down of rules within the family. It is an informal system but it could be
analyzed using essentially the same tools we use. One of the reasons that
you can have feasible adjudication within a family is that there are ele-
ments of compulsion to submit to the jurisdiction of the family. The head of
the family can impose costs on the other party.
Id. at 336-37.
67. Id at 337. According to Professor Posner, "[elven in a modern family, there
are sticks and carrots which the parents can use to force resolution of disputes among
the children." Id at 336-37.
68. See id at 331-32. Regarding the process of negotiation, Dean Hazard opined:
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dispute resolution is coercion, which is used when one party believes
that there is no reason to use persuasion to reach an agreement. 6
9
Coercion as a means of compelling participation requires that inter-
dependence between the parties exist.
In procedures that are adjuncts to court procedures, the defend-
ant is compelled to participate - though not necessarily to accept the
adjunct's result - by legal process and the possibility of a default
judgment or other sanctions imposed by the court. If the case is set-
tled in conciliation, conference or other pretrial proceeding, the settle-
ment agreement frequently is embodied in a consent decree or
judgment, in which case enforcement proceeds just as it would on a
judgment or decree obtained after a traditional trial.
In private procedures, participation is either wholly voluntary or
backed by the possibility of sanctions imposed in a collateral proceed-
ing. The effectiveness of the private procedure may be affected by the
speed and expense of the ultimate sanctions. For example, the Uni-
form Arbitration Act permits summary enforcement, by injunction,
of agreements to arbitrate, and permits summary entry of judgment
on an arbitration award.
2. Values Affectig Choices Among Processes
Once a means is found of compelling participation by the reluc-
tant party, other values affect choice among dispute resolution
Not all forms of dispute resolution in terms of rights involve adjudication.
And it may be helpful to look at the alternatives.
There is . . . negotiation. But negotiation often proceeds more effec-
tively if conducted in a framework involving the possibility of eventual
compulsion. One of the reasons people negotiate is because the alternatives
are frequently disagreeable, and I happen to think adjudication is a very
disagreeable process ....
Negotiation . . . can be private and voluntary in some sense of the
term, and can yield results tailored to the parties' specific needs.
Id at 331.
69. See id at 331. Regarding the method of coercion, Dean Hazard stated:
A second method of dispute resolution is coercion, in which one party
is able to arm himself sufficiently to resist all sorts of intrusions and entreat-
ies. There are many forms of coercion. Repossession is one of them. The
Mafia has other techniques; they have developed a whole system of private
justice that is said to be very efficient.
Indeed, "coercion" can be said to [be] the primal dispute-resolution
technique. It is used when a party sees no reason or hope to use persuasion
or exchange as a basis for concord. And coercion is actually often operative
in resolutions that nominally have been resolved by negotiation. The differ-
ence between coercion and negotiation may be only that in negotiation
both parties think the terms of resolution are substantially fair.
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processes. Professor Carrington begins with three moral premises for
dispute resolution:
1. Coercion by the government should be minimized.
2. Responsibility for the exercise of public power ought to
be diffused as much as possible.
3. All formal procedures are inherently undesirable. 70
These premises lead him to conclude that any procedure that enables
parties to a dispute to work out their own solutions by their own initi-
ative is inherently desirable. 7'
He notes that the least costly dispute resolution mechanism is
simple forbearance by the party who is otherwise aggrieved. 72 Ac-
cording to Carrington, there are some circumstances where the legal
system should encourage people to forebear from suit because there is
no means of dealing with the grievances that is not more burdensome
than the grievance itself.7 3
Professor Carrington also identifies a social value that constrains
the search for litigation alternatives, assuming that forebearance or
abandonment is not appropriate. Systems that follow familiar proce-
dures are seen as more legitimate than entirely new procedures. One
reason that arbitration procedure resembles formal adjudication is
that adjudication is familiar and legitimate, and therefore is a way of
securing mutual understanding between the parties who are agreeing
to the process.7 4
70. See id at 333. With respect to the first moral premise, Professor Carrington
maintains that "[g]overning least is governing best. We ought to use whatever kind of
public power we have as sparingly as possible." d. With respect to the second moral
premise, Carrington asserts that the adjudicative process is best when the person who
is asserting authority speaks for the community generally. See id Regarding the third
moral premise, Carrington suggests that all formal procedure is harmful to the per-
sons who participate in the adjudicative process. See id.
71. See id. According to Carrington, "[p]arty-initiated devices are consensual,
they are less authoritarian, and they are almost certainly cheaper from the point of
view of the kind of pain and waste that is involved in any kind of official process." See
id
72. See id.
73. See id As Carrington asserts:
In some circumstances it is appropriate for the legal system to encourage
people to forbear pursuing any kind of grievance simply because there is no
way to deal with the grievance that is not most burdensome and onerous
and more distasteful than the disappointment that gave rise to the
grievance.
Id
74. Id. at 335. As Carrington reasons, "I suppose you could try to invent an
arbitration process that was radically different from the adjudicative process. But the
effect would be a transaction cost . . . associated with trying to get people to under-
stand what that alternative process was. This would make it much more difficult." Id
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Another fundamental goal affecting choices among alternative
processes is to provide for a way in which interest disputes - the type
described by Professor Raz as "unregulated" 75 - can be resolved
more satisfactorily to the parties than by judicial application of ex-
isting formal norms. This felt need supposes that the parties are better
off if they can make up their own norms in the process of resolving the
dispute as opposed to having an external set of norms imposed on
them. This goal is served by ensuring the availability of nonadjudi-
catory, as well as adjudicatory, processes.
Empirical evidence on the handling of minor personal disputes
shows that citizens tend to avoid the courts. Two possible reasons for
this exist, which relate to the values suggested in this section. The first
reason is that citizens like to avoid involving the government in their
disputes, if possible. This is consistent with Professor Carrington's
premise that government coercion ought to be minimized. The sec-
ond reason is that real-world disputes usually do not fit legal pige-
onholes precisely. Some can be shoe-horned into recognized forms of
action without too much difficulty; these are characterized as rights
disputes. Other cannot be conformed to recognized forms of action at
all; these are characterized as interest disputes. In both cases, how-
ever, some simplification of the real nature of the dispute is required
if it is to be decided by the formal court machinery. Therefore, party
satisfaction is likely to be higher if dispute resolution methods are
available which permit disputes to be addressed and resolved in a
flexible, private manner.
3. Empi'rical Evidence on Disputant Behavior
The limited empirical data on the universe of private disputes
say that only a miniscule portion of such disputes is litigated. A study
of consumer complaints was conducted from 1978 to 1982 in Milwau-
kee, Wisconsin. 76 These complaints were examined to see how the
complainant sought to resolve them. Several different possibilities
were considered, including abandonment of the claim, consultation
75. SeeJ. RAZ, supra note 42, at 174. Raz maintains that, out of the three differ-
ent types of normative systems which he suggests, the Type C system provides a
means of settling unregulated disputes. See id
76. See Ladinsky & Susmilch, supra note 29, at 145. This study involved the 14
dispute processing forums that the authors found in Milwaukee. Id at 163. These
forums are formal entitities that were specifically designed by private and public
agencies to handle consumer problems. Id Each of these forums received consumer
complaints about service and product problems, and they attempted to help the con-
sumer if, after hearing both sides, redress was found to be justified. Id. Table 2 of this
study lists the 14 dispute processing forums found in Milwaukee and provides basic
facts about each. Id. at 164.
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with a "broker" (an individual with perceived expertise), presentation
of the claim to a private forum such as Action Line, and presentation
to a government agency including small claims court and the district
attorney's consumer fraud unit.77
About twenty-three percent of the perceived problems did not
result in claims. 78 Seventy percent of the problems were resolved en-
tirely or partially, 79 but only three percent of the unresolved claims
were presented to third parties for resolution. 0 Of the claims
presented to third parties, most were presented in informal networks
of friends and associates, directly to producers, or to forums such as
insurance companies or the Better Business Bureau.8 ' Very few claim-
ants presented complaints to governmental agencies, and a miniscule
proportion resorted to small claims court.
4. Incentives and Disincentives to Settle
It is well established that fewer than ten percent of the civil law-
suits filed are resolved by a judgment entered after a trial.8 2 Most
lawsuits are settled through negotiation. This fact, combined with the
likelihood that a far greater number of claims are abandoned or re-
solved through negotiation without ever reaching the judicial system,
means that an inquiry into dispute resolution must concentrate on
the incentives to settle claims. Incentives to settle can be understood
best by drawing on analytical models developed in the theoretical
literature.
The underlying premise of virtually all the theoretical models is
Professor Fisher's concept that a rational negotiating position de-
pends upon the "Best Alternative to a Negotiated Settlement"
(BATNA): no party will settle for a figure below his or her BATNA at
any point in time.83
77. Id.
78. Id. at 172. Ladinsky and Susmilch refer to those individuals who do not
make claims despite having valid complaints as "lumpits." Id While Ladinsky and
Susmilch maintain that 23% of all perceived problems are "lumpits," they claim that
the percentage is somewhat lower (18%) for service than for products (25%). Id
79. Id. at 173. Ladinsky and Susmilch estimate that about three-fourths of all
problems lead to claims, and most claims, approximately 70%, lead to partial or full
recovery of what consumers desire. See id
80. Id. Although 70% of all claims lead to some recovery, 27% of all claims are
abandoned. Id Thus, only 3% of all problems are presented to third parties for reso-
lution. Id. at 173-74.
81. Id at 188-91.
82. See H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT (1970). The author notes that 19 out
of 20 bodily injury liability claims are disposed of informally through settlement. See
id. at 136.
83. See R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 21, at 104. The authors note that the
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Lawsuits are filed to change BATNA's. Alternative dispute reso-
lution methods can be evaluated by using the dynamics of a lawsuit
as a baseline. Once one understands how lawsuits change BATNA's,
one can consider how alternative dispute resolution methods change
BATNA's.
Consider the defendant's negotiating position. A necessary conse-
quence of being a defendant is that any negotiated settlement will
impose a cost on the defendant. In other words, the defendant's bene-
fit will be negative. If we assume that the plaintiff is a stranger,84 the
defendant's BATNA when the dispute arises is zero. Therefore a ra-
tional defendant will make no positive offer and there is no zone of
agreement. But if the plaintiff files suit, the defendant's BATNA
changes to a nonzero (minus) quantity. If suit is filed, the plaintiffs
BATNA becomes greater than zero, and the defendant's becomes less
than zero. Thus the plaintiff can control the defendant's BATNA as
well as his own. Whether this change in BATNA's produces a zone of
agreement depends on the components of the respective BATNA's,
and those components are in turn determined by the litigation
process.
If suit is filed, the defendant's changed BATNA can be disaggre-
gated into two components: (1) the economic value of a judgment in
the lawsuit, and (2) the cost of defending the lawsuit. Both compo-
nents have negative value to the defendant.
The plaintiffs perspective is the converse of the defendant's. If he
files suit, his BATNA also may be disaggregated into two major com-
ponents: (1) the economic value of a judgment, and (2) the cost of
litigation. For the plaintiff, the value of the first component is posi-
tive, and the value of the second component is negative.
The economic value of a judgment obtainable in the litigation
can be decomposed into a function of four variables: (1) the expected
value of the judgment, (2) the variance around that expected value,85
(3) the length of time that will elapse before judgment is entered, and
purpose of negotiating is to achieve something better than the results obtainable
without settling. See id Those projected results, the Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Settlement (BATNA), are then measured against any proposed agreement. Id
84. This assumption is necessary because a nonzero BATNA for a potential de-
fendant may result from the costs of breaking off an advantageous commercial rela-
tionship, a strike or lockout, or exclusion from membership in an association. If the
potential defendant is a stranger, these sanctions are not available against him.
85. "Variance" is a measure of uncertainty. For example, if the average jury
verdict for medical malpractice is $100,000, but about as many juries find for the
defendant as award $200,000, the uncertainty about the outcome of a trial is great. In
this case the "expected value" would be $100,000, and the variance would be high. In
contrast, suppose the average verdict is $100,000, as before, but about half the juries
find for the plaintiff in the amount of $90,000, and about half find for the plaintiff in
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(4) a discount factor. In the aggregate, these variables will be referred
to as the "outcome value."
The two components of party BATNA's can be explored by fur-
ther elaboration of the example given above. If a plaintiff is certain of
obtaining a judgment of $10,000 in a trial that will cost $4,000, his
BATNA in settlement negotiations will be $6,000. Of course, in the
real world no claimant is certain of receiving a judgment of any
amount; rather his BATNA is determined by his expectati'ons about the
judgment he will receive if he tries the case. Expectations are inher-
ently uncertain. The availability of ADR processes alter the claim-
ant's BATNA in two possible ways: by changing his expectations
about trial judgment, and/or by changing the costs of obtaining that
judgment.
For example, suppose a claimant thinks he has a ninety percent
chance of obtaining a $10,000 judgment, and a ten percent chance of
obtaining a zero judgment, and that the cost of litigation will be
$4,000 in either event. His BATNA in settlement negotiations will be
$5,000 (.9 times $10,000, minus $4,000). Then suppose he is required
to present his case in a summary jury trial, which results in a verdict
of $8,000. This well may alter his expectations about the judgment
obtainable from a full-blown trial to a ninety percent probability of
obtaining $8,000 and a ten percent probability of obtaining zero. If
his expectations are altered thus, his BATNA will be reduced to
$3,200 by the availability of the summary jury trial procedure. The
effect of an alternative procedure that reduces costs below $4,000 is
more difficult to quantify in simple terms.
Costs of litigation can be decomposed into four variables: (1) the
cost of filing suit, (2) the cost of discovery and other pretrial prepara-
tion, (3) the cost of trial, and (4) any fees imposed by the judicial
system for moving from one step to another in the procedure. In most
cases, the amount of attorney's fees will far exceed any other costs.
The plaintiff has control, at least at the outset of the litigation, over
his own litigation costs. Additionally, he can determine a "floor" for
the defendant's litigation costs.
Filing a lawsuit requires the other party to address the dispute, if
only by filing a responsive pleading. This costs money. Filing also
confronts the other party with the potential costs of obtaining legal
representation and participating in discovery. If the other party is an
institution with substantial resources already committed to handling
litigation, these costs may be small. If the other party is an individual
the amount of $110,000. In this case, the expected value would be the same, but the
variance would be low.
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or an institution with few resources, however, these costs may be sub-
stantial. Accordingly, filing changes the BATNA of the defendant
and therefore may produce a zone of agreement where none existed
before suit. Any litigation alternative must be measured in part by
how effectively it forces the unwilling party to address the dispute.
Once a lawsuit is filed, other litigation initiatives may be under-
taken that further increase the costs to the other side. Probably the
best example is discovery. Certain forms of discovery, such as deposi-
tions, are expensive for both sides. The relative cost burdens of taking
a deposition may be greater for the initiating party than for the oppo-
nent. In contrast, the cost of propounding interrogatories is usually
low, while the cost of answering them may be substantial. The same
cost relationship obtains for production of documents. Therefore,
once litigation has begun, both parties may have a rational incentive
to proceed with certain types of discovery in order to increase the
costs of not settling for the other side. In choosing discovery methods,
they have an incentive to use procedures that have asymmetric costs.
Judicial and nonjudicial pretrial procedures affect more than
costs; they also change the magnitude, and reduce the variance, of
estimates about trial outcome. Understanding the interrelationships
between negotiated resolution of disputes and the availability of dis-
pute resolution institutions of different types requires a deeper under-
standing of two processes: the dynamics of negotiations and the
characteristics of the institutions.
To resume with the quantitative hypothetical, recall that the
plaintiffs BATNA after an advisory verdict had changed from $5,000
to $3,200. Consider the defendant's perspective. The defendant may
have believed at the outset that he enjoyed a fifty percent probability
of a $1,000 award in the plaintiffs favor. If he expected litigation
costs of $500 (much lower than the plaintiffs) his BATNA would
have been $1,000, and he would not have settled for the plaintiff's
BATNA of $5,000. The advisory verdict could change the defendant's
BATNA by changing his expectations about the probable jury ver-
dict, say to the same expectations as the plaintiffs: $7,200. Then, even
if he expects his further litigation costs to remain at $500, his
BATNA will have been changed to $7,700, and he will settle for the
plaintiff's new BATNA of $3,200.
Even if both parties' expectations about trial outcome remain
disparate after the advisory verdict, however, the costs of proceeding
further can produce a zone of agreement. Suppose that the plaintiffs
expectations of the trial outcome are $7,200, as before, and that the
plaintiff expects the costs of further litigation to be $2,000. Suppose
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the defendant's expectations of trial outcome, after receiving the advi-
sory verdict, are $2,500, and that he also expects further litigation
costs of $2,000. The plaintiff's BATNA will be $5,200, and the de-
fendant's BATNA will be $4,500, and there will be no settlement.
Suppose however, that both parties expect further litigation costs of
$3,000. Then the plaintiffs BATNA will be $4,200, and the defend-
ant's BATNA will be $5,500, and there is a zone of agreement. Ac-
cordingly, an alternative dispute resolution procedure can promote
settlement by bringing the parties' estimates of trial outcome some-
what closer together when substantial costs will be incurred by both
parties by litigating further. Generally, it can be shown that a zone of
agreement will exist in this simple model whenever the cost of further
litigation exceeds the difference between the parties' expectations
about trial outcome.
5. Attorney-Cient Differences and Deadlines
Professor Dunlop's article identifies dynamic characteristics of
negotiations, two of which are especially important for exploring
party preferences in relatively simple disputes: the existence of differ-
ences between negotiators and constituents, and the importance of
deadlines. 86
As in the negotiations between representatives of fairly stable or
continuating organizations, discussed by Professor Dunlop, 7 negotia-
tions between attorneys may produce a zone of agreement between
the attorneys but not between their clients because the clients con-
tinue to have substantially different expectations about trial outcome.
The availability of an advisory verdict of some kind may be essential
to close this client-to-client gap and thus permit the attorneys to settle
the dispute on terms which the attorneys agree are reasonable.88
Also, deadlines resulting from an early submission to advisory
forum can stimulate settlement by forcing the parties to evaluate the
strength of their positions.8 9
6. Other Literature on Party Behavior
Gordon Tullock has made a useful conceptual contribution that
aids in understanding these characteristics. He applies the principles
86. See Dunlop, The Negotiations Alternative in Dispute Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REV.
1421 (1984).
87. See id at 1430-44.
88. Id. at 1430-33.
89. Id at 1436-37. For a discussion of the use of early judicial intervention to
promote settlement, see notes 318-26 and accompanying text infra.
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of economic decision theory to a comprehensive model of civil litiga-
tion. In the basic Tullock model, the trial is represented as an imper-
fect random variable that will produce a correct decision with a
probability of less than 100%, as a function of the quality of evidence
presented to it.90
In this model, the plaintiff, viewing the trial ex ante, will settle for
any offer greater than his BATNA determined by the economic gain
from trial (post-trial award less litigation costs), and will go to trial in
the absence of such offer as long as his BATNA is greater than zero. If
the plaintiff's BATNA is zero or negative, as it would be if the eco-
nomic payoff from trial were less than litigation costs, he will aban-
don his claim. The defendant will settle for any figure less than his
expected loss (post-trial award plus litigation costs). The defendant
will defend at trial any case in which the expected loss is less than
simply paying the plaintiffs demand.
The relationship between the parties' expectations about trial
outcome and Tullock's model of the trial can now be explained. The
parties know that trial is an imperfect process, and even if they have
perfect knowledge about the information that would be presented at
trial, they cannot be completely certain about trial outcome. In the
real world, the parties not only face this uncertainty resulting from
imperfections in the trial process, they also lack perfect knowledge
about the information that will be presented at trial. Improving their
knowledge about the information to be presented is, of course, one
motivation for discovery. Under the Tullock model, the settlement
range, and the prospects of trial, thus depend on two institutional
characteristics of the litigation system and two characteristics of the
particular dispute. The two institutional characteristics are (1) cost of
trial, and (2) accuracy of decision making. The two dispute character-
istics are (1) the nature of the available evidence, and (2) the cost of
obtaining better evidence.
Higher trial costs borne by the parties will reduce the number of
cases that go to trial, but will increase social costs. Lower trial costs
will increase the number of cases that go to trial, but will reduce so-
cial costs. Improved evidence, that both parties know about, will re-
duce the chance of a particular case going to trial, because it reduces
party uncertainty about trial outcome. These three variables, accu-
racy, cost and evidence quality, are not independent, however. Im-
90. G. TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL 26 (1980). The author recognizes that dif-
ferent cases have evidence that varies in terms of amount and quality. See id He
maintains that these factors affect the probability of reaching a correct decision. See
Id
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proving the quality of evidence may also increase costs.9 '
Discovery is a good example of a procedural device that affects
more than one variable, but that also increases cost. Informal proce-
dure (for example, relaxation of the hearsay rule) is another good ex-
ample. Presumably this would reduce accuracy, but it also reduces
cost.
Some reasonable assumptions can be made about the nature of
the interdependence among the variables that facilitate a search for
the optimal theoretical combination. One can assume a diminishing
marginal return for investment of additional resources. In other
words, at some point as costs of the trial are increased, for each unit
increase in cost, there will be less than one unit improvement in accu-
racy. Likewise, at some point as costs of discovery are increased, for
each unit increase in cost, there will be less than one unit improve-
ment in evidence quality.
There is therefore always a tradeoff in selecting among processes
for dispute resolution. Accuracy of decision, or of forecasts about the
probable decision, can be purchased only at a price. Cheaper
processes produce less accurate decisions. Cheap final decision
processes may be so inaccurate that they are unacceptable to the par-
ties or to society. Cheap nonbinding decisions, intended to facilitate
settlement by improving a party's ability to project ultimate trial out-
come, may be so inaccurate that they do not promote settlement.
Other commentators have offered basically similar models of the
dispute resolution process.
Professor Landes92 identifies factors that determine the choice
between pretrial settlement and a trial in an economic model of the
criminal justice system. Appendix A of his article extends his model to
civil cases. In this appendix he concludes that the following factors
make settlement likely:
* Both parties have similar expectations about the
probability that the defendant would be found liable at
trial;
* Both parties have similar estimates of damages given that
the defendant is found liable at trial;
* Neither party has a strong preference for risk; and
91. Id at 151-57.
92. See Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971).
Landes maintains that in the criminal justice system, the decision to go to trial de-
pends on the probability of conviction by trial, the severity of the criminal offense,
the availability of the defendant's and prosecutor's resources, the costs of trial as
opposed to settlement, and attitudes toward risk. See id
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* The costs of a trial to the plaintiff and defendant, includ-
ing attorney's fees, court fees, and their own time exceed the
cost of settlement. 93
The following factors make settlement before trial unlikely:
* Dissimilar estimates of liability and damages by the
plaintiff and defendant, if the plaintiff's estimates are
higher;
* Lower risk averseness; and
* Lower court costs relative to settlement costs. 94
Professor Landes concludes that increased costs of access to the
courts would increase the incidence of settlement. He also concludes
that differences in the rate at which the plaintiff and defendant dis-
count future damages awarded at a trial can give rise to different
settlement rates as a function of delay. According to Professor Landes,
the higher the plaintiffs discount rate in relation to the defendant's,
the greater the plaintiff's losses and the smaller the defendant's gains
from an increase in delay.95
Cootner and Marks have developed a theoretical model of bar-
gaining in a litigation context. 96 They predict the effect on the
93. See id. at 101-02. According to the author, the plaintiff will determine a
settlement payment (A) that yields him the same utility as his expected utility at
trial. See id at 101. Xis the minimum sum that the plaintiff will accept to settle. Id If
the payment of X by the defendant yields him a higher utility than his expected
utility from a trial, a settlement will occur. Id The author maintains that this fol-
lows, since one can find a payment somewhat greater than Xthat gives both parties a
higher utility from a settlement than their expected utilities from a trial. See 1d. As
the author points out, factors such as the costs of a trial, including attorney's fees, will
increase the chances of settlement. See id
94. Id at 102.
95. See id at 103. Landes maintains that this, in turn, would decrease the sum
acceptable to the plaintiff by a greater amount than it reduces the defendant's offer,
thus making a settlement more probable. Id
96. See Cooter & Marks, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law.- A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavtor, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). Cooter and Marks describe bargain-
ing in the shadow of the law as a game with the following traits:
(1)There is a dispute between two players, the defendant and plaintiff, over
how to divide the stakes. (2) Bargaining consists in an exchange of demands
and offers for dividing the stakes. (3) Settlement occurs if the plaintiff's de-
mand does not exceed the defendant's offer. (4) Trial occurs if a settlement
is not reached before the trial date. (5) The outcome of a trial is the destruc-
tion of part of the stakes (the surplus) and distribution of the remainder.
Id at 228-29.
See generally Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly
Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982). The author notes that social efforts to
promote or subsidize lawsuits, such as the availability of class actions and the estab-
lishment of small claims courts, are designed to increase private incentives to bring
suit. See id at 339. He also maintains that social efforts to reduce the volume of
lawsuits, including the passage of statutes to circumvent the legal system (i.e., auto-
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probability of settlement of changes in various parameters.
* An increase in the urgency of resolution resulting from a
higher discount rate makes settlement more likely.
* An improvement in only one party's expectation about
trial outcome makes settlement less likely.
* An increase in the transaction costs of continuing the dis-
pute makes settlement more likely.
* An increase in spitefulness toward opponents makes set-
tlement less likely.
* Lower risk aversion makes settlement less likely.
* An increase in the familiarity of the opponents with each
other makes settlement more likely because it reduces
uncertainty.9 7
A recent article by Danzon and Lillard 98 applies three theoreti-
cal models to data on medical malpractice suits in all fifty states. The
key theoretical prediction of their model is that the sample of cases
going to verdict will be a "small atypical group in which the plain-
tiff's overestimate or the defendant's underestimate of the payoff at
verdict is large relative to the costs of litigation." 99 Their data showed
that fifty percent of the cases settled before suit was filed, forty per-
cent settled after suit was filed but before a verdict was reached, and
that less than ten percent of the cases went to verdict.100 Their study
conclusions generally validate the theoretical model of disputant
behavior.
This literature produces no single model of dispute resolution;
mobile no-fault schemes and workers' compensation) reflect the belief that there are
excessive private incentives to bring suit. See id.
97. Cooter & Marks, supra note 96, at 238. According to their first proposition,
Cooter and Marks maintain that a higher discount rate makes a plaintiff more will-
ing to settle, rather than put off resolution of the dispute until trial. See id Thus, he
pursues a more conciliatory strategy, and settlement is more probable. Id As Cooter
and Marks explain, the discount rate refers to the urgency with which the litigant
would like to settle. See id As they illustrate, a divorcing spouse who is eager to re-
marry wants to resolve the dispute quickly, so her discount rate would be high. See id
98. See Danzon & Lillard, Settlement out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malprac-
tice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STU). 345 (1983). In this article, the authors analyzed data
from two surveys of insurance company files closed in 1974 and 1976. See id at 346.
Interestingly, the authors estimate that, on the average, cases settle for 74% of their
potential verdict. See id Moreover, the size of the settlement is usually much closer to
the maximum the defendant would be willing to offer than to the minimum the
plaintiff would settle for. Id.
99. Id at 352.
100. Id. at 365. The authors note that, while the number of cases that go to
verdict represent a small percentage of the total of cases, they are very relevant be-
cause they determine the precedents that guide future settlements and because the
costs of litigation are appreciably higher. See id.
1983-841 1255
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nor does it permit a sufficiently sophisticated set of equations to repre-
sent the tradeoffs involved in party choice. Therefore no useful at-
tempt can be made to propose a rigorous framework for the
quantitative assessment of dispute resolution processes. The theoreti-
cal literature does reveal, however, virtual unanimity on the following
propositions that are useful in evaluating alternative processes.
First, the higher the costs for the next procedural step, the
greater the likelihood of settlement at that point.
Second, the more accurate - and similar - the parties' percep-
tions of the outcome ultimately obtainable from trial, the greater the
chances of settlement.' 0 '
All dispute resolution methods that seek to promote settlement
rather than further litigation can be evaluated according to these two
criteria.
III. INTEREST DISPUTES
Interest disputes are those for which there is no pre-existing rule
or principles by which the dispute can be resolved.' 0 2 Traditionally,
interest disputes have been thought unsuitable for resolution through
litigation.'0 3 Rather, private negotiation or public "negotiation" as a
part of the legislative process were relied upon to deal with these
types of disputes. 0 4 In recent years, however, courts have become in-
creasingly involved in addressing interest disputes. Therefore any in-
quiry into dispute resolution methods that seeks to divert disputes
from the civil trial process must consider certain types of interest
disputes.
Some types of interest disputes have been handled by the courts
101. An important impediment to negotiated settlement may be a difference of
opinion between negotiator and client about what is obtainable. See Dunlop, supra
note 86, at 1430-33. Improving the client's perception by a formal decision or opin-
ion may be useful even if it does no more than validate advice that the negotiator
already has given to his own client. The more official such a decision, the more legiti-
mate, and therefore persuasive, the client is likely to find it. This factor may militate
in favor of advisory opinions even when the negotiators have accurate and similar
perceptions of trial outcomes.
102. See Fuller, supra note 23.
103. The common law avoided interest disputes by concluding that no "cause of
action" was pleaded or proved. See id. at 369. The author maintains that, in order to
bring a dispute before the courts, the litigant must assert some principle upon which
his arguments are based. See id.
104. See Fuller, supra note 35, at 308. The author contends that, while the courts
seek to achieve conformity to norms, mediation is designed to create the norms them-
selves. See id For example, when a mediator assists parties in working out the terms
of a contract by defining their rights and duties toward one another, he is creating
rules by which the parties' conduct will be governed. Id
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because of a failure of other political institutions to deal with them
effectively. School integration disputes are a prominent example.10 5
Other types of interest disputes have been addressed judicially but the
development of alternative institutions better suited for resolving
them suggests that judicial involvement can be lessened. Environmen-
tal disputes are an example.' 0 6 Other interest disputes are handled
almost entirely outside judicial institutions, with the judicial resources
being applied only to ensure the integrity of the nonjudicial institu-
tions developed to handle the underlying disputes. Labor disputes are
the paradigm of this class. 107 A final class of interest disputes are han-
dled in administrative forums, but frequently spill over into the
courts because of imperfections in the administrative institutions to
deal with them effectively. 08
Simple interest disputes, such as Dean Hazard's dispute over
whether to go to a ball game or to watch television, can be resolved
without permanent machinery. More complex interest disputes, in
contrast, require some institutional structure within which certain
prerequisites to dispute resolution must take place. Legislatures pro-
vide one such structure that is relatively well accepted. American la-
bor law, by institutionalizing and channeling the strike and lockout,
provides another such structure that is well accepted by the parties to
collective bargaining. Unfortunately, interest disputes that are not
dealt with by legislatures, and that cannot be dealt with through
105. See Leubsdorf, Completing the Desegregation Remedy, 57 B.U.L. REV. 39 (1977).
The author asserts that, when the courts have only generalized about the evils of
school segregation in their opinions, they have created some uncertainty as to what is
actually condemned by the law. See id. at 40. According to Leubsdorf, "[t]he court
must concern itself not only with objective practices, but also with their probable
impact on the 'hearts and minds' of children and others ... ." Id Since school offi-
cials will often resist desegregation efforts, the remedy must be directly implemented
by the courts. Id
106. See Bacow & Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities:
The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 265, 279-81 (1982). The authors
point out that the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act, in which de-
velopers negotiate with potential host communities, creates a forum for confronting
the concerns of local residents who oppose a proposed hazardous waste facility. See id
at 280. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, §§ 1-19 (West 1981). Since this
process is intended to minimize the harm to the community, to avoid the formation
of adversary relationships, and to increase the public's confidence in the decision, the
authors suggest that "it may indeed be able to eliminate the causes of local opposi-
tion." See Bacow & Milkey, supra, at 280. The authors also note that the Act limits
the ability of local communities to exclude hazardous waste facilities without first
demonstrating how such facilities involve special risks. See id.
107. See Dunlop, supra note 86.
108. See Harter, Negotiatihg Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982).
The author notes that courts frequently revise administrative policies through the
process of judicial review. See id at 58. As a result, the agency cannot be confident
that its views of a particular administrative regulation will prevail. Id.
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traditional collective bargaining, cannot be referred to an institu-
tional mechanism that is at all well suited to dealing with them. The
rulemaking process under the Administrative Procedure Act, and
similar state statutes, provides a starting point for developing such an
institutional mechanism in administrative agencies, but frequently
the disputing parties have escaped this mechanism and gone to the
courts, where they have succeeded to a large degree in forcing the
agencies to engage in adjudication, as though they were confronted
with rights disputes rather than with interest disputes.
Recently, policy makers have come to realize that adjudicatory
models are not well suited for resolving interest disputes, and have
turned their attention to developing other institutional and proce-
dural models. One of the most comprehensive is Phil Harter's regula-
tory negotiations model. 10 9 Other models have been suggested in
connection with environmental disputes."10 Still others, less visible be-
cause they have been developed as adjuncts to court systems at the
local level, have been developed to deal with family disputes. William
Kraut addresses one of these." '
Most of these models concentrate on institutional ways to ensure
the presence of the prerequisites for effective negotiation of interest
disputes: (1) identifying the affected interests, (2) ensuring the ade-
quacy of representation for these interests, (3) enforcing the duty to
bargain in good faith, (4) and defining or limiting the types of pres-
sure the parties may utilize to promote acceptance of their views.
In substance, these are the same issues that are addressed by la-
bor law."12 Efforts to provide effective institutions for resolving inter-
109. See id at 113. See also Harter, Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law: The
Histoy, Needs, and Future of a Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REv. 1393 (1984). As
Philip Harter asserts, "[tihe malaise of administrative law, which has marched stead-
ily toward reliance on the judiciary to settle disputes and away from direct participa-
tion of affected parties, could be countered with a participatory negotiation process.
Regulatory negotiations would provide the legitimacy currently lacking in the regu-
latory process." Harter, supra note 108, at 113.
110. See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 106, at 280. The authors describe how the
Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act not only provides for effective
negotiation between developers and host communities, it requires that deadlocks be-
tween developers and host communities be submitted to an arbitrator. See id See also
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, §§ 12-15 (West 1981).
111. See Kraut, Domestic Relations Advocacy - Is There a Better Alternative?, 29 VILL.
L. REV. 1379 (1984).
112. American labor law identifies the affected interests through the principle of
exclusive representation, combined with government supervised elections of bargain-
ing representatives. It ensures adequacy of representation by permitting lawsuits for
"breach of the duty of fair representation." DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151
(1983). It enforces the duty to bargain in good faith through administrative proceed-
ings. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). It defines and limits the types of economic pres-
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est disputes modelled on collective bargaining also, however, must
seek to replicate the strike or lockout. The theory of negotiations says
that a zone of agreement, and therefore the potential for settlement,
does not exist unless the parties' BATNA's are nonzero. Adjudication
of rights disputes in the civil courts often provides nonzero BATNA's
resulting in a zone of agreeement because of the costs of litigation. In
any event, the traditional adjudicatory means of resolving rights dis-
putes leads to a final decision that will be imposed by the state absent
private agreement. It is more difficult to affect BATNA's or to pro-
vide for a final decision in interest disputes because such disputes, by
definition, cannot be decided by reference to pre-existing principles.
Most labor disputes are resolved because the continuing cost of a
strike or lockout on both sides changes BATNA's until the parties
adjust their position to produce a zone of agreement. Most of the in-
terest dispute resolution machinery developed so far to address nonla-
bor interest disputes depends on the unattractiveness of a resolution
through adjudicatory means to produce a zone of agreement. Thus,
in custody conciliation, for example, the mediator says to the parties:
"If you do not work this out for yourselves, the judge will impose a
solution that neither of you may like." It is appropriate to support
continued efforts to refine these models and to force interest disputes
to be addressed through them rather than through adjudication.
For organizational reasons, this article does not separate dispute
resolution methods suitable for dealing with interest disputes from
adjudicatory methods; rather, the established methods are discussed
according to whether they are private, administrative, or judicial. For
example, coercion, discussed in the private methods section, is used
most frequently in connection with interest disputes in the labor area.
Mediation, utilized privately, administratively and judically, is as
well suited for interest disputes as for rights disputes. The reader
should keep in mind, in reviewing the discussion of each method, the
incongruence between interest disputes and adjudicatory methods.
IV. METHODS FOR RESOLVING RIGHTS DISPUTES
Alternative methods for resolving private rights disputes can be
grouped into three broad categories: those involving private means,
those involving adminstrative agencies, and those involving specific
features of judicial procedure. The following sections consider each
category. Regardless of the category into which it falls, each dispute
resolution method has one or more of the following goals: reduction of
sure that may be exerted by limiting recognitional picketing and secondary pressure.
See id § 158(b)(4),(7).
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cost for producing a binding decision with an acceptable accuracy
level; improving the accuracy of party expectations about trial out-
come at a lower cost than continuing to litigate; or increasing the
costs of continuing the dispute.
A. Private Methods
Certain means of dispute resolution can be utilized completely
outside governmental institutions. Many of these means also can be
utilized as adjuncts to the administrative or judical processes. Their
use as adjuncts is considered separately in Parts IV(B) and IV(C) be-
low. Part IV(A) is limited to purely private processes.
Virtually all dispute resolution procedures that function outside
governmental institutions depend on some kind of social interdepen-
dence between the parties to induce participation. The paradigm is
labor management arbitration, in which the practical ability to inflict
economic injury makes it desirable for the parties to establish their
own institutions to resolve discrete disputes. Analogies exist in the
family, landlord-tenant, and commercial areas.
1. Coercion
The most primitive way of settling civil disputes is through phys-
ical or economic coercion. Putting aside violence and other illegal
methods, several permissible types of coercion exist that make settle-
ment of a dispute likely without resort to the courts: boycotts, self-
help repossession of chattels, distraint, taking children, withholding
payment, and adverse publicity."13
Strikes and lockouts are a special form of boycott that are en-
shrined legally as the underlying method of dispute resolution in la-
bor-managment interest disputes. Section 13 of the National Labor
Relations Act' 14 expressly preserves the right to strike, and the
Supreme Court has said:
[N]egotiation positions are apt to be weak or strong in ac-
cordance with the degree of economic power the parties pos-
sess . . . . [T]he use of economic pressure by the parties to
a labor dispute is not a grudging exception to some policy of
113. See Neely, supra note 1, at 112-24. Filing a lawsuit also has a coercive effect
in bringing about settlement of disputes; this may be the only way for the "weaker"
party to speak on reasonable terms with the more powerful.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982). This section provides: "Nothing in this subchapter,
except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations
or qualifications on that right." Id
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completely academic discussion enjoined by the Act; it is
part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining.' 15
A substantial part of labor law concerns itself with defining the
perimeters of the lawful exercise of the right to strike, to lock out, and
to effect change in terms of employment. For example, economic pres-
sure of this kind is not permitted until an "impasse" has been reached
in negotiations;" 6 strike pressure may not be applied to parties too
remote from the basic dispute;' ' 7 strike pressure may not be exerted
in circumvention of statutory procedures for union recognition;" 8
and strikes may not occur over rights disputes covered by arbitration
procedures in collective bargaining agreements." 9 Strikes as an in-
ducement to settle labor-management disputes are well accepted for
115. NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 489, 495 (1960). Permissible eco-
nomic pressure by an employer was held to include lockout for the sole purpose of
exerting economic pressure on a union after impasse in negotiations. American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965). See also NLRB v. Tomco Communica-
tions, 567 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1978).
116. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5), (b)(3). These provisions require management
and labor, respectively, to bargain collectively. There is a good faith obligation in
collective bargaining. Id § 158(d). Furthermore, a complete refusal to negotiate
over wages, hours and conditions of employment is a violation of § 158(a)(5) even
though such refusal is in good faith. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(1982)).
Engaging in a strike or lockout before an impasse has been held to violate these
obligations under some circumstances. But see Darling & Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 801
(1968), aj'd sub nom. Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (pre-impasse
lockout permitted where employer faced with prospect of "unusual harm"). Cf
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (employers may not make unilateral changes in
terms and conditions of employment until an impasse has been reached).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982) (prohibiting the use of secondary pressure).
118. Id§ 158(b)(7). This section regulates recognition picketing by unions and
prohibits such picketing in three circumstances:
(1) where the NLRB has certified another union;
(2) where a union was rejected by employees in a valid election under
the NLRA within 12 preceding months; or,
(3) where picketing continues without filing a representation petition
"within a reasonable period not to exceed 30 days from commencement of
such picketing."
Id. § 158(b)(7)(A)-(C).
The purpose of § 158(b)(7) is to bar "economic warfare" in representation dis-
putes and to foster the use of the NLRB election processes. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT
ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 230-39 (1976).
119. The Supreme Court recognized that arbitration was a key element in fed-
eral policy for resolving labor disputes in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
398 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970). The Court held that the Norris-La Guardia Act's anti-
injunction provisions concerning strikes do not apply to disputes subject to arbitra-
tion persuant to a collective bargaining agreement. See id at 253. The Court, how-
ever, made it clear that equitable injunctive relief would only be proper if there was
an arbitration agreement covering the particular dispute, the employer was ready to
proceed with arbitration at the time the strike was sought to be enjoined, and all
equitable prerequisites for injunctive relief had been met. See id at 253-54.
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two reasons. First, legal institutions may find it difficult to prevent
strikes at costs acceptable in a democratic society. Second, strikes are
perceived as being reasonably fair ways to resolve disputes between
parties of roughly equal bargaining power.
Strikes promote settlement by reducing the BATNA's of both
sides to a labor dispute. At the risk of oversimplifying things a little,
one can say: "The longer the strike, the lower the BATNA." The em-
ployer's BATNA is reduced because of lost production, leading to
lower revenues; labor's BATNA is reduced because of lost wages.
Anyone who actually has participated in collective bargaining knows
that party positions and priorities change much more substantially in
the face of a strike or strike threat than they do in the face of litiga-
tion over the same type of disputes. Therefore, this form of sanctioned
economic coercion is much more efficient in promoting dispute settle-
ment than any form of civil litigation. There are, however, social
costs. Most legislation curtailing the right to strike is justified on the
grounds that the public cannot afford the inconvenience of work
stoppages.
Another form of private coercion exists in commercial relations.
The buyer of goods frequently has possession of the goods before he
completes his payment obligations. If he is dissatisfied with the goods,
he can exert coercive economic pressure by withholding payment.
The seller has a coercive remedy of his own in some circumstances:
self-help repossession under the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC).12° Section 9-503 of the UCC permits the holder of a security
interest in a chattel to retake the chattel from a defaulting debtor
when such retaking can be accomplished without a "breach of the
peace."' 2 1 In Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, the Supreme Court held in an
analogous situation that self-help enforcement of warehousemen's
liens by public or private sale pursuant to U.C.C. section 7-210 does
not involve sufficient "state action" to trigger procedural due process
protections. 122
The existence of this form of coercion presumably induces settle-
ment of debtor-creditor disputes by raising the potential cost to the
debtor of default, thus lowering the debtor's BATNA. Of course, bar-
gaining power between creditors and debtors frequently is quite une-
qual, and the Supreme Court also has recognized this in imposing
120. U.C.C. § 9-503, 3A U.L.A. 211 (1981). Section 9-503 only applies to se-
cured creditors under Article 9 of the U.C.C. Id
121. See id.
122. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). The Court stated that there was no allegation of offi-
cial action in the complaint, thus distinguishing Flagg Brothers from the line of cases
following Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 436 U.S. at 157.
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due process protections where repossession is effected with the aid of
judicial process.' 23 The creditor is not permitted to use the state to
buttress his power to exercise self-help repossession even without the
aid of judicial process.' 24
Another traditional form of private coercion, disfavored in re-
cent years, is the right of a landlord to "distrain" a tenant's chattels as
a remedy for nonpayment of rent.' 25 The distress process promotes
settlement by reducing the tenant's BATNA.
Until recently, parent-initiated child abductions were a fre-
quently used means of coercion in family disputes. In 1977, it was
estimated that the number of such abductions ranged between 25,000
and 100,000 per year.' 26
Other forms of coercion exist but receive less attention because
they are not uniform from one jurisdiction to another. For example,
the Virginia General Assembly recently authorized merchants to
"boot" cars improperly parked in their parking lots.' 27 The effect of
123. See North Ga. Finishing v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
124. See, e.g., Stone Mach. Co. v. Kessler, I Wash. App. 750, 463 P.2d 651 (1970)
(when sheriff accompanied creditor and debtor protested repossession, a "breach of
the peace" occurred in violation of UCC § 9-503).
125. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord & Tenant §§ 726-760 (1970) (summarizing
right and opining that it is being limited in most jurisdictions). The Uniform Resi-
dential Landlord and Tenant Act abolishes distraint for rent. See UNIF. RESIDEN-
TIAL LANDLORD & TENANT AcT § 4.205(b), 7A U.L.A. 499, 552 (1978). Some courts
have held that distraint is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Holt v. Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2
(W.D. Ky. 197 1) (sections of state statute which permitted landlords to seize and sell
a tenant's property under a distress warrant without an opportunity for tenant to be
heard violated federal constitutional due process); Blocker v. Blackburn, 228 Ga. 285,
185 S.E.2d 56 (1971) (seizure of household furniture pursuant to distress warrant
proceeding without any prior notice or hearing requirements violated due process);
Phillips v. Guin & Hunt, Inc., 344 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1977). In Phillips, sections of a
state statute permitting distress on rent default were held to be violative of constitu-
tional due process in that they failed to provide for a prompt hearing prior to seizure
of property, and failed to require issuance of a distress writ by a judicial officer or by
a clerk who independently determines if the statute was complied with. Id. at 572.
It is significant that the Florida statute did provide some due process protection
by requiring the posting of a distress bond of twice the value of claimed property. Id
at 570.
126. See E. BERTIN, PENNSYLVANIA CHILD CUSTODY § 1.9, at 115 (1983). In
1977, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act was promulgated, providing legal
sanctions for this form of coercion. Id, at 116. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5341-5366 (Purdon 1981).
127. VA. CODE § 46.1-551 (1983). The statute provides for "booting" of tres-
passing vehicles as an alternative to towing. See id A "boot" is a device which immo-
bilizes a vehicle by locking a wheel and preventing its turning; the fee for removal of
the boot cannot exceed $25. Id.
Another obvious example of private coercion is a shutoff of utility services by the
supplier when the consumer fails or refuses to pay his or her bill. Another, more
personal example, is the time a commuter air carrier tried to refuse me boarding after
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such measures to increase the bargaining power of the merchants so
authorized is obvious.
Publicity is another form of coercion that may be effective
against retailers, service establishments, and producers of consumer
products. Publicity is not unrelated to the boycott, since the disputant
who publicizes her dispute hopes the publicity will stimulate a boy-
cott, and the target of the publicity fears that a boycott - or at least
the same sort of economic injury - will result from the publicity.
The forms of publicity that may induce settlement of a dispute are
infinite in number, limited only by the consumer imagination and
access to the media. One institutional mechanism for applying the
publicity sanction is the "Action Line" in the local newspaper, or a
similar service sponsered by television or radio stations. The litera-
ture on dispute resolution unfortunately has paid little attention to
the functioning of such processes. One exception is a recent paper
presented by Ms. Amy Shapiro, of the Rocky Mountain News.' 28 She
estimated that about 250 newspapers and radio or television stations
have such a service.' 29
Action Lines promote settlements because the possibility of unfa-
vorable - or favorable - publicity changes the BATNA's of provid-
ers of goods and services. 130 Procedurally, Ms. Shapiro forwards
consumer correspondence to the affected business, requesting a re-
sponse within fourteen days. 13' A follow-up letter is sent if necessary,
suggesting that government agencies will be contacted or that legal
I had been checked in and given a boarding card. The carrier erroneously had
boarded too many standbys. I refused to get off the airplane until the carrier either
(1) summoned the police, or (2) offloaded one of the standbys. A standby was
offloaded.
128. See Shapiro, Actton Lines, in ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EXPLORING THE ALTER-
NATIVES 509 (1983).
129. Id
130. Id at 510. An Action Line also may promote settlement by reducing the
transaction cost of negotiations for the consumer. Action Lines reduce this transac-
tion cost by performing a free brokerage service, one of the functions of mediation.
The apparent power of the adverse publicity threat makes it more appropriate to
classify Action Line as a coercive rather than a private mediatory process.
131. Id at 514. The letter reads:
Action Line, the reader service column of the Rocky Mountain News in
Denver, Colorado, has received the enclosed letter and/or documents.
Could you please give this matter every consideration? Although we are
unable to verify every statement made in every one of the letters we receive,
we believe that the fact that our reader was concerned enough to write us
should merit your attention.
We would appreciate your speedy action. If you correspond directly with
our reader, please send us a copy. Because of our time constraints, we must
request a response within 14 days.
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remedies will be recommended to the consumer if a reply is not forth-
coming. 32 Ms. Shapiro's Action Line does not attempt to evaluate
the merits of a claim but, as she tells the business, "we believe that the
fact that our reader was concerned enough to write us should merit
your attention."' 33
Her service pursues almost every complaint until the matter is
resolved.' 34 When the file is returned to the reader, information on
how to sue in small claims court is provided, if that seems
appropriate. 3 5
The availability of coercive action, or its actual use, creates a
potential zone of agreement in negotiations between the parties. Co-
ercion either increases the BATNA of the actor, as in the case of a
purchaser of goods who withholds payment, or reduces the BATNA
of his opponent, as in the case of the owner of an illegally parked car
that is booted.
Thank you for your help. It helps us better serve the needs of our nearly
one-half million readers.
Sincerely,
Amy Shapiro
Action Line
Rocky Mountain News
Box 719
Denver, Colorado 80201
(303) 892-5000 x420
enclosures (s)
As/sh
Id
132. Id. at 515. The follow-up letter reads:
We contacted you on - regarding the enclosed inquiry received by
Action Line, the reader service column of the Rocky Mountain News. Our
files indicate that you did not respond. If your answer was somehow mis-
placed, could you please send us another copy?
If you haven't responded, we would still appreciate hearing from you. How-
ever, if we do not receive a reply within 10 business days of this letter, we
will assume that you are not interested in trying to resolve this matter. We
will then take other action, such as contacting government authorities and
recommending that our reader seek legal remedies.
Thank you for your cooperation. We look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Amy Shapiro
Action Line
Rocky Mountain News
P.O. Box 719
Denver, CO 80201
(303) 892-5000 x420
enclosures
As/sh
Id
133. Id at 514.
134. Id. at 511.
135. Id
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2. Private Arbitration
Private arbitration is a matter of contract. In this form, arbitra-
tion is not strictly private; its efficacy depends on whether courts will
enforce arbitration agreements and whether they will honor arbitra-
tion awards once they have been issued. 136 After early development,
essentially as an adjunct to equity in England in the seventeenth cen-
tury, 137 private arbitration went through a period in which it was
disfavored by the courts.' 38 Early in the twentieth century, however,
Congress, 139 then state legislatures, 40 enacted statutes establishing a
presumption in favor of arbitration. Currently, about twenty-six
states have enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act.141 This statute
makes arbitration agreements specifically enforceable,' 42 and ensures
that arbitration awards are subjected to only limited review.' 43
In Southland Corp. v. Keatzt'g,14 4 the Supreme Court held that a
state statute which invalidates private arbitration agreements violates
the supremacy clause of the federal constitution. 145 The Court found
136. See Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984). In Faherty, the
New Jersey Supreme Court decided that arbitration clauses in marital separation
agreements are enforceable. After an arbitration award was entered under such a
clause, the husband claimed that the courts should not defer to arbitration involving
marital disputes. The court had little difficulty in concluding that agreements to ar-
bitrate alimony disputes should be enforced. Id at 108, 477 A.2d at 1261. It had more
difficulty with the portion of the agreement that referred disputes over child support
and custody to arbitration, because of the strong public policy in favor of courts
retaining their role with respect to the parenspatriae doctrine. This doctrine says that
children's maintenance, custody-visitation, and overall best interests should be sub-
ject to the close scrutiny and supervision of the courts despite any agreements to the
contrary. Id at 111, 477 A.2d at 1262. Nevertheless, it permitted arbitration of these
child-related disputes also, subject to "special" judicial review. Id at 111, 477 A.2d at
1263.
137. See H. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.1 (1984).
138. See id See also Note, Commercial Arbitration in the Eighteenth Centul." Searching
for the Transformation in Amencan Law, 93 YALE L.J. 135 (1983) (questioning conven-
tional wisdom about the reasons for the decline of commercial arbitration in 18th
century New York).
139. See United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See also Nuclear
Installment Servs. Co. v. Nuclear Servs. Corp., 468 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(doubts resolved in favor of arbitration); Consumer Concept, Inc. v. Mego Corp., 458
F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (doubts as to parties' intent are to be resolved in favor
of arbitration); De Mart v. Moore, 425 F. Supp. 55 (D. Fla. 1976) (federal courts to
construe arbitration clauses liberally).
140. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (1956).
141. UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1978). See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7301-7320 (Purdon 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (1974);
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. R. §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980).
142. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 2, 7 U.L.A. 1, 23 (1978).
143. The Act provides five limited bases for judicial vacation of an arbitration
award. See id § 12, 7 U.L.A. at 55.
144. 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
145. Id at 858. To be covered by the federal act, the Court found only that the
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that Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration. 146
Labor arbitration is the most prominent form of private arbitra-
tion. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,147 as in-
terpreted in the "Steelworkers' Trilogy,"'' 48 ensures that arbitration
provisions obtained in collective bargaining agreements are honored
by federal and state courts. 149 It has been estimated that some ninety-
five percent of collective bargaining agreements contain arbitration
provisions. 50
Private arbitration is also used extensively in certain types of
commercial contracts, especially those involving international trade
and building construction. The use of private arbitration more gener-
ally as an alternative for civil litigation has been popularized by the
"rent-a-judge" program, which began in California in 1976. 15 This
program involves an agreement between the parties to a lawsuit to
refer the case to a retired judge for arbitration, under the 1872 Cali-
arbitration agreement must be part of a contract "evidencing a transaction involving
commerce." Id (footnote omitted).
146. Id
147. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). This section confers jurisdiction on federal courts
to resolve labor disputes, as well as authority to "fashion a body of federal law for the
enforcement of. . .collective bargaining agreements and includes within that fed-
eral law specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bar-
gaining agreements." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
Section 185 was held by the Court to reject the common law rule against enforcing
arbitration agreements. Id. at 456. Federal law is to be developed from the "policy of
our national labor laws."
148. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In this trilogy, the
Supreme Court fashioned significant law under § 185. In American Manufacturing, the
Court held that a court's role in suits to compel arbitration pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement is confined to determining whether the dispute falls under the
arbitration clause; it is not to adjudicate the merits or equities of a particular griev-
ance. 363 U.S. at 568. In Warrior & Gulf, the Court held that arbitration clauses are
to be construed liberally to encompass disputes unless "the most forceful evidence of
a purpose to exclude claim from arbitration" is present, all doubts being resolved in
favor of arbitration. 363 U.S. at 584-85. Finally, in Enterprise Wheel & Car, the Court
held that the arbitrator and not the court is to interpret the collective bargaining
agreement; and the arbitrator's construction is not to be overruled. 363 U.S. at 599.
149. See Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (state courts obligated to
apply federal common law).
150. See P. PRASOW & E. PETERS, ARBITRATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(1983).
151. See Christensen, supra note 5, at 80.
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fornia "general reference" statute. 52 The statute says nothing about
the identity or qualifications of the arbitrator, but the parties have
elected to utilize retired judges because of their judicial skills and pos-
sible expertise in the subject matter of cases referred to them.153 These
special characteristics increase the acceptability of the arbitral process
as a substitute for the judicial process because it permits realizing
some of the benefits of both. 154 The program has been subjected to
criticism, much of which is based on unfamiliarity with the arbitra-
tion process. ' 55
Other, court sponsored, programs essentially put a gloss on pri-
vate arbitration which already is permitted under general arbitration
statutes. The District of Columbia Superior Court "voluntary arbitra-
tion" program is an example. 56 Such programs add little legal au-
thority to the authority contained in the Uniform Arbitration Act,
but have the advantage of making appropriate segments of the bar
more aware of the private arbitration alternative and coordinating
arbitration agreements with trial court calendar management. 57
Recently, private organizations, led by the American Arbitration
Association (AAA),' 5 8 have promoted private arbitration agressively.
152. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 638-645 (West 1976 & Supp. 1981). See generally
Christensen, supra note 5, at 79-80.
153. Christensen, supra note 5, at 81.
154. Id
155. For an example of criticism of the "rent-a-judge" program, see Note, The
Califoria Rent-a-Judge Experiment. Constitutional and Policy Considerations of Pay-As- You-Go
Courts, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1592 (1981). The note compares the California-type pro-
gram with arbitration, citing articles and some older case law recognizing a distinc-
tion between reference and arbitration. See also Carpenter v. Boomer, 54 N.J. Super.
157, 165-68, 148 A.2d 497, 501-03 (1959); 5 AM. JUR. Arbitration andAward§ 4 (1962).
Reference is essentially a form of arbitration which is distinctly judicial in nature,
though there are minor distinctions between reference and arbitration. See Note,
supra, at 1600, 1610-13. The note finds an attractive advantage in the appealability
of referee decisions. Id at 1600. The note's author, however, fails to realize that arbi-
tration is a contractual solution to disputes and the contract may very well include a
provision on reviewability.
The note also proffers constitutional issues raised by the California program,
including a possibility that a not-yet-recognized fifth amendment right to attend civil
trials might be violated by the program. d at 1610. The note fails, however, to
relate this proffered right to the fact that dispute resolution in 90% of the civil cases
that do not go to trial is entirely private.
156. See D.C. SUPER. CT. Civ. ARB. R.
157. See, e.g., D.C. SUPER. CT. Civ. ARB. R. 2(a). This rule provides that the
clerk shall provide the plaintiff with a form explaining the arbitration program and
permitting election of the program. See also D.C. SUPER. CT. Civ. ARB. R. 7, 10.
These rules permit entry ofjudgment on an award or trial de novo without the neces-
sity of commencing a new action.
158. Lucius Root Eastman, a prominent advocate for the AAA, stated the
group's philosophy:
I think voluntary arbitration is to all of us less of a procedure than it is a
[Vol. 29: p. 12211268
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Private arbitration settles disputes by a binding decision theoretically
obtainable at lower cost than a judicial decision on the same dispute.
It functions best, and perhaps only, when the parties are in a position
of interdependence that makes both willing to participate in the arbi-
tration process. In the absence of such interdependence, arbitration,
even if it has been agreed to beforehand, is likely to require resort to
litigation to compel participation. Even where judicial compulsion is
necessary, however, arbitration still promises a decision of acceptable
accuracy at lower cost than a judicial decision after a traditional trial.
Some doubts about cost advantages may be appropriate, how-
ever. Kritzer and Anderson compared analysis of case processing
time, method of disposition, and cost in AAA arbitration, compared
with the courts. 159 They conclude: "(1) that AAA cases are generally
processed more quickly than court cases, 16° (2) that AAA cases are
more likely to be 'decided' (rather than settled),' 6 ' and (3) that AAA
processing is not necessarily less costly than court processing."' 162
symbol of the peace on earth and goodwill toward men which exists in the
hearts of all Americans in this great struggle for freedom which now encom-
passes the world. Many of us believe that in arbitration we have a concept
that stands out in opposition to war. We believe that a science of arbitration
can be equally well organized and intelligently administered and that
under the banner of arbitration the scattered forces of those who strive for
peace can be united. But to be effective, the concept of voluntary arbitra-
tion must be vitalized. We must organize it scientifically. We must through
education and actual performance bring its potential values home to every
American and through him to the world of which he is becoming so large a
part.
Eastman, Dedication to AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ARBITRATION BIBLI-
OGRAPHY (1954).
The AAA is also actively engaged in encouraging arbitration to resolve interna-
tional disputes. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, NEW STRATEGIES FOR
PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DisPuTEs (1971).
159. Kritzer & Anderson, The Arbitration Altemative." A Comparative Analysis of Case
Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the
Courts, 8 JUST. Sys. J. 6 (1983). Their analysis utlized data from 1500 court cases in
state and federal courts in five federal judicial districts and from 147 AAA cases in
the same geographic area. id. at 8.
160. In three districts (South Carolina, New Mexico, and Central California),
the AAA was faster. In one district (Pennsylvania), the AAA and the federal courts
showed similar case processing times. In one district (Wisconsin), the AAA was faster
for contract cases but slower for tort cases. Id at 14.
161. Only about five percent of court cases are fully adjudicated, compared
with over 50 percent of AAA arbitration cases. Id. at 11. This finding suggests that
arbitration is less effective than traditional litigation in inducing negotiated settle-
ment. This would be expected if it cost less than traditional litigation. In addition,
the parties to an arbitration agreement can tailor the procedures and the rules of
decision to the types of disputes they anticipate, thus making an arbitration award
more satisfactory than a court judgment. The greater likelihood of an arbitration
award that both parties can live with also reduces the incentives for negotiated
settlement.
162. Id at 6. The study measured costs according to attorney fees. AAA arbitra-
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Legislatures may be reluctant, however, to make all agreements
to refer disputes to arbitration enforceable. Enforcement of such
agreements may be appropriate for commercial disputes, but it may
lead to overreaching by businesses who force consumers to sign form
contracts. 163
3. Fact Fhdihg
Private fact finding is less common than other private methods of
dispute resolution. Some corporations have experimented in recent
years with a form of private fact finding called the "mini-trial."'1 64
Those involved claim generally good results.
A fact finding procedure has the intended effect of improving the
accuracy of party projections of litigation outcome. It has two advan-
tages over discovery procedures in litigation in accomplishing this
goal. It usually can be accomplished at lower cost and it focuses on
the total outcome, while discovery procedures are disaggregated and
thus provide less guidance as to the probable trial outcome.
4. Mediation and Conciliation
Mediation is perceived as superior to traditional adjudication for
two reasons. It can result in settlement at less social cost than adjudi-
cation. 165 It also permits the parties to decide their dispute according
to rules closely tailored to their needs. 166 Adjudication, in contrast,
tion was least expensive for small cases (averaging about $500 per case), and most
expensive for larger cases. Federal court is least expensive in the $5,000-$ 10,000 range
(averaging about $1,500 per case), and state court was least expensive for cases over
$10,000 (ranging from $2,000 to $4,000 per case). Id at 17-18.
163. See R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 116. Justice Neely prefers the West Virginia
approach, which excludes consumer arbitration from the general enforceability pro-
visions. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984), raises doubts about the
constitutionality of such a state prohibition of arbitration. In his concurring opinion
in that case, Justice Stevens expressed concern that the case would foreclose reason-
able state efforts to limit the effect of arbitration agreements where one party to the
agreement possessed little bargaining power. Id at 863 (Stevens, J., concurring). This
was the rationale for West Virginia's exclusion of consumer form contract arbitration
clauses from enforceability. See R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 116. The majority opinion,
however, would permit traditional equitable or legal defenses to the enforcement of
arbitration agreements, though it suggests that these defenses be considered initially
by the arbitrator. See 104 S. Ct. at 858.
164. See CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, CORPORATE DISPUTES, MANAGE-
MENT MH-7 (Mini-Trial Handbook)(1982).
165. Abraham Lincoln perceived this when he stated: "Discourage litigation.
Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how
the nominal winner is often a real loser - in fees, expenses and waste of time." See R.
COULSON, How TO STAY OUT OF COURT 13 (1968); see also id. at 15-30 (discussing
the "secret costs" of litigation).
166. See C. UPDEGRAFF & W. McCoy, ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 15-
19 (1961).
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results in a decision according to predispute rules of decision framed
to meet societal needs in general. As noted earlier, mediation there-
fore is better suited than any kind of adjudication, private, judicial or
administrative, to the resolution of interests disputes.
Long before alternative dispute resolution became fashionable,
mediation was practiced in civil dispute resolution. 167 Usually this
form of mediation occurred in conjunction with litigation, usually as
part of pretrial conferences presided over by a judge or subordinate
court official.' 68 Other forms of mediation also have been used for a
long time, but less visibly and less formally. The Milwaukee consumer
dispute study makes this clear. 169 Mediation in conjunction with
court proceedings will be discussed in the next part; this discussion
will focus on purely private mediation. This is a matter of growing
interest because of the realization that attorneys can function as
mediators in certain types of disputes as well as advocates for only one
side. 170
Some of the same limitations on negotiation as a dispute resolu-
tion technique apply to mediation.' 7' This is not surprising since me-
diation is no more than negotiation augmented with the assistance of
a third party. The most basic limitation is lack of inducement for the
opposing parties to participate. 72 As a starting point, one can postu-
late that the parties will not take part unless there is some form of
coercion or state power that can be brought to bear. 73 Using differ-
ent nomenclature, a party will not participate in mediation unless it
improves his BATNA.174 It is easy to identify certain types of dis-
putes, where the state's power has not yet been invoked, in which this
criterion is met. In labor-management disputes, the alternative to a
mediated settlement is a strike or lockout, with the economic costs on
both sides that this may entail.175 In family disputes, there is the emo-
tional and economic harm that will result from a breakup of the mar-
riage.' 76 Even if the marital relation is dissolved, an incentive to
167. See Kraut, supra note 111, at 1380-81.
168. See notes 314-43 and accompanying text ihfra.
169. See notes 76-81 and accompanying text supra.
170. See Kraut, supra note 111, at 1382-86.
171. See notes 105-13 and accompanying text supra.
172. See A.B.A. SPECIAl. COMMITTEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 31,
at 33-37 (remarks of lawyer-mediator Joel Edelman). For a discussion of coercion as
a factor in negotiation, see notes 113-35 and accompanying text supra.
173. See generally P. HERMAN, BETTER SETTLEMENTS THROUGH LEVERAGE
(1965).
174. Id. See also notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra.
175. See notes 114-19 and accompanying text supra.
176. See Kraut, supra note 111, at 1386-90.
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mediate over child custody and child-rearing issues remains because
the parties must deal with each other until the children are grown. 177
In certain commercial disputes, continuation of the relation between
the disputing parties is desirable economically to both, and thus they
have an incentive to mediate. In other types of disputes, it is difficult
to see what factors would induce the parties to participate in media-
tion outside the court system. Usually, some form of state intervention
is necessary to create a BATNA for the resisting party that is not
superior to a mediated solution. However, there are underway several
"neighborhood justice center" experiments that rely on mediation to
solve disputes. Mr. Wahrhaftig's article identifies some of the social
and psychological factors that may promote use of such centers. Data
from these experiments should assist in evaluating the necessity of
state intervention. 178
B. Administrative Methods
A host of adminsitrative agencies at the federal and state levels
make rules and adjudicate individual cases. For purposes of this pa-
per, a distinction should be drawn between administrative agencies
that handle claims related to benefits or rights created by the legisla-
ture, and administrative agencies that handle claims related to com-
mon law rights.1 7 9 Only the latter type of agency is of interest in
connection with resolution of private disputes.
The principal feature distinguishing the handling of private dis-
putes by administrative agencies from the handling of the same dis-
putes in the common law courts is that the state provides the
resources for fact investigation, witnesses, and litigation in the admin-
istrative forum. In judicial forums, the parties bear the costs of these
activities.
Beyond that distinction, administrative methods of dispute reso-
lution are as varied as private methods or judicial methods. Some
administrative arrangements, such as those employed for workers'
compensation claims, are adjudicatory. Others, such as those em-
ployed for railroad employee grievances, are arbitral. Still others,
such as the ones employed for race and age discrimination, are
mediatory.
177. Id.
178. See Wahrhaftig, Nonprofessional Conflict Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REv. 1463
(1984). See generall R. ToMASIC & M. FEELEY, supra note 3.
179. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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1. Administrative Adjudication. Workers' Compensation
The best known schemes of administrative adjudication arise
from workers' compensation statutes, including the federal Black
Lung Benefits Act.' 80 In the typical state workers' compensation sys-
tem,"'" an injured employee files a claim initially with his employer
or its insurance carrier.' 82 If the claim is denied, the employee then
files with a state agency. ' 8 3 The agency typically refers the claim to a
referee, who makes a decision through an adjudicatory process.' 8 4 Ap-
peals are permitted to an administrative board,' 85 and ultimately to
the courts. 186
In black lung cases, the disabled worker applies to the appropri-
ate agency18 7 for benefits, alleging disability caused by inhalation of
coal dust. The agency, following certain statutory presumptions,' 88
awards or disallows benefits. If the applicant is dissatisfied with the
outcome, he may appeal the decision to a court, which is restricted in
its review to finding whether there is substantial evidence for the
determination. 189
180. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1982)
181. For a detailed description of the philosophy and mechanics of state
workers' compensation laws, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 80, at 530-34 (4th ed. 1971); Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensaion,
37 CORNELL L. REV. 206 (1952).
182. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-296 (West 1958 & Supp. 1984) (vol-
untary agreements).
183. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-297 (West 1958 & Supp. 1984); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 711, 751 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1984).
184. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-298 (West 1958) (provides for hear-
ing before "commissioner" who is not bound by common law or statutory rules of
evidence, but is to "make inquiry in such manner.., as is best calculated to ascer-
tain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out justly the spirit of this chap-
ter"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 710, 711, 751 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1984) (referral
to referees).
185. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 851-856 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1984).
186. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 871 (Purdon & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-301 (West 1958 & Supp. 1984). The Connecticut statute also pro-
vides for reservation of certain cases for the state supreme court. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-324 (West 1958 & Supp. 1984).
187. The federal statute requires the Secretary of Labor to set up offices and
procedures to process claims in states which inadequately compensate black lung-
disabled workers. Otherwise, on and after January 1, 1974, claims are to be made
pursuant to the applicable state workmen's compensation law. 30 U.S.C. § 931
(1982). Consequently, both state agencies and Labor Department offices process
claims.
188. See 30 U.S.C. § 92 1(c) (1982). The rebuttable presumptions listed in
§ 921 (c) are based on duration of employment in "one or more coal mines" for peri-
ods of 10, 15, or 25 years. Section 921(c) is favorable to the ailing worker in presum-
ing his disease arose at his places of work and that his death was due to Black Lung
Disease. Id For a more detailed listing of presumptions, see 1.
189. See Parker v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 590
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The Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act ' 90 and Federal Employees' Compensation Acts' 9 ' create sim-
ilar systems. These systems replace the common law system where, in
theory, the disabled worker would file a tort claim against the em-
ployer and win or lose as the evidence and tactics permitted. In prac-
tice, coal miners would never be able to prove disability caused by
inhalation of dust, 192 and the transaction costs effectively precluded
such suits. 193
Several statutes essentially eliminate certain issues as the source
of dispute, and refer disputes over other issues to administrative or
arbitral forums. No-fault automobile insurance laws require motor-
ists to carry a minimal amount of insurance to protect themselves in
case of an accident, and bar plaintiffs with claims below a set statu-
tory amount from suing. Dispute resolution techniques range from
adjudicatory 194 to arbitral.195 In major respects, no-fault auto statutes
address dispute resolution by removing fault as a source of dispute. 196
F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1979) (hearing officer's finding that a compensable respiratory
impairment arose out of coal mine employment was held conclusive where supported
by substantial evidence; a court's determination of whether substantial evidence ex-
ists is to be based on the record as a whole); see also Prater v. Harris, 620 F.2d 1074
(4th Cir. 1980). In Prater, a hearing officer's finding that plaintiff was not suffering
from Black Lung Disease was carefully reviewed by the court. Id at 1077-80. How-
ever, the court concluded its role was to determine "whether there is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id at 1084 (quoting
Vintson v. Califano, 592 F.2d 1353, 1357-58 (5th Cir. 1979)) (emphasis supplied by
Prater court).
190. 33 U.S.C. § 901; 42 U.S.C. § 1651; 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). The law is
administered by the Office of Workers' Compensation of the United States Depart-
ment of Labor, through deputy commissioners appointed to 16 compensation dis-
tricts. Dispute claims are adjudicated by administrative law judges. The decisions of
administrative law judges are subject to appeal to the Benefits Review Board in the
Department of Labor and ultimately to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
191. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8151 (1982).
192. Even after an extensive benefits program was devised, disabled miners had
difficulty obtaining benefits until the current presumptions were created. See S. REP.
No. 743, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2305,
2307.
193. This difficulty is what led to the creation of worker's compensation pro-
grams in the early part of the century. See W. PROSSER, supra note 181, § 80, at 530.
194. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-349 (West Supp. 1984) (administrative
hearing before commissioner). Appeals from the commissioner's decisions may be
made to superior court. Id § 38-349(c). See also id § 4-183 (no provision for
arbitration).
195. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-717 (1973 & Supp. 1983) (mandatory,
binding arbitration procedures between insurance companies on issues of liability
and damages); N.J. Statewide Rules Governing Automobile Arbitration, 484 A.2d
cxiv (1985); N.Y. INS. LAW § 675(2) ( McKinney 1983) (insurers must provide oppor-
tunity for claimants to submit disputes to simplified arbitration procedures).
196. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
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Medical malpractice statutes, which proliferated in the early
1970's when insurance rates skyrocketed, vary in their procedures.1 97
A common model requires the plaintiff to submit his medical mal-
practice claim to a panel of one health professional, one lawyer and
one layman. Such panels, in theory, improve party understanding of
trial outcome, thereby promoting settlement. 98 Health care review
panels are adminsitrative, because they usually are established and
supervised by an administrative agency. 199 Functionally, however,
they are means for judicial reference of cases.20 0
2. Admt'snztrali've Arbitralion." Railroad Labor Relations
One major administrative scheme for dispute resolution is arbi-
tral in character. Labor relations agencies generally are hard to class-
ify. As noted in the introduction to this section, the Supreme Court
has drawn a distinction between adminstrative adjudication of "pub-
lic rights" created by the legislature, and "private rights" that existed
at common law.2 0 ' Alternative dispute resolution is concerned pri-
marily with the "private rights" half of this dichotomy. Private rights
are subjected to administrative adjudication by federal labor relations
agencies. The most familiar of these is the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), but the NLRB primarily adjudicates public rights
established by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).20 2
The administrative mechanism established under the Railway
Labor Act (RLA)20 3 employs arbitration to resolve rights disputes. It
is less familiar to most lawyers than the NLRA mechanism, but it
reaches further into the substitution of an administrative process, for
a judicial one, for the final adjudication of private common law
VICTIM 273-98 (1965); I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 1.02 (2d
ed. 1981).
197. For a thorough treatment of the causes underlying the medical malpractice
insurance crises, see Documentary Supplement.- Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an Alterna-
tive Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 693 (1972). For
an overview of the types of system in use, see Note, Medical Malpractice Mediation
Panels: A Constitutional Analysis, 46 FORrHAM L. REV. 322 (1977).
198. See Sakayan, Arbitration and Screening Panels: Recent Experience and Trends, 17
FORUM 682, 685-86 (1981). See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN tit. 40, § 1301.308 (Purdon Supp.
1984); see also Note, supra note 197.
199. But see VA. CODE § 8.01-581.3 (chief justice appoints the panels).
200. For a discussion of judicial reference systems, see notes 353-467 and accom-
panying text infra.
201. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
67-72 (1982).
202. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982). One might also denominate these as "con-
gressionally created private rights" under the Northern Ppehne formula.
203. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-160 (1982).
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rights. Section 3, First of the RLA20 4 establishes a National Railroad
Adjustment Board (NRAB) to adjudicate disputes arising between
railroad and airline employers and their employees. Section 3, Sec-
ond 20 5 permits unions and employers to establish private arbitration
bodies to exercise the jurisdiction of the NRAB. In Andrews v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R.,206 the Supreme Court held that employees covered
by these provisions were not entitled to maintain actions for wrongful
discharge in federal or state court. Instead, such employees must fol-
low the grievance and arbitration procedures in the RLA.20 7
These RLA bodies function in most respects like arbitration bod-
ies established privately under collective bargaining agreement and
enforceable by virtue of section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act.20 1 But the RLA tribunals are statutorily mandated substi-
tutes for the courts for the adjudication of common law claims. 20 9
In recent years, other statutes have been enacted that provide for
arbitration of claims arising over statutorily created rights.210 Dispute
resolution through arbitration is not voluntary under these statutes.
Accordingly, whether the parties would prefer traditional litigation is
immaterial. The policy justification for requiring arbitration rather
than traditional litigation in the courts is the need for expertise by the
decisionmaker and greater speed and lower cost.
3. Administrative Medattbn." Employment Discrimination
Some agencies use mediation and conciliation as a basic method
of dispute resolution, rather than adjudication. The most prominent
example of such procedures exists in the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission's (EEOC) treatment of title V1121I and Age Dis-
204. Id § 153, First.
205. Id § 153, Second.
206. 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
207. Id. at 324, 326. But see id. at 330-31 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Doug-
las dissented on the grounds that the first, fourteenth and seventh amendments enti-
tle an employee bringing a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge to an
option between a jury trial or arbitration under the applicable collective bargaining
agreement and labor statute. Id
208. 29 U.S.C. § 181 (1982).
209. The Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipel'ne might appear to raise
questions about the constitutionality of this requirement, but such challenges have
been rejected by the courts. SeeJackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717 F.2d 1045,
1049 n.6 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Essary v. Chicago & N. Transp. Co., 618 F.2d 13, 17
(7th Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1000 (1984).
210. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7
U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1982).
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crimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claims. 212 Under title VII
and ADEA, employees may bring suit to redress discriminatory em-
ployment actions.2 13 Prior to bringing suit, however, the complaining
employee must file a complaint with the EEOC2 14 and the state
agency with jurisdiction over discrimination complaints. 215 Before the
EEOC will issue to the employee a right-to-sue letter,216 it will at-
tempt to resolve the complaint by "informal methods of conference,
conciliation and persuasion. '21 7
Generally, if conciliation is successful, the EEOC will prepare a
conciliation agreement, after which it meets with the party
charged. 218 In essence, the Commission mediates the dispute between
the parties, also representing its own interests in any settlement. 21 9 If
the parties cannot agree, the complainant may sue. 220
Mediation is not voluntary under these statutes; it is a prerequi-
site to access to the courts, and it is conducted by a federal agency.
Requiring mediation is justified by the policy in favor of voluntary
resolution of employment disputes.
4. Incentives to Pursue Claims." Fees
As noted in the introduction to this section, administrative claim
forums are distinguished from private and judicial forums by provid-
ing public resources to at least one of the parties for dispute resolu-
tion. The theory of dispute resolution suggests that such free services
will reduce settlement and encourage litigation. 22'
212. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1982).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1982).
216. The EEOC issues this letter to the complainant in title VII actions when
conciliations efforts have failed, or when 180 days have passed from the date that the
EEOC received the complaint. The EEOC will also issue the letter when it decides to
dismiss the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). Under ADEA, the complainant
only has to wait 60 days after filing with the EEOC before suing in court, since no
right-to-sue letter is necessary. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c), (d) (1982).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982).
218. This description of conciliation procedures is taken from B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 965 (2d ed. 1983). See also EEOC
COMPL. MAN. (CCH) §§ 60.64.8; Enforcement of Title VII, 1 FED. REG. EMPLOY. SERV.
(RIA) §§ 3.36-.44, §§ 3.56-.62, (1980); Job Discrimination, I FED. REG. EMPLOY.
SERV. (RIA) § 5.80 (1981).
219. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 218, at 966.
220. The EEOC may sue, or may authorize the complainant to sue, in title VII
cases. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). Under ADEA, the right to sue ends when the
EEOC sues, but the complainant need wait only 60 days after filing with the EEOC
before filing a civil suit. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1), (d) (1982).
221. For an analysis of dispute resolution theory, see notes 19-101 and accompa-
nying text supra.
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One source of opposition to administrative dispute resolution
methods, therefore, can arise from a perception that these methods
may encourage the pursuit of claims when the social costs are so high
that the claims would be better off abandoned. Accordingly, it is of
interest to consider whether administrative procedures for dispute res-
olution could be accompanied by fees for access, which would pro-
mote private settlement.
In theory, there is no reason why an agency created to resolve
disputes could not impose fees upon parties. Its justification would be
to relieve some of the administrative costs of running such an agency,
as well as to discourage the filing of frivolous complaints. Courts and
arbitrators require parties to pay fees for the resolution of claims, and
it would be no departure from precedent to permit adjudicative agen-
cies to charge fees as well.
Due process complicates the problem, however. In Bodde v. Con-
necltcut,222 the Supreme Court struck down a state law requiring all
persons filing for divorce to pay court fees of about sixty dollars.223
The Court held that the law violated due process. 224 A similar situa-
tion arose in Sea & Sage Audubon Society v. Planning Comm'ss'on.225 In Sea
&Sage, an environmental group had objected to a planning commis-
sion's approval of a subdevelopment's tract maps, and wanted to ap-
peal the action to city council. Under a city ordinance authorized by
state law, the city required an "administrative appeal fee" equal to
half the fee imposed on the subdeveloper. 226 In subsequent litigation
the Supreme Court of California did not reach the fee issue, because
appellants had failed to raise the issue below.227 The dissenters would
222. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
223. Id at 372, 374.
224. Id at 382-83. The Court, however, was careful to limit its holding to the
facts in Boddie. Due process was violated because under Connecticut law, the sole
means of obtaining a divorce was in state court. Id at 380. Divorce was held to be so
linked with the "fundamental human relationship" of marriage that a bar to the sole
means of divorce to indigent citizens violated due process. Id at 383. The Boddie
holding does not preclude reasonable fees in a non-marriage/divorce context. See id.
at 386 (Douglas, J., concurring) (the proper analysis in Bodde should have been
under the equal protection clause); id at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring) (case
presented a "classic equal protection problem").
225. 34 Cal. 3d 412, 668 P.2d 664, 194 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1983).
226. By California law, planning agencies are permitted to charge reasonable
fees for processing subdivision plans. See CAL.. GOv'T. CODE § 66451.2 (West 1983).
The city also chose to charge those who wish to appeal planning commission deci-
sions a sum equal to half the fee charged the subdeveloper - in this case, the appeal
fee was $607. Sea & Sage Audubon Soc'y v. Planning Comm'n, 34 Cal. 3d at 415, 668
P.2d at 665, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
227. But the court hinted in a lengthy footnote that the fee structure would
have been found reasonable had the issue been raised properly. See Sea & Sage, 34
Cal. 3d at 422 n.5, 668 P.2d at 670 n.5, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 363 n.5.
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have found the fee an "arbitrary and unreasonable barrier to the pur-
suit of administrative remedies," and would have invalidated it.228
It appears that, should an agency be created as an involuntary
alternative to court adjudication, its fees would be subject to chal-
lenge in Boddie-like circumstances. A solution may be found in one
state statute which permits waiver of the costs of appealing adminis-
trative actions.2 29 Such a procedure would permit appeals by indi-
gents who could not afford to pay and yet prevent frivolous abuses of
the administrative dispute resolution process.2 30
C. Judicial Methods
Except for those classes of disputes where economic or social in-
terdependence makes participation in private dispute resolution
mechanisms feasible, most disputes cannot be resolved equitably ex-
cept through an administrative or court-annexed procedure. The pur-
pose of having a civil judicial process in the first place is to enlist the
coercive power of the state to force the stronger party in a bilateral
dispute to participate in resolving it on terms acceptable to both par-
ties or deemed by the society to be fair.
1. Direct Economic Incentives to Settle
One of the clear conclusions of the dispute resolution literature is
that settlement of disputes is furthered by costs of litigation.2 3 ' Any
contemporary judicial system uses this fact, more or less consciously,
to promote settlement short of trial.
a. Costs
The theory of dispute resolution rests on the notion that transac-
tion costs substantially affect whether and on what terms disputes will
be settled.2 32 Potential plaintiffs will not sue if the transaction costs of
suit are greater than the expected payoff from suing.233 Potential de-
fendants are confronted with being forced to pay not only the value
228. Id at 428, 668 P.2d at 674, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
229. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-183(i) (West Supp. 1984) (authorizing
court to waive costs of appealing administrative ruling).
230. Section 4-183(i) provides that the court may require a hearing upon the
application for waivers, and its judgment is to contain a statement of the facts the
court has found on the issue. Id
231. See Cooter & Marks, supra note 96, at 238; Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial:
A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 55, 58-59 (1982).
232. For a discussion of the effect of transaction costs on settlement of a dispute,
see notes 82-85 and accompanying text supra.
233. See notes 84-85 and accompanying text supra.
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of the claim, but also the transaction costs of defending a Suit.2 3 4 Thus
either party to a single dispute dislikes high costs: the plaintiff because
they may deprive him of compensation for a meritorious claim; the
defendant because they inflate the economic burden of a dispute even
if the claim is not meritorious. In the aggregate, however, costs of
litigation provide an incentive to settle. The literature demonstrates
how zero transaction costs for suit would mean many more trials and
fewer settlements. 23 5
Most nonjudicial dispute resolution techniques are advocated,
among other things, because their costs are lower than litigation. To
the extent that these alternatives are viewed as "better" because of
lower costs, society should consider reducing the costs of civil litiga-
tion, its principal institution for resolving private disputes. To the ex-
tent that costs are an important incentive to settle disputes fairly
before trial, once they are in the civil litigation system, society should
consider how the incidence of costs can be manipulated to promote
fair settlements and fewer trials.23 6
Many of the devices discussed in the following sections on judi-
cial dispute resolution methods have as one of their objectives cost
reduction; others have as one of their objectives shifting the incidence
of costs. 237
Costs of litigation, exclusive of attorney's fees,238 are often
awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit.2 39 The practice of
awarding costs dates to the Statute of Gloucester, 240 and in the
United States is provided for by statute or rule of court 24 1 in nearly
234. Id
235. Seegenerallj Shavell, supra note 231.
236. Id.
237. Small claims procedures are probably the most obvious example of an at-
tempt to reduce costs. Accuracy in decision making is sacrificed in order to reduce
costs. Some states have gone so far as to prohibit the appearance of attorneys in their
small claims forums. SeeJ. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: A NA-
TIONAL EXAMINATION 3 (1978) (eight states prohibit attorneys from appearing in
their small claims tribunals). Discovery, in contrast, increases costs, while improving
the parties' ability to predict accurately the outcome of a trial. For a discussion of the
use of discovery, see notes 286-314 and accompanying text infra. Rules of civil proce-
dure which relate to offers of settlement, both at the state and federal level, address
the incidence of costs explicitly. For a discussion of these rules, see notes 258-85 and
accompanying text infra.
238. Under the "American Rule," attorney's fees ordinarily are not among the
costs that a winning party may recover. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S.
752, 759 (1980) (citing Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S.
714, 717-18 (1967)).
239. See generallj 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 5 (1965).
240. 6 Edw. I ch. 1 (1278). This statute permitted costs to be awarded only to
successful plaintiffs. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 371-72 (1852).
241. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 5 (1965).
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every jurisdiction. 242 Only taxable costs are recoverable. Usually these
include witness fees and mileage, 24 3 deposition expenses,2 44 costs of
obtaining documentary evidence,2 45 and fees for the services of court
clerks, sheriffs and referees or masters. 246 These types of traditionally
taxable costs are usually much less than attorney's fees. 2
47
Long before the end of the lawsuit, however, the magnitude of
costs affects parties' decisions about how to handle their claims. 248
Many claimants cannot afford to litigate, regardless of the merit of
their claims. 249 In considering the effect of costs on dispute resolution,
it is important to note that the risk taker on the plaintiff's side fre-
quently is the attorney. This is so because of the prevalence of contin-
gent fee arrangements for plaintiffs,2 50 and the practice of plaintiff's
counsel advancing the costs of litigation. 25' Therefore access to the
courts for an impecunious plaintiff frequently is controlled by his at-
torney's assessment of the probability of a recovery or a settlement
sufficient to cover transaction costs and to compensate the attorney
for his time.2 52
242. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Rules similar to rule 54(d) have been adopted in
many states. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 14 (1965).
243. In federal courts, fees above the statutory amount for expert witnesses ordi-
narily are not taxable unless the court calls the expert. See Henkel v. Chicago, St. P.,
Minn. & 0. Ry., 284 U.S. 444, 446 (1932); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 67 n.13 (1932).
244. The federal practice is to allow deposition expenses. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D
Costs § 57 (1965). In some states, expenses for depositions taken solely for discovery
purposes are not taxable absent a statute authorizing the expense. Id.
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (1982) (the fees for the exemplification and copying of
documents that were necessarily obtained for use at trial may be taxed as costs). See
Banks v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 62 F.R.D. 21, 22 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
246. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 67, at 53 (1965). For a list of the costs that ordina-
rily can be taxed against the losing party in a federal suit, see 28 U.S.C. § 1920
(1982). See also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757 (1980). Section
1920 includes clerk's, marshal's, and witness fees. Id. at 758.
247. Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U. S. 346, 379 n.5 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
248. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 296 (1973).
249. See Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 363-64 n. 1. See Janofsky, A.BA. Attacks Delay
and the High Cost of Litigation, 65 A.B.A. J. 1323 (Sept. 1979).
250. The contingent fee is virtually the exclusive method of fee arrangements in
personal injury cases. Comment, Of Ethics and Economics: Contingent Percentage Fees for
Legal Services, 16 AKRON L. REV. 747, 747-48 (1983).
251. Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct provide that an attorney may advance the client the costs of
the litigation. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e)(2) (1983) (at-
torney may pay the court costs of an indigent client without any reimbursement). In
the case of a nonindigent, the repayment of the advances for court costs may be made
contingent upon the outcome of the litigation. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e)(1); see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
5-103 (B) (1979) (such advances allowed only if the client remains ultimately liable
for the expenses).
252. Shavell, supra note 231, at 61 n.24.
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Transaction costs for litigation are determined basically by the
procedure employed by the litigation system in use. Eliminating dis-
covery, for example, would reduce transaction costs, though it also
would have other effects that generally have been determined by
policymakers to be sufficiently undesirable to outweigh the cost effects
of eliminating it.253
Most of the existing programs discussed below affect transaction
costs. Some others, not discussed separately, are concerned primarily
with allocation of costs. A prominent example is the statutory award
of attorney's fees.254 Several commentators have explored the theoret-
ical effects of still other programs that would influence dispute reso-
lution primarily through their effect on costs. 255 Most of these
concepts relate to the incidence of expenses for attorney's fees. 2 5 6
b. Settlement Offers
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deals with offers
of settlement. 257 Under the rule, if it is amended as proposed, any
party to an action may serve upon any other party,258 at least thirty
253. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee note.
254. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982)
(court may award attorney's fees to the prevailing party); The Civil Rights Attorneys
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (court may award attorney's fees in
any civil rights action).
255. See, e.g., Cooter & Marks, supra note 96; Shavell, supra note 231.
256. See Shavell, supra note 231. Professor Shavell concludes that a trial will be
more attractive under the American attorney's fees rule (which does not include at-
torney's fees as a cost that the prevailing party may recover) than under the British
rule (which does include attorney's fees as a recoverable cost) for a pessimistic liti-
gant, because if unsuccessful it does not run the risk of having to pay the added costs
of defendant's attorney's fees. Id at 59-60. He concludes that a trial will be more
attractive under the British rule for optimistic litigants who are risk neutral or only
slightly risk averse, because the expected value of victory is higher since it will include
compensation for his attorney's fees. Id at 59. Extremely risk averse persons, whether
optimistic or pessimistic, would prefer trial under the American rule because of its
lower risk. Id at 62. On the other hand, "[ilf optimism is the cause of trials [as the
literature almost uniformly suggests] and if litigants are not too risk averse, then the
British rule will cause more suits to be tried." Cooter & Marks, supra note 96, at 245
(footnote omitted). Professor Shavell suggests that the British attorney's fees rule
would, in certain situations, produce fairer results and lower social costs. Shavell,
supra note 231, at 72-73. Where the number of suits won by plaintiffs in a given area
of law is only a small fraction of the suits filed in that area, the use of the British
system would reduce the number of suits filed and tried in that area. Id at 69-70, 72.
257. Rule 68 provides in part:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judg-
ment to be taken against him for the money or property or to the effect
specified in his offer, with costs then accrued.
FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
258. The present rule pertains only to "a party defending against a claim" and
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days prior to the start of trial, an offer which will stand open for the
full thirty days.259 The offer would state the amount of money or
property which is being offered in settlement.2 60 If unaccepted after
thirty days, or earlier if the court so authorizes, the offer is deemed
withdrawn. 261 Starting with the withdrawal date, any costs which ac-
crue to the offeror must be paid by the offeree if the judgment in the
subsequent trial is not more favorable to the offeree than the offer had
been.262 In such occurrence, the offeree would be liable for the costs
and expenses (including reasonable attorney's fees) of the offeror, and
would be charged interest on the amount offered starting from the
date offered. 263
The court has some discretion as to the awarding of expenses and
interest. The court may reduce the award if it determines such an
award to be excessive, that is, out of proportion to the case.264 Also, if
the offeree has acted reasonably or such an award would lack fairness,
the court may determine the award to be unjustifed and deny it en-
tirely.265 If bad faith by the offeror was found by the court, through
the offer of a token, or "sham" offer (so disproportionately small, rela-
tive to the amount in dispute that the offeree would most likely not
accept it), no award would be granted. 266
Substantively, the amendments add attorney's fees to the costs
recoverable under the rule.2 6 7 In addition, to clarify the mechanics of
the rule, the amendments propose that the final judgment, which
would determine whether the offeree would have fared better in tak-
ing the offer, would be evaluated excluding the costs and expenses of
the parties.2 68 If liability has been determined but the amount of lia-
bility has not, the rule would allow an offer to be made at this point,
therefore would not apply to offers made by the claimant to the defendant. FED. R.
Civ. P. 68.
259. See Pre/iminaiy Draft of Proposed Amendments, 98 F.R.D. 337, 353, 361-62
(1983).
260. Id at 353, 361.
261. Id at 353, 362.
262. Id.
263. Id. Such interest would not be charged separately against the offeree if the
interest normally would be included in the judgment rendered. Id. This provision is
intended to deter the defendant from declining an acceptable offer because of the
extra interest that may be made in delaying payment until judgment following a
trial. Id. at 365.
264. Id at 362, 366.
265. Id
266. Id at 362, 365-66.
267. Id at 362, 365.
268. Id at 362, 364.
1983-84] 1283
63
Perritt: And the Whole Earth Was One of Language - A Broad View of Dispute
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
standing open for thirty days.269
Federal Rule 68 originally was modeled after state civil proce-
dure rules. 270 The state statutes mandated the imposition of costs on a
plaintiff who rejected settlement offers; state versions of Federal Rule
54(d) 27 1 allowed the prevailing party to recover its costs. 272 For exam-
ple, the current Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238 allows
damages to be awarded for delay.2 7
3
Such rules encourage the settlement of claims without litigation,
by providing incentives to both sides of the conflict to reach agree-
ment. The present version of the federal rule is applicable only to
offers made by one defending against a claim. 2 74
The proposed amendments to Federal Rule 68 would enhance its
effectiveness. If amended as proposed, it not only would apply when
the offeree wins a judgment less in amount than the offer, but also
would apply when the offeror wins the judgment.2 75 This approach,
however, creates the potential for abuse by the defendant making a
269. Id at 363.
270. See Delta Airhnes, 450 U.S. at 356 & n.18 (1981). "Rule 68 is an outgrowth
of the equitable practice of denying costs to a plaintiff 'when he sues vexatiously after
refusing an offer of settlement.'" Id at 356 (quoting 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3001, at 56 (1973)).
271. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). The rule provides in part: "Except when express
provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules,
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs . .. ."
272. Preh'minaqy Draft of Proposed Amendments, 98 F.R.D. 337, 356-58 (1983). Most
of these state offer-of-judgment rules applied, however, only to grant discretion to the
trial court to shift the burden of costs when the plaintiff prevailed. Id. at 358 & n.21.
The state provisions did not grant discretion in the trial court to allocate costs when
the defendant prevailed. Id
273. See PA. R. CIv. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1983). The
scope of this rule is more limited than the federal rule, applying only to actions for
bodily injury, death or property damage. Id Pennsylvania Rule 238 allows the court
to add 10% to the compensatory judgment, computed from the date of the filing of
the complaint or from one year after the accrual of the cause of action, whichever is
later. Id However, if at any time the defendant makes a pretrial offer equal to at
least 80% of the judgment, there would be no damages for delay award for the period
after the date the offer was made. Id
274. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68; 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3001 (1973).
275. See Prtehminaqy Draft offtroposed Amendments, 98 F.R.D. 337, 367 (1983). The
language in the first sentence of the second paragraph of rule 68 describing a judg-
ment "obtained by the offeree" has been eliminated in the proposed draft. See td. at
362. This language had been interpreted by the Supreme Court as making rule 68
applicable only when the plaintiff had judgment entered in his favor (although for an
amount less favorable than defendant's offer), and not when judgment was entered in
the defendant's favor. See Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 351. Such a construction of rule
68 would appear to create the anomalous situation where a defendant who prevails
in a case is actually in a less favorable position than if the plaintiff had prevailed,
albeit in an amount less than the offer. Id at 353 n.12.
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token offer.27 6 If the plaintiff refuses such an offer and judgment ulti-
mately is entered for the defendant, the defendant effectively would
have shifted his post-offer costs of litigation to the plaintiff, while
never having made a good faith settlement offer.27 7 The proposed
amendments have attempted to deal with this potential problem by
giving the trial judge discretionary power to invalidate an award if he
or she finds that the offeror acted in bad faith.278
One earlier approach to the problem of abuse by the defendant
was to require that only reasonable offers cause the rule to apply.279
Applying rule 68 only to situations where the plaintiff obtained a
judgment in his favor negates the need for this reasonableness re-
quirement, because a sham or unrealistic offer would not serve any
purpose for the defendant. 280
The Advisory Committee considers the existing rule basically in-
effective for fulfilling the basic purposes for which it was created.28,
The proposed amendments strengthen the rule by including attor-
ney's fees as an incentive. 28 2 In a civil suit, probably the greatest moti-
vation for settlement is money; the defendant wants to minimize the
sum of litigation expenses and payment to the plaintiff; the plaintiff
wants to maximize what he receives from the defendant less what the
plaintiff pays for litigation expenses. Providing for an award of attor-
ney's fees may give rule 68 the "teeth" it needs to promote settlement
276. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, 98 F.R.D. at 366-67.
277. See Delta Airlines, 450 U.S. at 353.
278. See Preliminaov Draft of Proposed Amendments, 98 F.R.D. at 366-67. Whether
the offeror has acted in bad faith is to be determined from objective factors, such as
the possible merits of the claim or defense at the time of the offer and the amount of
the proposed offer. Id at 367.
279. See Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 355.
280. Id One commentator suggested that the applicability of the rule be re-
stricted to judgments where the offeree secures at least some relief. Note, Rule 68: A
"New Tool"for Litiation, 1978 DUKE L.J. 889, 895. The rule "would insure that token
offers would not be made" since they would not produce an early settlement and
would therefore gain the offeror nothing. Id In many cases, the defendant (offeror),
as prevailing party, is entitled to costs under rule 54(d). id "When the defendant
(offeror) is not so entitled, he ought not to be able to employ rule 68 to override the
discretion that the court would otherwise have, in order to compel the awarding of
costs." Id For the pertinent text of rule 54(d), see note 271 supra.
281. Preliminay Draft of Proposed Amendments, 98 F.R.D. at 363. The committee
has attributed the rule's failure in part to the fact that costs, absent the inclusion of
attorney's fees, are too small an incentive to parties to utilize the rule. Id Further, the
fact that the rule is available only to parties defending claims, rather than claimants,
has hindered the rule's effectiveness, in the committee's view. Id
282. Id at 365. Because of the sizable amount of attorney's fees at the pretrial
and trial stage, with the inclusion of attorney's fees as costs, the risk increases for the
offeree if he fails to consider the proposed settlement before trial. Id He may be
creating more of an incentive for the offeree to arrive at settlement before the heavi-
est expenses of litigation. Id
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rather than further litigation.283
2. Improving Party Assessment of Trial Outcome
The second major finding of the dispute resolution literature is
that settlement rather than further litigation results when the parties
have accurate perceptions of probable trial outcome. 28 4 A variety of
procedural devices both old and new in the judicial system make use
of this fact to promote settlement.
a. Discovery
Discovery is an accepted part of modern civil procedure,2 8 5
though it is a fairly recent addition. Before the merger of law and
equity, discovery was not permitted in actions at law. 28 6 Rather, a
party to a legal action desiring discovery needed to file a separate bill
283. Rule 68 has been characterized as "little known and little used," but it has
recently attracted greater attention in this period of increasing federal dockets.
Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 475 (7th Cir. 1983)(citation omitted). In Chesny, the
defendants made a timely rule 68 offer of $ 100,000 in an action filed under § 1983. Id
at 476. The offer included costs then accrued and attorney's fees. Id. The offer was
refused, and the jury subsequently awarded $60,000. Id The district judge found that
the prerequisites of rule 68 were satisfied, $60,000 being less than $100,000. 'Id There-
fore, the court limited the statutory award of attorney's fees to $32,000, the amount
accrued up to the time of the rule 68 offer. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). On ap-
peal, the court of appeals held that a rule 68 offer may include attorney's fees then
accrued. 720 F.2d at 477-78. The court further held that rule 68 does not bar the
award of plaintiff attorney's fees under § 1988 for postoffer attorney time. Id. at 478-
79. The court reasoned that the legislature, in enacting § 1988, "would not have
wanted its effectiveness blunted because of a little known rule of court (rule 68)
promulgated almost 40 years earlier." Id at 479. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled
to recover attorney's fees after the date of the offer, despite the language of rule 68.
See id at 480. The court observed that the proposed amendments to rule 68 would
require the offeree to pay the attorney's fees of the offeror in any case in which the
judgment was less favorable than the offer. Id. at 479. The court agreed with the
Advisory Committee's view that "unless the offeree is penalized by being made to
pay the offeror's attorney's fees, Rule 68 will never become an effective tool for induc-
ing settlements." Id at 479-80 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, it noted that the rule's
existing provision on costs "creates an incentive for the defendant to make a reason-
able offer and that once such an offer is on the table the plaintiff has a big incentive
to accept it and thereby avoid the expenses and uncertainty of a trial." Id. at 480.
Cootner and Marks conclude that a compromise rule similar to the proposed rule 68,
which is akin the current British rule, would reduce the incidence of trial and in-
crease the likelihood of settlement. Cootner & Marks, supra note 96, at 245-46.
284. See text accompanying note 101 supra; Lambros & Shunk, supra note 38, at
43.
285. "The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism established by Rules 26 to
37 is one of the most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under the prior federal practice, the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formu-
lation and fact-revelation were performed primarily and inadequately by the plead-
ings." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-501 (1947) (footnote omitted).
286. See 4 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.03 (2d ed. 1984) (fed-
eral practice before adoption of federal rules). Many states permitted pretrial discov-
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in equity.28 7 Since the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938, however, discovery as a regular pretrial procedure
gradually has been accepted in most American jurisdictions.2 8 8
Five methods of discovery commonly are provided: interrogato-
ries, 28 9 depositions,29 0 requests for production of documents,2 9 1 orders
for physical or mental examination,2 92 and requests for admissions.2 93
Sanctions may be imposed for failure to participate, ranging from im-
position of costs to adverse judicial determination of the merits. 294
Protective orders may be obtained from the court when discovery
threatens undue inconvenience or other recognized legal interests. 295
Discovery influences the resolution of civil disputes in three ma-
jor ways. First, it increases the amount of information available to a
party about the strength of his opponent's position.29 6 In this manner,
it permits the parties more accurately to assess the probable outcome
of a trial. 297 The majority of the theoretical and empirical literature
concludes that a more accurate assessment of trial outcome makes
pretrial settlement more likely. 298 Second, it can form the basis for
ery before the federal rules were adopted. Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) committee note,
reprinted in 4 J. MOORE, supra, 26.01[2] (citing state statutes permitting discovery).
287. See 4 J. MOORE, supra note 286, $ 26.03[11; Sunderland, Scope and Method of
Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 866 (1933).
288. 23 AM. JUR. 2D Depositions and Discovery § 2 (1983). For a list of states
adopting all or a substantial part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see AM.
JUR. 2D Desk Book 408 (1979). See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. preceding explana-
tory note on discovery and depositions (Purdon Supp. 1984); PA. R. Civ. P. 4001
(new Pennsylvania discovery rules modelled closely on federal rules).
289. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33. Interrogatories are written questions presented to
an opposing party which that party is required to answer under oath. Id
290. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (oral depositions); FED. R. Civ. P. 31 (depositions on
written questions). Depositions usually are oral examinations conducted by counsel
under oath in the presence of a stenographer. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c). Depositions
may also be conducted by written questions submitted by counsel. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 31. Nonparties as well as parties may be examined in depositions. FED. R. Civ. P.
30(a). Nonparties may be required to participate in depositions by means of a rou-
tine subpoena. Id.
291. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
292. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
293. See FED. R. Civ. P. 36. Requests for admission are written statements of
legally material facts or opinions to which the recipient must agree or disagree. Id
For a discussion of this rule, see generally Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal
Civil Procedure, 71 YALE L.J. 371 (1962).
294. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
295. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
296. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1298 (1978); Kaufman,Judicial Control Over Discovery,
28 F.R.D. 111, 114-16 (1962).
297. Sunderland, Improving the Administration ofJustice, 167 ANNALS 60, 76 (1933).
298. Brazil, supra note 296, at 1302. The majority of commentators have con-
cluded that the lack of information on both sides is a key ingredient in the decision to
1287
67
Perritt: And the Whole Earth Was One of Language - A Broad View of Dispute
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
pretrial resolution of the dispute through summary judgment, when
discovery demonstrates an absence of disputed issues of material
fact. 299 Third, discovery imposes additional, sometimes substantial,
costs on the other side.3 00 This increases the transaction costs of liti-
gating the claim.
The cost-increasing effect of discovery may make pretrial settle-
ment of a claim more likely, but one must remember that discovery
increases transaction costs on both sides.30' Some forms of discovery
are more or less symmetrical in their cost impact on the plaintiff and
defendant. Depositions are an example. Both sides must pay counsel
to prepare for and to attend the deposition, Other forms are signifi-
cantly asymmetrical in their cost impact. Interrogatories are an exam-
ple. Plaintiffs counsel who specializes in a particular type of case is
likely to have standard form interrogatories which can be sent to the
defendant at minimal marginal cost.3 0 2 The defendant, on the other
hand, must respond to the interrogatories with facts unique to the
particular case. Sometimes the cost of ascertaining these facts and
preparing responses can be substantial. Thus interrogatories are a
form of discovery that permits the plaintiff to increase transaction
costs on the other side without a commensurate increase in plaintiff
costs. Generally, the literature suggests that the increased transaction
costs makes pretrial settlement more likely. 303 Thus the availability of
gamble by going to trial. Id. Since discovery enables the parties to gain a more
realistic view of the outcome, there is a greater incentive to settle so as to avoid un-
necessary expense. Id But see Watson, The Settlement Theory of Dscoveqy, 55 ILL. B.J.
480, 489-90 (1967). This commentator notes:
[Plerhaps the most important factor in the making of settlements is the fear
of unknown evidence in the possession of one's opponent. . . . [T]he mu-
tual fear of . . . unknown factors creates a greater desire to settle than is
present if each party already knows exactly what the other side's evidence
will be and has had an opportunity to prepare his case accordingly.
Id
299. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (allowing summary judgement to be based on
discovery results); W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
24 (1968). But see VA. CODE § 8.01-420 (1984) (summary judgment not to be based
on deposition unless both parties consent).
300. W. GLASER, supra note 299, at 172-77. Predictably, discovery costs are a
function of the amount of money at stake in the litigation. Id at 172. Discovery costs
are especially high in antitrust and patent cases. Id
301. See notes 84-85 and accompanying text supra.
302. Shroeder & Frank, The Proposed Changes tn the Discovery Rules, 1978 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 475, 478.
303. See W. GLASER, supra note 299. Discovery is most useful as a tool to en-
courage a settlement when the party requesting discovery is affluent and the other
party has limited financial resources. Id at 182, 184. For a discussion of discovery as
a tool to procure a settlement, see Speck, The Use of Discoveov n United States Distrct
Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1150-53 (1951).
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discovery probably means that more suits, once filed, settle than
would be tried if discovery were not permitted.
On the other hand, substantial time is required for discovery.
Extensive discovery also certainly will delay the trial date, and may
delay the commencement of serious settlement negotiations. 30 4 More-
over, discovery increases the total cost of judicial dispute resolution
and thus may make the judicial machinery practically unsuitable for
certain smaller claims. 30 5
304. For recent criticisms of the federal discovery rules, see Brazil, Civil Discovery."
Lawyer's Views of its Effctiveness, Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 789; Brazil, supra note 296; FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note
for proposed changes. A recent survey conducted from a sampling of Chicago liti-
gators revealed that 20% of the litigators reacted positively to the rules of discovery,
while 33% reacted negatively. The remaining 47% displayed mixed emotions. Brazil,
supra, at 795.
The great majority of the group that reacted positively to the discovery rules
handles small litigation, representing individual clients and often involving tort
claims. On the other hand, the 33% who reacted negatively represented large clients
of corporations and were frequently involved in antitrust suits. Id at 799-801.
A separate survey revealed that with respect to "small cases"(median range of
$24,000 or less), 31% of the litigators reacted positively while 23% reacted negatively.
Conversely, in dealing with large cases of over one million dollars only 7% of the
litigators reacted positively while 43% reacted negatively. Id at 803.
The survey also revealed a marked distinction in reactions depending on
whether the litigator was representing the plaintiff or the defendant. 30% of the liti-
gators who represented plaintiffs reacted positively while 27% reacted negatively. On
the other hand, only 20% of litigators who represent defendants reacted positively
while 34% reacted negatively. Id. at 804.
The most frequently mentioned discovery problems are broken down as follows:
71% of responses stated that the negative impact of the rules was due to the role or
attitudes of judges or magistrates. Evasive responses, withholding information, or
noncompliance was the second major grievance of the litigators while overdiscovery,
delay and cost followed in succession. Id. at 824-25.
Most scholars agree that the reform of discovery rules can take one of two forms.
One alternative is to require judges to supervise the discovery process on a case by
case basis, producing the tailored results but at a certain cost to the judicial system.
Brazil, supra note 296, at 1353-58. However, this alternative also saves some of the
current high cost of "adversary jockeying," and may also save costs through the
court's encouragement of early settlements. Id at 1357-58. Another alternative
would be to place overall limitations on the scope of discovery, resulting in unfairness
in some cases and still requiring judicial involvement. So far, the Supreme Court has
adopted the first measure. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446
U.S. 995, 999 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
305. One study concluded that discovery is used in only 50% of the cases filed in
United States District Court. See Levy, Dicovery - Use and Abuse, Myth and Reality, 17
FORUM 465, 467 (1981-1982). In April of 1980, the United States Supreme Court
promulgated a set of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
took effect August 2, 1980. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446
U.S. 995 (1980).
Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Stewart dissented because the proposed amend-
ments did not reflect the degree of change necessary to make the Rules of Discovery
more efficient. Id at 1000 (Powell, J., dissenting ). As Justice Powell stated: "I do not
dissent because the modest amendments recommended by the Judicial Conference
are undesirable. I simply believe that Congress' acceptance of these tinkering changes
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California recently completed an experiment with limitations on
discovery, and simplification of discovery procedure. Under the pro-
gram, begun in 1978,306 cases involving less than $25,000 were han-
dled under simplified procedures in municipal and superior courts in
three geographic areas. 30 7 Simplified pleadings did not produce the
desired results. Limitations on pretrial motions were unsuccessful.
Significant limitations on discovery, however, reduced the cost of dis-
covery by an estimated fifty percent, and the overall cost of litigation
by an estimated fifteen to twenty percent.30 8 Fifty-eight percent of
will delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective reforms." Id In adopting the
amendments, the Judicial Conference rejected two specific proposals. Porter, Discov-
egy Abuse.- Interrogatories, Sanctions, and Two Proposals to the Federal Rules Which Were Not
Adopted, 17 FORUM 482, 483, 488-89 (1981-1982). The first proposal would have cur-
tailed the scope of discovery by altering rule 26 to permit discovery only of matters
relevant to the issues raised by the claims of defenses of the parties, rather than by
broader discovery relevant to the subject matter of the suit, as the rule now provides.
Id at 488. The second proposal would have curtailed the use of discovery by amend-
ing rule 33 to limit the number of interrogatories of each party to 30. Id at 486.
There are two major areas of discontent concerning the Rules of Discovery. One
challenged premise is that the discovery practice is "to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment." See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hckman, the
Court rejected the "fishing expedition" argument as a limitation on discovery. Id at
507. Of late, however, some commentators have argued that in order to curtail abuse,
it is necessary to develop a more limited scope to discovery. See Porter, supra, at 489
(arguing that it is necessary to move away from the limitless "subject matter" stan-
dard of the federal rules and towards more of a focus on the "claims" and "defenses"
in order to help alleviate burdensome and unduly expensive discovery requests).
Another challenged premise is that discovery only requires judicial attention in
exceptional cases because lawyers will practice it under a rule of reason, reinforced by
mutual self-interest in avoiding the waste of their time or the waste of a client's
money that results when unnecessary pursuit or resistance in the discovery occurs.
Many judges and commentators have believed that common sense on the part of
the litigants will result in decisions not to abuse the discovery process. See, e.g., Becker,
Modem Discover.y Promoting Etient Use and Preventing Abuse of Discovery in the Roscoe
Pound Tradtion, 78 F.R.D. 267, 277 (1978). Recently, however, it has been argued that
the litigants, when left on their own, have abused the discovery process, seeking irrel-
evant information resulting in an unnecessary expenditure of time. Porter, supra, at
482-83.
On the other hand, it has been argued that amendments to the federal rules
which would narrow the scope of discovery would:
1. eliminate notice pleading;
2. be inefficient in the face of the rule permitting liberal amendments to plead-
ing; and
3. prompt a new round of litigation as to the meanings employed by the
amendments.
See Schroeder & Frank, supra note 302, at 481.
306. SeeJUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL REPORT, at 15-17 (1983).
The program was authorized by a pilot project of the California legislature. See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1823-1833.2 (West 1983).
307. CAL. R. CT. 1701-51 (1978) (repealed 1983). These rules implemented the
experiments in the Fresno County and Los Angeles Municipal Courts and the Tor-
rance Branch of the Los Angeles Superior Court and the Fresno Superior Court.
308. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL REPORT 15-16 (1983).
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attorneys in an interview sample favored continuing with the pro-
gram, with modifications. 30 9 At the conclusion of the experiment,
legislation was proposed to make certain features permanent: limita-
tions on discovery, 3 10 mandatory utilization of a "case question-
naire," 31' and simplified trial procedures.3 1 2 Some of the
recommendations were adopted by the California legislature in 1983,
and made applicable to all except small claims cases in municipal
and justice courts statewide.3 13
b. Pretrial Conferences: Judicial Mediation
Judicially annexed mediation is hardly a new concept. It occurs
every time a judge tries to settle a case. This section summarizes the
prevalence of the practice and some judicial observations on its dy-
namics. It also identifies some programs that seek to enhance the pro-
cess by more formal means. Finally, it offers some thoughts on how
this form of dispute resolution can be improved.
In fiscal year 1981, 172,942 civil cases were filed in the federal
courts. 314 Of these cases, 24.1% were resolved with no court action,
and 35.3% were resolved after court action but before pretrial confer-
ence, 34% were resolved after pretrial conferences, 3.9% were resolved
after a nonjury trial, and 2.7% were resolved after a jury trial.31 5
These figures show the significance of the pretrial conference as a set-
tlement-inducing procedure.
On the other hand, the elapsed time was nearly as great for cases
disposed of at or after the pretrial conference as for cases that were
309. Id. at 16.
310. Id. at 17. Under the recommendation, each party would be permitted to
propound, as to each adversary, its choice of either a combination of 25 interrogato-
ries, requests for admission, or requests to produce or identify documents or things, or
one deposition. Id
311. Id. at 17. Under the recommendation each party would be required to
complete a standard form with its initial pleading. Id. The form would supply essen-
tial information normally developed by interrogatories, such as names and addresses
of witnesses, a list of relevant documents, a statement of the nature and amount of
damages, and information on insurance coverage, injuries and treating physicians. Id.
312. Id. at 17. The principal proposals for simplification permitted use of decla-
rations instead of live testimony in certain circumstances. Id
313. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 90-100 (West 1983). The Act made two princi-
pal changes in the recommendations. Id §§ 93-94. First, discovery is less restricted.
Each party may propound, as to each adversary, a combination of 35 interrogato-
ries, requests for admission, requests to produce or identify documents or things, and
may take one deposition. Id § 94. Second, the plaintiff is given the option whether or
not to use the case questionnaire. Id. § 93. See JUDICIAl. COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA,
ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1983).
314. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE DIRECTOR A-26 (1981).
315. Id.
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tried. Twenty months elapsed, on average, for cases tried. 3 16 Nineteen
months elapsed, on average, for cases resolved before trial but at or
after the pretrial conference. The ninetieth percentile elapsed time
was forty-eight and sixty-three months, respectively. In contrast, cases
resolved by court action before the pretrial conference were resolved
in a median time of eight months, with a ninetieth percentile figure of
thirty-two months, and cases resolved without court action were re-
solved in a median time of five months, with a ninetieth percentile
figure of thirty-eight months.31 7 Thus the empirical data do not indi-
cate that pretrial conferences expedite resolution of disputes.
The Federal Judicial Center has published comments by federal
trial judges on the judge's role in the settlement process. Judge Fred-
erick B. Lacey 3t 8 has recommended a routine procedure under which
a standard form is sent to counsel after an answer is filed in a case. 319
The form would contain dates for pretrial and status conferences and
for the date of trial. According to the judge, this minimizes lost time
between the time an answer is filed and the date the case is ready for
trial, and enhances settlement. 320
In terms of the personal role of the judge in promoting settle-
ment, Judge Lacey suggested that the first prerequisite of a successful
settlement conference is that the judge be firm about the trial date. 32'
He has further suggested that the cases most difficult to settle are
those in which there is a disparity in counsel's skill, experience, and
knowledge of the case.322 In such circumstances, Judge Lacey has sug-
gested that the judge should discuss his perception of the strong and
weak point of each case.3 23 According to Judge Lacey, "[o]nce the
316. Id at A-30.
317. Id
318. United States District Judge, District of New Jersey.
319. F. LACEY, THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL SUITS 10
(1977) (federal judicial center education and training series) [hereinafter cited as
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER STUDY].
320. Id. at 11. According to Judge Lacey, the greatest of incentives to settle is
the trial date. Id The setting of a deadline for trial requires the attorneys to give
added attention to the case, which leads to earlier preparation and discussions be-
tween counsel. Id
321. Some of Judge Lacey's suggestions would work effectively, if at all, only in
a system with individual calendars. See generally Solomon, Caseflow Management in the
Trial Court, 2 A.B.A. COMMISSION STANDARDS JUD. AD. SUPPORT STUD. 1 (1973).
Under the individual calendar system, the same judge presides over all motions and
pretrial and settlement conferences in a particular case, and will preside over the trial
if there is one. Id at 8. Therefore each judge is able to act independently in the
management of his caseload. Id
322. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER STUDY, supra note 319, at 14-15.
323. Id at 15. Of course, a prerequisite to such discussion is that the judge him-
self have a thorough understanding of the law and facts of the dispute. Id
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bubble of counsel's unfounded optimism is exploded by a judge's
knowledgeable and penetrating questions, a settlement results. '32 4
Judge Lacey has stressed early intervention by the judge. Recog-
nizing that some institutional parties will not settle until after certain
discovery has been completed, he nevertheless has urged judicial ad-
ministrative steps to ensure that a minimum of discovery is completed
promptly and that settlement conferences occur regularly. 32 5
Judge Lacey then suggests several methods for dealing with the
situation in which the major disagreement is not over facts but over
value. 326
The method suggested by Judge Lacey consumes substantial ju-
dicial time. But, as he points out, it consumes substantially less time
than a nonjury trial. As Judge Lacey stated, "even a relatively simple
nonjury trial will require many hours of posttrial reflection by you in
arriving at your decision and in writing your opinion or findings of
fact and conclusions of law pursuant to rule 52(a). '327
The recent revisions to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 are
consistent with these suggestions. 32 Rule 16 now permits a discretion-
ary preliminary pretrial conference in which "facilitating the settle-
324. Id at 15.
325. Id. at 16-17. When parties are not ready to settle at a particular conference,
Judge Lacey has urged that the judge identify exactly what additional information is
required or what steps are to be taken and then schedule another settlement confer-
ence after those actions can be taken. Id. at 17-18.
He has given the following advice about the method to be used in settlement
conferences:
Encourage counsel to talk about the strength of their cases and the weak-
nesses of the opposition. At the outset listen, and give each side equal time.
Then and only then should you ask questions. Having studied the file, you
will know what questions to ask. Require clear, frank reponses. Along the
way, be alert to admitted and stipulated matters. The smaller the area in
dispute, the better chance you have of bringing the parties together. Whit-
tle down the controversy to its hard core. Then there can be intelligent
analysis rather than emotional reponse. Settlement conferences involve
much more than having the judge simply get two figures from the litigants
and then split the difference . . . . After . . .I have a good picture of the
case . . .I develop areas of agreement on the facts and law (which if settle-
ment fails then, can be later incorporated in a stipulation).
Id. at 19-20.
326. For instance, Judge Lacey suggests that the judge, after conferring individ-
ually with the opposing counsel, present a "ballpark" figure for settlement. Id. at 21-
22. Both attorneys are then requested to discuss the proposed figure with their clients
and then report back to the judge. Id. at 22.
327. Id at 23. Other judges have offered more detailed suggestions on formulas
to narrow the differences between the parties on a dollar figure for settlement. H.
WILL, R. MERHIGE & A. RUBIN, THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE SETTLEMENT
PROCEss 25-30 (1977) (federal judicial center education and training series).
328. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
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ment of the case" is expressly listed as an objective. 329 In addition, the
new rule 16 requires the issuance of a scheduling order no later than
120 days after filing of the complaint. 330 Such a scheduling order is to
limit the time for filing motions and for completion of discovery. 331
Despite the obvious potential of pretrial conferences and other
forms ofjudicial intervention to promote settlement, allocation of ad-
ditional judicial resources to the pretrial process can be counter pro-
ductive. A 1982 RAND study analyzes government expenditures for
processing tort cases.332 Costs for the jury trial ranged from a low of
$3,064 for non-auto negligence cases in Florida to a high of $12,035
for airplane personal injury cases in federal court.333 Costs of a non-
jury trial ranged from a low of $2,484 for a Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act (FELA)334 case in federal court to a high of $10,642 for a
tort-to-the-land case in federal court. 335 Costs of one motion hearing
ranged from a low of $60 for an auto negligence case in Florida to a
high of $1,299 for the assault, libel, and slander category in federal
court.3 36 Costs for one conference ranged from a low of $105 for auto-
mobile negligence in Florida to a high of $649 for the assault, libel,
and slander category in federal court. 337
These figures make it appear advantageous, from a cost stand-
point, to allocate additional judicial resources to motion hearings and
conferences, if that would have the effect of reducing time required
for jury or nonjury trials by promoting settlement or summary resolu-
tion. Analyzing the costs in a different manner, however, raises
doubts about the soundness of this approach. Average expenditure
per case suggests that conferences can be more expensive than trials.
For example, the expenditure per case for conferences was about
$125 in California, while the cost per case for a nonjury trial was $37-
329. Id 16(a)(5).
330. Id 16(b)(5).
331. Id 16(b)(2), (3).
332. J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN, COSTS OF THE CIViL. JUSTICE SYSTEM -
COURT EXPENDITURES FOR PROCESSING TORTS CASES (1982). The authors began
with categories of case-related time expenditure of judges in state courts in Califor-
nia, Florida and Washington, and for the United States District Courts nationwide.
Id. at xi-xii. They combined these figures with government expenditures for judges,
including both the direct salary and fringe benefits for the judge, and for supporting
services, such as staff and office space. Id at xii. The result was a cost figure for each
major activity associated with litigation of tort cases in the jurisdictions studied. Id at
xvii.
333. Id at xvi.
334. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
335. J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN, supra note 332, at xvi.
336. Id
337. Id
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64.338 Similarly, in federal court, the cost per case for conferences in
FELA cases was $405, compared with a cost per case of FELA trials
of $47. In many other categories, the cost per case for conferences was
higher than the cost per case for nonjury trials.339 Even with respect
to jury trials, the figures are close enough to suggest caution in pro-
moting more conferences in an effort to reduce trials.340
The problem of burdening judges with pretrial conferences and
other forms of mediation can be addressed by designating other per-
sons to perform this function. A variety of methods have been tried.
The most prominent is the system of assigning magistrates to perform
pretrial conference duties in the federal courts. 341 Other systems have
been utilized in the state courts. 342
338. Id at xvii.
339. Id
340. Id Pretrial procedures can also result in "overregulation." See FED. R. Civ.
P. 16 advisory committee note; Pollack, Pretrial Procedures More Effectively Handled, 65
F.R.D. 475, 477 (1974). Another criticism voiced of the pretrial conference is its
merely ceremonial or ritualistic use on some occasions. See McCargo v. Hedrick, 545
F.2d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 1976). Its use when the attorneys attending the conference are
not trying the case or do not have authority to enter into binding stipulations is of
little value. FED R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory committee note.
341. Rule 16(b) allows magistrates to conduct pretrial conferences when author-
ized by district court rule. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). While the drafters of the rule
have noted a preference for the judge to preside over the pretrial conference, the
drafters acknowledge the imposition on the judicial schedule which this would in-
volve. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory committee note.
342. One example is North Dakota's Boards of Conciliation. See Skeen, Minor
Dispute Resolution in North Dakota, 57 N.D.L. REV. 163, 165 (1981). Under a statute in
effect. from 1895 to 1921, either party could request that a civil action, once filed, be
referred to an elected Board of Conciliation for the jurisdiction. Id at 165 n.5 (citing
1895 Laws of N.D. ch. 22 (codified at 1913 Compiled Laws of N.D., §§ 9187-92)
(repealed 1921)). The Board conducted a hearing and was required to persuade the
parties to settle the matter amicably. Id at 165.
This statute was replaced by one requiring the judges to establish conciliation
boards. Id. (citing 1921 Laws of N.D. ch. 38 § 1 (codified at 1921 Compiled Laws of
N.D., §§ 9192(a)(1)-(15) (Supp. 1925)) (repealed 1943)). Civil claims involving sums
below $200 could not be filed with the court unless a certificate also was filed demon-
strating unsuccessful reference to conciliation. Id at 166. The requirement of at-
tempted conciliation prior to filing a lawsuit was held to comport with the
requirements of due process. See Klein v. Hutton, 49 N.D. 248, 191 N.W. 485 (1922).
A careful study of mediation in Maine small claims courts showed that defend-
ants are nearly twice as likely to comply fully with mediated outcomes as with judg-
ments imposed by the court after adjudication. McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in
Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 L. & Soc. REV. 11 (1984).
The authors suggest that the improvement in compliance is due largely to a higher
degree of psychological commitment resulting from consensual settlements, as com-
pared with authoritative judgments. Id.
The Philadelphia Municipal Court offers the litigants in small-claims and land-
lord-tenant disputes the opportunity to participate in mediation rather than tradi-
tional trial. Law students and graduate students in social work serve as volunteer
mediators. Impressionistic evidence says the program is quite successful. The author
is a member of the advisory council for part of this mediation program.
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In family disputes, especially those involving child custody, there
is growing acceptance of the practice of automatically referring such
cases for conciliation or mediation before the judicial process
proceeds. 343
c. Advisory Opinions: Judicial Fact Finding
An obvious way to improve the accuracy of party projections
about the potential outcome of a trial is to simulate the trial. Many
methods for doing this occur under judicial reference, where an insti-
tution other than the regular court institutions simulate the trial.344
Two major programs directly involve court institutions.
The first is the summary jury trial program established in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. In this
program, counsel are required to present one-hour summaries of their
evidence to an advisory jury selected from the regular jury panel. 345
The parties retain their right to try the case in the usual manner af-
terward.3 46 The program seems to promote settlement at a cost lower
than the cost of having the case fully tried before a regular jury.
The other major program was established by the Philadelphia
Common Pleas Court for the large volume of asbestos cases. 347 Such
cases must be tried to one of several designated judges, 348 who issue
advisory opinions.349 The program is intended to promote settlement
by giving the parties a better idea of what they might recover at
trial.3 50 It is hoped that cost savings will result because the designated
judges become familiar with the issues in this class of cases and thus
are able to supervise the presentation of evidence to make the process
343. See Kraut, supra note 111.
344. For a discussion of these methods, see notes 353-467 and accompanying
text 1infa.
345. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 38, at 46-47.
346. See Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntaty Settlements, 29 VILL. L.
REV. 1363 (1984).
347. In 1982, 1,850 asbestos-related cases were pending in Philadelphia, with
approxiamately 75 new cases being filed each month. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v.
Bradley, 499 Pa. 291, 296, 453 A.2d 314, 315 (1982). Because of the long latency
period of asbestos-related diseases, the number is likely to remain substantial. Id at
294, 453 A.2d at 315; Schwartz & Means, The Needfor Federal Product Liability and Toxic
Tort Legislation. A Current Assessment, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1088, 1099 n.46 (1983).
348. PHILA. C.P. LOCAL RULE 203; Pittsburgh Coring, 499 Pa. at 294, 453 A.2d
at 315.
349. Subsequent to the nonjury trial any party is free to demand a de novo trial
by jury. PHILA. C.P. LOCAL RULE 203; Pittsburgh Coming, 499 Pa. at 294-95, 453 A.2d
at 315.
350. As of 1982, very few such cases had settled, in part because of the large
number of defendants in each asbestos suit. Pittsburgh Corming, 499 Pa. at 297 & n.4,
453 A.2d at 317 & n.4.
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more efficient. 35 ' It is not clear how successful the program is. The
defense bar has major complaints, and the appeal rate seems high.3 52
d. References: Court-Annexed Fact Finding
Greater use of mandatory pretrial fact finding requires personnel
to perform the fact finding function. Judges can perform pretrial fact
finding functions, and more judge positions can be authorized legisla-
tively, but there are values in conserving the dignity associated with
the judicial office. Accordingly, most judicial systems rely on nonjudi-
cial personnel or "parajudges" to conduct fact finding. Three types of
systems using such personnel are in wide use: reference to masters or
referees, reference to arbitration, and reference to screening panels.
(i) Masters and referees
As far back as the reign of King Henry VIII,3 5 3 courts utilized
the services of masters to sort out the facts of complex cases. 354 The
practice crossed the Atlantic with the American colonists, 355 becom-
ing well-established in the federal judiciary. 35 6 In 1938, with the ap-
proval of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal practice was
codified in rule 53, permitting judges to refer cases to masters in cer-
tain circumstances. 357
Since the adoption of the federal rules, the question of when
masters properly may be used has been addressed several times by the
Supreme Court. The most celebrated case is LaBuy v. Howes Leather
Co, 3 5 8
351. See id.
352. As of 1982, of the fewer than 25 cases tried to verdict, all had been by jury.
Id at 294, 453 A.2d at 315.
353. Kaufman, Master in the Federal Courts.- Rule 53, 58 COLuM. L. REV. 452, 452
n.1 (1958).
354. Justice Brandeis described the master's job as follows: to take and report
testimony; to audit and state accounts; to make computations; to determine, where
the facts are complicated and the evidence voluminous, what questions are actually
in issue; to hear conflicting evidence and make finding thereon; these are among the
purposes for which such aids to the judges have been appointed. Ex parte Peterson,
253 U.S. 300, 313 (1920) (citing Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 523 (1889)).
355. See Kaufman, supra note 353, at 452; Silberman, Masters and Magi trates Part
IT The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1322 (1975).
356. See Kaufman, supra note 353, at 454 n.12. The Federal Equity Rules, used
long before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated, provided for
reference to masters. See Fed. Eq. R. XXIX, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xvii, xx (1822); Fed.
Eq. R. 59-68, 226 U.S. 631, 666-69 (1912). Reference also was the means used under
early state systems to effect commercial arbitration. See Note, CommercialArbitration in
the Eighteenth Centug: Searching for the Transformation of American Law, 93 YALE L. J. 135
(1983).
357. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
358. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
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In LaBu,, a district court judge who had heard numerous pre-
trial motions in two complex antitrust cases referred both cases to a
master shortly before trial. 359 He had been told by one attorney that
his case probably would take six weeks to try, and, citing a crowded
docket, referred them over the objections of counsel.36° The Seventh
Circuit granted the attorneys' application for a writ of mandamus,
and the Supreme Court affirmed.3 6'
The court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the orders "were
an abuse of the petitioner's power under Rule 53(b). ' 3 6 2 The court
noted that while the record did not show to what extent references
were made, it would be dangerous to approve referrals for reasons of
court workload, increased numbers of suits and lengthy trials. "If
such were the test," the majority explained, "present congestion
would make references the rule rather than the exception. ' 363 The
decision has been described as condemning the reference of ordinary
matters to masters as the abdication of judicial function.364
Criticism of the use of masters is as old as the practice. English
commentators attacked the commonplace reference of cases to mas-
ters as costly and time-consuming, 365 and the chancery abandoned
the use of masters in 1852 as a result of the difficulties and abuses
arising from the practice. 366 The federal use of masters has been criti-
cized on the grounds that judges abdicate their authority when refer-
ring matters to masters,3 67 that the extra cost is a hardship to the
359. Id at 250-54.
360. Id Opinions vary on the validity of the referral. See Silberman, supra note
355, at 1326 n.168.
361. 352 U.S. at 254-60.
362. Id at 256.
363. Id at 259.
364. See Silberman, supra note 355, at 1327.
365. See Kaufman, supra note 353, at 452 n.4. At common law, masters earned
their livings by exacting fees from litigants, and thus scheduled more meetings, each
costing the litigant a fee, than were necessary. One commentator described the pro-
cess as follows:
The procedure before the masters was almost inconceivably dilatory. For
every attendance at a master's law office a warrant must be taken out, and
a fee paid. Each attendance was only for an hour; and though, if all the
parties were friendly, two or three successive hours might be arranged, this
was seldom possible owning to the engagements of the master. If the parties
were not friendly the hour would never be exceeded; and the business might
be infinitely protracted by failure to attend to or to attend punctually.
9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 360-61 (1926)(footnotes omitted).
Professor Holdsworth devotes six pages of his well known treatise to the various evils
of referring matters to masters. Id at 360-65.
366. See Kaufman, supra note 353, at 452 n.4.
367. This is a common complaint. See TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th
Cir. 1972).
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parties,363 and that it is pointless to refer complex matters to those
with little expertise and time.3 69
The Federal Magistrates Act,370 enacted in 1968, superseded the
federal system of commissioners by authorizing the appointment of
magistrates to aid district court judges in various matters.37' The leg-
islation specifically authorized judges to assign magistrates to serve as
special masters, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.372
This legislation, which permitted judges to refer actions to quali-
fied persons373 at small cost to the parties,374 gave rise to cases criticiz-
ing the new ways in which courts attempted to lighten their
caseloads. In IPO, Inc. v. McMillen,375 the Seventh Circuit issued a writ
of mandamus requiring a district court to vacate its reference of a
case to a magistrate. The petitioners objected to reference of their
motion to dismiss to a magistrate. The court of appeals agreed that a
magistrate had no power to decide motions to dismiss or motions for
summary judgment, "both of which involve ultimate decision-mak-
ing.' ' 376 The court explained that the district court did not have au-
thority to delegate such decision making power, and in doing so, had
abdicated its judicial function. 377
In Ingram v. Richardson,378 the Sixth Circuit was harshly critical of
a district court's referral of all Social Security appeals to a magis-
trate. 379 The court said that while dockets may be crowded,
368. See Kaufman, supra note 353, at 453, 461.
369. See La Buy, 352 U.S. at 253 n.5, 259.
370. 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 631-639 (1982); and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3060, 3401-34 (1982).
371. 28 U.S.C. § 631 (1982).
372. Id § 636(b)(2).
373. Section 631(b) restricts appointments to those who have been a "member
in good standing of the bar of the highest court of the State in which he will serve."
Id §631(b). The original bill placed no experience restraints on appointees, but
amendments in 1976 required magistrates to have been bar members for at least five
years. Id. § 631(b)(1). The magistrate is to be selected "pursuant to standards and
procedures promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United States." Id
§ 631 (b) (5).
374. Since magistrates are provided with office space and clerical aid at govern-
ment expense, presumably costs to the parties would be less than under a traditional
master. See Silberman, supra note 355, at 1328.
375. 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972).
376. Id at 359.
377. Id.
378. 471 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1972).
379. Id. at 1270. The court said: "Appellant has raised no question in this Court
as to the propriety of the reference to the Magistrate, but we conceive it to be our
duty to notice and pass upon obvious irregularities appearing on the face of the rec-
ord." Id In its first footnote the court explained
that no order of reference appears in the appendix; it must have been made
verbally. A formal order of reference should have been made to authorize
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"[r]eference of cases to magistrates, however, is not the proper solu-
tion [to] the problem. '380 The duty of the district court in Social Se-
curity appeals was to determine whether the Secretary's decision was
supported by substantial evidence, the court stated, implying that the
district court should be able to deal with such cases quickly. 38 ' There
was "no good reason" that Social Security cases should be "shunted
in favor of other civil actions. '38 2 The court said the litigant would be
required to disprove the magistrate's findings of fact, as well as the
Secretary's, upon appeal, and that to do so would be burdensome.
383
Although the court of appeals' decision in Ingram boded ill for
the widespread use of magistrates in adjudicating civil matters, rein-
vigorating the special master by way of the Federal Magistrates Act is
quite feasible in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v.
Weber.3 34 In Mathews, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
challenged a district court rule referring all Social Security appeals to
a magistrate.38 5 The magistrate was directed to conduct hearings as
appropriate, and to prepare a written proposed order or decision,
with proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.3 6
The Court upheld the referral, holding that the preliminary re-
view function of the magistrate was one of the "additional duties"
authorized under the Act. 38 7 The action taken by the magistrate was
not that of a special master, the Court stated, and thus was not for-
bidden under the holding of LaBuy.388 The Court endorsed the role of
the magistrate in assisting the district court, stating that the magis-
trate's review of the record helped narrow the dispute to arguments
supportable by the record. 3 9
The decision approves the apparent blending of the traditional
role of master and of the statutorily created magistrate. Conse-
quently, Mathews v. Weber, combined with the statutorily defined du-
the Magistrate to act, and so as to afford the litigants an opportunity to
object to the reference. A Magistrate is not an Article III court.
Id at 1270 n.l.
380. d at 1271.
381. Id at 1271-72. The court explained that "these cases (Social Security ap-
peals) could be briefed, argued and decided long before other civil cases are at issue
particularly where discovery or other protracted proceedings are conducted." Id
382. Id at 1272.
383. Id at 1271.
384. 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
385. Id at 264 n. 1.
386. Id at 263-64.
387. Id at 272.
388. Id at 275.
389. Id. at 271.
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ties of magistrates,390 will permit magistrates to shoulder a large
amount of routine pretrial work formerly borne by district court
judges.
The original statute was amended in 1976 and 1979,39' substan-
tially increasing the magistrate's authority to handle "virtually any
pretrial matter in the district courts. '3 92 The Judicial Conference of
the United States, which was charged in the 1979 amendments with
studying the magistrate system,393 concluded that the scheme was
working well, and suggested minor changes in procedure,3 94 selection
requirements, 3 95 and sentencing authority.396 One commentator has
suggested that Congress should codify Weber by stating expressly that
pretrial references are not subject to the master's restrictions of rule
53(b), and should expressly authorize disposition of matters by magis-
trates, subject to appeal to an article III district court judge.3 97
Magistrates have substantially increased the number of cases
that a judge can process. In 1981, judges handled an average of 345
390. For a discussion of these duties, see notes 372-73 and accompanying text
supra. The statute permits magistrates to act in criminal cases, especially prisoners'
rights, as well as in civil matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1982). Magistrates were
heavily utilized for procedural and discovery motions (43,691 cases in 1980-81), pre-
trial conferences (23,109 cases in 1980-81), and postindictment arraignments (18,981
cases in 1980-81). JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE FEDERAL
MAGISTRATES SYSTEM 13-14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
SYSTEM].
391. See Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 3401, 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 631-636, 1915 (1982)); United States
Magistrates-Jurisdiction, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982)).
392. See FEDERAL MAGISTRATES SYSTEM, supra note 390, at 5.
393. Id at iii.
394. Id at iii-v. The report recommends that the language read by the clerk of
court in advising litigants of a magistrate's availability to try a case be made clearer.
Id at 50. Under the statute's language, some courts were reluctant to authorize mag-
istrates to try cases because it could have been construed to require a court to accede to
litigant demands for a magistrate in lieu of a judge. Id
395. Id at iii-v. The statute requires that magistrates be members of the bar of
the highest court of the state in which they will sit for five years. Id. at 39. The
suggested change would allow attorneys of five years' membership in any highest
court's bar to become magistrates, as long as they were now a member of the bar of
the state's highest court. Id.
396. Id at iii-v. For instance, magistrates were restricted in sentencing under the
1979 amendments, being unable to place juveniles on probation for longer than six
months for petty offenses. Id at 55. The Judicial Conference recommended longer
probation sentencing capacity, eliminating the disparity in sentencing power be-
tween judges and magistrates for youth offenders, and repealing the statute's condi-
tional release requirements. The Conference made numerous other minor
recommendations for the magistrate's authority in criminal cases. Id
397. See Silberman, supra note 355, at 1346. Professor Silberman also recom-
mended changes in postconviction motion jurisdiction that were adopted in the 1979
amendments. Id at 1349; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1982).
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civil cases each, while in 1970, before the magistrates were estab-
lished, judges disposed of 201 cases each. 398 In 1981, 127 magistrates
disposed of 1,933 civil cases under their authority to adjudicate with
the consent of the litigants, with 600 cases tried. 399 About one-fourth
were personal injury or other tort suits. 40 0
The statute authorizing magistrates to try cases with the consent
of the litigants40' was enacted in 1979. Of the 168 magistrates certi-
fied to try cases, 127 exercised that jurisdiction in 1981.402 Recently, a
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held it un-
constitutional for magistrates to try cases even with the consent of the
litigants. The slip opinion was withdrawn, however, a few months
after it was announced, and the court granted rehearing en banc and
reversed the panel decision. 40 3
The panel had described the magistrate's authority, finding that
under the statute,40 4 a magistrate's judgment in a consented-to-trial
could be appealed, because it was final and an ultimate decision. 40 5
Thus, the magistrate was exercising the powers of an article III judge
without article III protections; the exercise could not be saved by the
consent of the parties, since the requirement that article III judges try
cases was jurisdictional and could not be waived. 40 6 According to the
panel, appellate review could not save the exercise of judicial
power. 4
0 7
Various commentators have suggested that, even with consent of
the litigants, magistrates cannot constitutionally try cases. 40 8 How-
398. See FEDERAL MAGISTRATES SYSTEM, supra note 390, at 18.
399. Id at 16.
400. Id 156 of the 611 cases were tort cases. Civil rights suits accounted for 124
of the 611, and there were 106 contract disputes adjudicated. Id
401. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982).
402. See FEDERAL MAGISTRATES SYSTEM, supra note 390.
403. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. Instromedix, Inc., 712 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.
1983), rev'd, 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984). The
Ninth Circuit sitting en banc held that the Federal Magistrates Act allowing magis-
trates to enter final judgments with consent of the parties was constitutional.
404. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (1982).
405. Pacemaker, 712 F.2d at 1311.
406. Id at 1312. The panel cited criminal law cases from the Supreme Court to
support its argument that article III judges were necessary parts of the framework of
government. It rejected the analogy to arbitration agreements entered into by con-
sent, stating that arbitrators could not enforce judgments but magistrates could. By
using magistrates, the parties were "invoking the judicial system." Id. at 1311.
407. Id at 1313 (citing Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)).
408. See Comment, Article III Limits on Article I Courts. The Constitutionality of the
Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrates Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 560, 592-96 (1980);
Comment, Article III Constraints and the Expandng CivilJurisdction of Federal Magtrates.
A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1047-61 (1979).
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ever, the Third, as well as the Ninth Circuits have rejected such
arguments. 40 9
As previously noted, the masters system became well-established
in the state courts after arriving with the colonists.410 The system still
exists today, with some states patterning their references on the fed-
eral model,41 ' and others using a variety of practices. 41 2
One state system, the Massachusetts system of "auditors," 41 3 re-
ceived attention in the 1950's and early 1960's as an antidote to short-
comings in civil litigation. In 1956, trial delay in that
commonwealth's superior court exceeded two years in ten of fourteen
counties, 41 4 and was four years in one county.41 5 The designation of
members of the bar as "auditors" to try cases referred to them by the
409. See Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th
Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984); Wharton-Thomas v. United
States, 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983). See also Note, The Constitutionality of the Magstrate
System After the Northern Pipeline Decision, 29 Viii. L. REV. 1201 (1984)
410. See Bryant, The Ofjce of Master in Chanceg." Colonial Development, 40 A.B.A. J.
595 (1954).
411. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. § 4317 (McKinney 1963). The New York rule
provides as follows:
(a) Upon consent of the parties. The parties may stipulate that any
issue shall be determined by a referee. Upon the filing of the stipulation
with the clerk, the clerk shall forthwith enter an order referring the issue for
trial to the referee named therein ....
(b) Without consent of the parties. On motion of any party or on its
own initiative, the court may order a referee to determine a cause of action
or an issue where the trial will require the examination of a long account,
including actions to foreclose mechanic's liens; or to determine an issue of
damages separately triable and not requiring a trial by jury; or where other-
wise authorized by law.
Id See also N. J. Civ. PRAC. R. 4:41-5. This rule provides as follows:
(b) In an action to be tried without a jury the court shall accept the master's
findings of fact unless contrary to the weight of the evidence ....
(c) In an action to be tried by a jury the findings of the master upon the
issues submitted to him are admissable and the evidence taken before him
may be read to the jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon objections to
the report of the evidence.
Id
412. See Note, supra note 155, at 1594 (table classifying state reference systems).
413. Terminology for those who act as parajudges varies from state to state. See
66 AM. JUR. 2D References § 16, at 492; FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a) ("Master" includes
referee, auditor, examiner, commissioner and assessor). The Massachusetts system
was recreated under statutory authority in 1956 to alleviate severe court congestion.
The 1975 revisions were nearly identical to the federal language of rule 53, but in
1982 the language was substantially changed. See MASS. R. CIV. P. 53, reprinted in
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 43A, R. 53 (West Supp. 1983). The notes following the
1975 revisions state that the differences between the federal language and the state
rule were intended to continue state practice; the notes to the 1982 revisions explain
how superior court rules are merged into the 1975 revisions. Id.
414. See Rosenberg & Chanin, Auditors 'n Massachusetts as Antdotes for Delayed C'vil
Courts, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 27, 28 n. 3 (1961).
415. Id n.2.
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courts led to a dramatic reduction in delay, with only one county
reporting delay of one year or more4 16 by late 1959.
The courts in the Massachusetts system designate qualified law-
yers4 17 to hear cases. Any action may be referred,4 " and referral is
effected by an order directing the lawyer to hear and report on speci-
fied matters at a specified time.419 The auditor receives "competent
proof under courtroom rules of evidence and passes on its credibility
and weight. '420 If the parties consent, the findings of fact may be
made unimpeachable; but most of the referrals provide for nonfinal
findings.421 The case will be retried in court upon the insistence of one
or both parties, but the auditor's report is admissible and becomes
prima facie evidence. 422 The introduction of the report has been held
not to violate the right to a jury trial. 423
The alternative state systems of removing certain cases from
traditional courts in the first hearing have at their core the saving of
judge time.42 4 By the calculations of one study, the Massachusetts sys-
tem saved one-third of a judge-year in the county court that was
evaluated. 4
25
(ii) Court annexed arbitration
One of the most successful dispute resolution alternatives is court
416. Id n.4.
417. See Reardon, Civil Docket Congestion - A Massachusetts Answer, 39 B.U.L.
REV. 297, 309 (1959). (The author was Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Massa-
chusetts at the time of the study.) The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court solic-
ited local bar associations for the names of attorneys thought capable of handling
cases. The names were screened by the court's Committee on Procedures and for-
warded to the presiding justices of the counties. The presiding judge made the refer-
ences. Id
418. Rosenberg & Chanin, supra note 414, at 31.
419. Id
420. Id
421. Id This rule was altered in 1975 and 1982. Id. at 32. The findings have
evidentiary weight if opposed by evidence and have conclusive weight if no evidence
is introduced in opposition. Id Other evidence may come in if the court permits, or if
the parties have reserved those issues for additional evidence. Id at 33. This rule has
been changed to permit the report to be read to the jury only.
422. Id at 32.
423. See Baldassare v. Crown Furniture Co., 349 Mass. 183, 189-90, 207 N.E.2d
268, 273 (1965).
424. See Clark, Parajudges and the Admnistration ofjustice, 24 VAND. L. REV. 1167(1971).
425. See Rosenberg & Chanin, supra note 414, at 40. The authors carefully ex-
plain how they came to their conclusions, comparing cases lkely to have gone to trial
with cases that actually did go to trial to get their final figures. The researchers also
evaluated potential time-saving stemming from the nature of trials based on auditors'
reports, but found no savings. Id at 42-43.
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annexed arbitration.426 It is hardly a new idea, having been provided
for by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1951, 427 and recommended for
adoption by the federal courts in 1959.428 By 1977, it was estimated
that at least ten states had some form of court annexed arbitration.429
In the typical program, all civil cases demanding damages below
a certain threshold value are required to be submitted to "arbitation"
before they can be tried. Arbitrators are usually members of the local
bar, appointed by the court, and sitting in panels of three. The parties
try their case before the arbitrators under the usual rules of civil pro-
cedure, although certain exceptions to the hearsay rule may be pre-
scribed to facilitate introduction of routine documents and of written
summaries of expert testimony.
Success, as measured by appeal rates,430 varies with programs of
this sort. The program in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas is
highly successful, with an appeal rate of less than ten percent. 431 Ap-
peal rates elsewhere in Pennsylvania are somewhat higher, but still
low. 4 32 A federal district court program in the same city is less suc-
cessful, with appeal rates ranging to sixty-one percent. 433 Programs in
426. The name "arbitration" is somewhat misleading because the result is not
binding; "fact finding" would be a more accurate description.
427. 1951 Pa. Laws 590 (1952) (current version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7361 (Purdon 1982)).
428. See Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 24, at 797, 911.
429. Id at 796 (citing The Court Annexed Arbitration Act of 1978.- Hearings on S.2253
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machneg of the Senate Judicia
, 
Committee,
95th Cong. 2d Sess. 21 (1978) (statement of Attorney General Bell)).
430. Regardless of how small the costs of such programs, or how quickly they
work, if the appeal rate is high, they merely add to the cost and delay of civil litiga-
tion. See ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS § 2.74 comments, at 134 (1976) (characterizing
concern that the opportunity for de novo trial after an arbitration award would in-
vite multiple trials, thereby exacerbating the court congestion problem) [hereinafter
cited as ABA STANDARDS]. An arbitration program with a high appeal rate also
might result in increased total costs for the court system. See D. HENSLER, A. LIPSON
& E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE FIRST YEAR 62-66 (198 1)
[hereinafter cited as D. HENSLER]. For a set of equations that relate appeal rates to
total cost, see note 447 infra.
431. See Doty, Philadelphia's Compulsogy Arbitration System, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1449
(1984).
432. The 1982 appeal rate in Montgomery County was 26.4%, and 26.0% in
Delaware County. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENN-
SYLVANIA, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 5.
433. See Nejeslski & Zeldin, supra note 24, at 814, 820. According to their study,
838 cases involved arbitration awards, and 508 of these cases were appealed after an
award. This produces the 61% figures. As Nejelski and Zeldin point out however, of
the 508 cases appealed, only 72, or 14.9% actually resulted in a trial de novo. Id. at
814. The Federal Judicial Center studied all three experiments in the federal courts
and found an appeal rate of about 60%. See A. LIND & J. SHEPARD, supra note 24, at
xiii.
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California have much higher appeal rates.4 34
Three characteristics of the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court
program are worth mentioning, because they may explain the success
of that program. First, cases are automatically scheduled for an arbi-
tration hearing on the date that the complaint is filed.4 35 This hearing
date is set no more than 240 days from the filing date.436 This ensures
the parties of a speedy determination and puts pressure on counsel to
move initial discovery along.437 Second, arbitration hearings are
scheduled centrally and held in a court facility, reducing the logistical
complexity of the hearing process. 438 Third, if a party wishes to ap-
peal, he or she must pay the cost of arbitration (about $200) before
the appeal will be filed. 43 9
It should be noted, however, that the large difference between
the California and Philadelphia Common Pleas appeal rates cannot
be explained entirely by imposition of cost burdens for appeals from
arbitration awards. The California system also imposes costs on the
appealing party if that party does not obtain a judgment in the de
novo trial more favorable than the arbitration award.440 These costs,
unlike the appeal fees in Pennsylvania, are not imposed as a threshold
requirment before an appeal can be filed. This may explain some of
the difference. Also, in California, when an arbitration case is ap-
pealed, the case resumes its former position on the trial list;441 in Phil-
adelphia, an appeal from an arbitration award "goes to the end of the
line." Thus delay is used as an incentive to accept the arbitration
award in Philadelphia, but not in California.
Lawyer resistance to mandatory arbitration has been strong in
some jurisdictions. In the District of Columbia, the Board of Gover-
nors of the local bar rejected a 1979 committee recommendation that
434. See D. HENSLER, supra note 432, at 32. About 38% of arbitration awards
were appealed for a trial de novo during the program's first year. Only a small per-
centage of these appeals actually went to trial; however, the appeal rate has been
rising. In the third year of the program, 50% of the awards in the larger courts were
appealed. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 73. Despite
the high appeal rate, the program is credited with reducing court congestion, and the
judicial council has recommended legislation to increase the jurisdictional limit from
$15,000 to $25,000 for the entire state. See D. HENSLER, supra note 430 at 33-34.
435. See PHILADELPHIA C. P. CT. Civ. R. 180 IV.
436. See Doty, supra note 431, at 1457.
437. Id at 1457 & n.49. The efficacy of deadlines in promoting negotiated settle-
ments is well recognized. See Dunlop, supra note 86, at 1436-37.
438. PHILADELPHIA C. P. CT. CIv. R. 180 III(A).
439. PHILADELPHIA C. P. CT. Civ. R. 180 Rule VIII(A)(2).
440. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1141:21 (West Supp. 1984).
441. See CAL. CIv & CRIM. R. § 1616 (West 1981).
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the Philadelphia plan be adopted.442 Instead, an experimental volun-
tary arbitration program was adopted, which adds little to the legal
framework for arbitration already existing under the Uniform Arbi-
tration Act. The voluntary program has been a failure, measured by
the number of cases handled. 443 In Connecticut federal courts, an ex-
perimental program with mandatory arbitration was abandoned, re-
portedly because of bar opposition.444
The Judicial Conference study of the three federal court experi-
ments resulted in some data on the effect of the arbitration process on
case handling by attorneys. In the cases referred to arbitration that
settled before the hearing, forty-five percent of the counsel believed
the arbitration program had no effect on the case. Thirty-seven per-
cent through that the expedited discovery required by the arbitration
timetable resulted in earlier settlement than would have occurred in
the absence of the arbitration program. In cases terminated by arbi-
tration award (where no appeal was filed), fifty-two percent of coun-
sel said that counsel and client viewed the award as "reasonable."
442. In the District of Columbia in 1979, at the suggestion of Chief Judge H.
Carl Moultrie, the Bar Association created the Superior Court Arbitration Commit-
tee to study the feasilbility of implementing mandatory arbitration. The report was
issued to the Board of Governors on May 1, 1979, which favored a mandatory arbi-
tration plan for the District. Waxman, Moving The Apart Together, Alternatives to Litiga-
tion, DISTRICT LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 29, 56. Two members of the committee
disagreed with the report, expressing concern that mandatory arbitration would have
a negative impact on litigants from the lower and middle classes. Opposition was
based on the perception that mandatory arbitration would give a relative advantage
to collection agencies and other high volume plaintiffs, at the expense of poor liti-
gants. See Report of the Superior Court Arbitration Committee to the Board of Gov-
ernors of the District of Columbia Unified Bar, app. 4, at 12 (May 1, 1979). With
opposing views on the committee and a lack of support from the bar, the Board of
Governors did not endorse mandatory arbitration. In 1980, the District's Judicial
Conference decided in favor of voluntary arbitration. Waxman, supra, at 57. Judge
Gladys Kessler of the Superior Court announced a new court-sponsored arbitration
plan on February 15, 1982. Id
443. During 1982, the new voluntary arbitration plan was not effectively used as
an alternative to trial. Only six cases went to arbitration within the eleven remaining
months of the year. Each year the district has between 15,000 and 16,000 civil cases.
Since the initiation of the new voluntary arbitration plan in February of 1982, only
fifteen cases have gone to arbitration. As of publication date, three of the fifteen total
cases are pending. Interview with Thomas Hammond, Chief Deputy Clerk, Civil
Division, D.C. Superior Court (Jan. 25, 1984). Recent efforts to improve the accepta-
bility of the program involve enlisting more prominent attorneys to serve as arbitra-
tors and greater publicity. After five years of voluntary arbitration in one form or
another, Chief Judge Moultrie is again requesting the District's Bar to consider the
possiblity of mandatory arbitration. Waxman, supra note 442, at 58.
444. See D. CONN. R. Civ. P. 28, reprinted in A. LIND & J. SHEPARD, supra note
24, at 99-106 (remarks of Judge Warren W. Eginton before 1983 ABA Annual Meet-
ing). See generally A. LIND & J. SHEPARD, supra note 24. After abandoning court-an-
nexed arbitration, the District of Connecticut adopted Local Rule 11, which
expanded pretrial procedures aimed at promoting settlement.
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Thirty-nine percent thought they might do better at trial but found
the risks and cost of further litigation greater than the advantages of
appeal. Twelve percent attributed acceptance to the delay that
would be involved if an appeal were filed. In cases settled after an
arbitration hearing, sixty-seven percent of counsel thought "the arbi-
tration hearing was a useful disclosure of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the case, and as such was of significant assistance in reaching
settlement." Twenty-two percent found the arbitration award a rea-
sonable valuation of the case, which "became the focus around which
a settlement was reached. '445
The federal study led the authors to conclude that the arbitra-
tion programs reduced the time from filing to disposition primarily
by increasing the rate of settlement before arbitration hearing. It ap-
pears that court-annexed arbitration can serve as an effective dead-
line for case preparation, substituting for trial not as a forum for case
resolution but as a stimulus to settlement. They suggested that atten-
tion also be given the role of arbitration in promoting post-hearing
settlement. "Effectiveness of the arbitration procedure might be en-
hanced if the role of arbitrators were not limited to the fact-finding
and judgment function of judge or jury, but included advising coun-
sel on the strengths and weaknesses of the case in order to maximize
the possibility that they can achieve an acceptable compromise in ap-
propriate cases." '446
These and other factors can be evaluated quantitatively to assess
the cost-effectiveness of court-annexed arbitration. 447
445. Se A. LIND & J. SHEPARD, supra note 24, at 66-68 (table of counsel ques-
tionnaire reponses).
446. See id. at 75-94.
447. As an example of useful quantitative analysis, consider the following sim-
plified model of court-annexed arbitration.
Let:
N total cases filed
S - total cases settling before trial
s - percent of cases filed that settle before trial (s=S/N)
t = cost per case to try
r = cost per case to arbitrate
a = percent of arbitrated cases appealed for trial de novo
The cost of the system without arbitration can be expressed as:
CP = t (N-S)
The cost of a revised system, in which arbitration is mandatory in every case,
and no cases settle prior to arbitration, can be expressed as:
CA = rN + taN
The breakeven point is where the cost of the arbitration system exactly equals
the cost of the system without arbitration, i.e.:
CP = CA
rN + taN = t(N-S), or
rN + taN = tN - tS
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(iii) Screening panels
About twenty states have responded to the growth in medical
malpractice cases by establishing some form of pretrial screening of
those cases. 448 Some systems function through administrative agen-
cies, with judicial review of their decisions. 449 Others are functionally
indistinguishable from court-annexed arbitration, discussed in the
preceding section. 450 Some provide for judicial reference of medical
malpractice cases to screening panels. 451 In the last category of sys-
tems, the panel issues a nonbinding opinion as to the merits of the
plaintiff's case, which opinion may be introduced as evidence at
trial.
4 5 2
A good example is the Arizona system. Under that system, com-
plaints in medical malpractice actions are to be referred to screening
panels chaired by judges, with attorneys and physicians or hospital
representatives as members.453 The reference requirement is waiv-
able, if the plaintiff agrees to remit any verdict or judgment in excess
of $50,000. 454 The original statute was modified to conform to a state
supreme court decision invalidating a requirement that a plaintiff
wishing to proceed to trial despite an adverse panel decision post a
$2000 bond to cover defense costs and expert witness fees.455 The re-
vised statute permits a plaintiff who is unsuccessful before the panel
Dividing through by N, yields:
r + ta = t - t(S/N)
Substituting s for S/N yields:
r + ta = t - ts
Subtracting ta from both sides yields:
r = t(I-s-a)
dividing through by t yields:
r/t = 1 - s - a
This expression for the economic breakeven point says that a compulsory arbi-
tration program will be economically beneficial only if the appeal rate is lower than
the settlement rate. Otherwise, the ratio of per-case arbitration costs to per-case trial
cost must be negative to satisfy the breakeven condition.
Obviously this model can be made more useful and realistic by adding variables
for the settlement rate after the arbitration program is introduced and by adding
other variables to consider the possibility of funding for an arbitration program
(which would permit a negative r/t ratio).
448. See Sakayan, supra note 198, at 686 & n.17.
449. Id
450. See notes 426-47 and accompanying text supra
451. See Sakayan, supra note 198, at 686.
452. Id
453. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (Supp. 1983-1984).
454. See id § 12-567(a).
455. See Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (en banc) (de-
claring provisions of Medical Malpractice Act requiring posting of bond by non-
prevailing party unconstitutional as violation of state privileges and immunities
clause).
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to proceed to trial without any special burden. 456 If a case proceeds to
trial, the conclusion of the panel may be admitted into evidence and
the jury must be instructed that the panel conclusion "shall not be
binding but shall be accorded such weight as they choose to give
it.''4 57 If the panel finds for the plaintiff, it is required to assist the
plaintiff in obtaining expert medical testimony for any subsequent
trial of the plaintiff's claim. 458 Proceedings before the panels are to
be conducted according to traditional rules of procedure, including
normal discovery, except that the total amount of oral testimony in
any one case is limited to eight hours.459
Other systems contain variations on this model. For example, the
Massachusetts system 460 requires medical malpractice suits to be sub-
mitted to three-person screening panels. The panel, rather than hear-
ing evidence, considers an offer of proof by the plaintiff. If the panel
finds that the offer does not make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff
may proceed with the suit only by paying a bond of $2000.461 The
Rhode Island system, found unconstitutional in 1983,462 permitted
the presiding judge to decide, on the basis of the complaint, whether
the evidence warranted continuing to trial. An adverse ruling at this
stage meant dismissal of claim with prejudice.463 The Virginia sys-
tem464 provides for submission to the screening panel only upon re-
quest of one of the parties. The finding of the panel not only is
admissible as evidence in a subsequent trial, but the panel members
456. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(H) (Supp. 1983-84), amended by 1982
Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 224, § 1.
457. See id. § 12-567(K), amended by 1982 Ariz. Sess. Laws, § 1.
458. See id § 12-567(I), amended by 1982 Ariz. Sess. Laws § I.
459. See id § 12-567(D). Under the rules promulgated by the Arizona Supreme
Court, certain discovery is automatic, and unusually short time limits are set for cer-
tain prehearing steps. See ARIZ. UNIF. R. FOR MEDICAi LIAB. REV. PANELS IN
SUPER. CT. 1-6, reprinted in ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. vol. 17A (Supp. 1983-1984)
460. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1983-1984).
461. See Beeler v. Downey, 387 Mass. 609, 442 N.E. 2d 19 (1982) (panel findings,
because based on nonadversary hearing, not admissible before jury; otherwise consti-
tutional). The Ohio system makes the findings of the panel admissable in the subse-
quent trial only if the trial judge approves the findings as not clearly erroneous. See
O-o REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21(c)(1) (Page 1981). See also Beatty v. Akron City
Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424 N.E.2d 586 (1981) (Brown, J., dissenting)(finding
system constitutional under equal protection and jury trial tests).
462. See Boucher v. Sayeed, - R.I. -, 459 A.2d 87 (1983) (reenacted Medical
Malpractice Reform Act of 1976 unconstitutional on equal protection grounds; Act
may also have been unconstitutional as infringement of right to jury trial). An earlier
Rhode Island system required reference to a three-person panel, and resembled the
Arizona system as amended.
463. See R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 10-19-4 (Supp. 1983).
464. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.1 to -581.12 (1984).
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may be called as expert witnesses. 4 65
Early evidence suggests that the screening panel process pro-
duces a high settlement rate, though the settlement figures used in
support of this conclusion seem to be of the same order of magnitude
as the general pretrial settlement rate for all cases.466
A number of constitutional challenges to special treatment of
malpractice cases have succeeded. 467 Thus, the viability of this refer-
ence procedure only for one category of civil disputes is in doubt.
3. Summary Judicial Decistons
One obvious, but relatively little utilized, way to make judicial
dispute resolution more efficient is to permit final decisions to be
made at lower transaction cost than would be involved in a full blown
trial.468 Such methods sacrifice a measure of accuracy in exchange for
reducing costs.
a. Summary Judgment
The summary judgment procedure is a well-accepted method of
obtaining summary judicial decision at a time that truncates transac-
tion costs of litigating. The procedure originated in English legal pro-
cedure, where it was confined to certain kinds of actions, such as those
involving bills or notes.469 It was designed to spare the plaintiff the
burden of proving at trial the validity of the obligation evidenced by
such presumptively valid instruments.470 It was adopted in a few
American states in this limited form.47' The 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure adopted a considerably expanded form of the rule,
making it available to both defendants and plaintiffs in all kinds of
actions. Since then, most states have adopted similar broad summary
judgment rules. 472
A 1977 study of the rule in the federal courts suggests that its
principal use is by defendants to dispose of cases in which the facts do
465. See Di Antonio v. Northampton-Accomack Memorial Hosp., 628 F.2d 287
(4th Cir. 1980) (Virginia's screening system does not violate equal protection or sepa-
ration of powers).
466. See Sakayan, supra note 198, at 687.
467. See notes 517-45 & 561-71 and accompanying text ihfra.
468. See Nejelski, The Small Claims and Access to Justice, Dispute Resolution: Trends
and Issues, 20 ALBERTA L. REV. 314 (1982).
469. See McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of the Federal SummaryJudgment Rule, 6 J.
LEG. STUD. 427, 429 (1977).
470. Id.
471. Id
472. Id. at 430.
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not warrant a trial.4 7 3 Defendant summary judgment motions are
successful in seventy-four percent of the cases in which they are filed.
The evidentiary materials submitted with the motions considered in
the 1977 study suggests that its use permits savings in discovery costs
as well as trial costs.4 74
b. Small Claims Courts
The movement toward alternative dispute resolution procedures
is motivated by two somewhat conflicting convictions. The first is that
the judicial machinery is becoming congested with many claims that
do not belong there. The other is that the costs of access to the formal
judicial machinery are so high that many meritorious claims are
abandoned rather than being resolved justly. These two conflicting
convictions also lay behind a longstanding American interest in small
claims courts, as has been pointed out in a recent study.475
Small claims courts have been established for various reasons.
One of the most important contemporary reasons is to afford a lim-
ited means of state intervention to permit private disputes without
large social policy consequences to be resolved rather than
abandoned. 476
All but eight states had a small claims procedure as of 1977.4 77
Jurisdictional limits ranged from $1000 in Texas to $3000 in Indi-
ana.4 78 Simplified procedures typify these forums. 479 Pretrial proce-
dural steps are minimal. The rules of evidence are relaxed. 48 0
Attorneys are not required and sometimes positively discouraged.481
Costs are reduced by eliminating the jury and by relying on service
473. Id at 441-42.
474. Id at 443 (table 7).
475. See Steele, supra note 7.
476. Id at 364. Steele discussed the merits of small claims courts as follows:
Efficient processing of such microsocial disputes has often meant making
the minimal change in the strategic balance between the parties which will
force the claim below the threshold of taking action and thus cause the case
note to be pressed further, as contrasted with the time-consuming and inef-
ficient process of full exploration and deliberation on factual and legal in-
terests and issues.
Id
477. See J. RUHNKA, EXECUTIvE SUMMARY: HOUSING JUSTICE IN SMALL
CLAIMS COURTS 7 (1979); J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, supra note 237, at 2.
478. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 11.6-4-2 to .6-4-3 (West Supp. 1984); TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
479. J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, supra note 237, at 93-122.
480. Id at 137.
481. Id at 10-12 (table 1.2). Six of the fifteen courts studied prohibited attorneys
in the small claims trial. Id
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by mail. 48 2 The clerk's role is enlarged to assist parties without attor-
neys in presenting their claims. 483 Appeals are permitted, but often on
terms or at a cost intended to reduce one of the historic problems with
justice of the peace courts: a rate of appeal that was so high that the
original forum became meaningless. 4 4
Pennsylvania has a relatively modern system of small claims
courts known as magisterial courts.4 5 In 1982, there were 553 of these
courts.48 6 Approximately sixty-four percent of the business of these
courts involves traffic citations.4 7 About twenty-five percent involves
other criminal matters.4 8 Eleven percent of the courts' business in-
volves civil complaints.4 9
In 1982, the Pennsylvania Magisterial Court system handled
191,892 civil complaints filed, and disposed of 188,616 civil cases. 490
About twenty-five percent of the cases went to trial; eighteen percent
were settled; three percent were closed because of no service; and al-
most forty-eight percent were resolved through default judgments. 49'
District magistrates need not be attorneys, but they must com-
plete a training course and pass a qualifying examination before tak-
ing office. They also must participate in one week of continuing
education each year.
District magistrates have concurrent jurisdiction with the courts
of common pleas over claims for up to $4000. An "appeal" exists as a
de novo trial, as though the case never was filed in district justice
court.492 Statistics on appeal rates are not readily available, but the
rates appear to be roughly comparable to the appeal rates from court-
482. Id at 113.
483. Id at 101. See also Steele, supra note 7, at 330-33.
484. See Steele, supra note 7, at 332-33. See also J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, supra
note 237, at 155. For example, Pennsylvania imposes costs on a party who appeals a
district justice judgment and does not obtain a more favorable judgment. See PA. R.
DIST. JUSTICES 206(B).
485. On May 4, 1984, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entered an order that
changed the name of the district justices to district magistrates, and redesignated
their courts "magisterial courts." Order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, May
24, 1984, Re: Amendment of Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration No. 102
(reprinted in 476 A.2d Adv. Sh. #3, at CVIII).
486. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS, 1982 ANNUAL
REPORT 56. Pennsylvania, by constructing its minor courts around the old justice of
the peace system, preserved the convenience associated with geographically dispersed
courts.
487. Id
488. See id at 58 (table 14).
489. Id
490. Id at 66 (table 22).
491. Id
492. See PA. R. DIST. JUSTICES 1007(A).
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annexed arbitration. 493
Virginia reformed its minor courts so as to eliminate justices of
the peace in a way that made the minor court system costly for minor
disputes. In Virginia, a system of general district courts is provided
for, with one such court in each city or county. Civil jurisdiction in
these courts is exclusive over claims for up to $1000, and concurrent
jurisdiction with the circuit court exists for claims up to $7000. 4 9 4
Cases involving claims for more than $1000 filed in district court may
be removed to the circuit court. 495 Informal procedure is contem-
plated but attorneys usually are involved. Appeal from the judgment
of a general district court judge may be taken as of right to a court of
record by filing a notice within ten days after entry of judgment. 496
Appeals may be perfected only by filing a performance bond and
paying the costs of the appeal in advance. 497 Appeals are tried de
novo by the circuit court. 498
Florida, like some other states, reformed its minor courts so as to
eliminate justices of the peace but to preserve features that make the
new forums reasonably satisfactory for resolution of minor claims. In
Florida, the minor courts have been centralized, 499 but lay judges are
permitted in small counties. 50 0 Informal procedure is provided for,50 1
and participation without attorneys is encouraged by protecting pro
se litigants from discovery. 50 2
Current suggestions for reform address the same issues that led to
the basic structural characteristics of these courts in the first place. 503
493. Statistics from the Prothonotary's Office in Montgomery County for 1982
show that 23% of the civil cases tried before district justices were appealed to the
common pleas court. This represents 6.5% of the total civil cases disposed of at the
district justice level in that county.
494. VA. CODE § 16.1-77(1) (1982).
495. Id § 16.1-92. See Autry v. Bryan, 224 Va. 451, 297 S.E.2d 690 (1982) (ap-
plying Virginia removal provision).
496. VA. CODE § 16.1-106 (1982). See Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Clark, 92 Va. 118,
22 S.E. 867 (1895) (analysis of predecessor section).
497. VA. CODE § 16.1-107 (1982).
498. Id § 16-1.113. See Leisge v. Leisge, 223 Va. 688, 292 S.E.2d 352 (1982). But
see K-B Corp. v. Gallagher, 218 Va. 381, 237 S.E.2d 183 (1977) (only claims ruled
upon by district court may be considered in appeal); Godlewski v. Gray, 221 Va.
1092, 277 S.E.2d 213 (1981) (establishing 30 day limit for filing appeal bond).
499. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 34.01 (West Supp. 1984)
500. Id. § 34.021.
501. FLA. R. SUMM. P. 7.140. See Stauber, Small Claims Courts in Florida. An Em-
pi'al Study, 54 FLA. B.J. 130, 133 (1980).
502. FLA. R. SUMM. P. 7.020.
503. See Steele, supra note 7 at 354-55; J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, supra note 337,
at 189. Justice Neely has suggested a variety of procedures, including scheduling fol-
lowups and telephone interviews of witnesses to make the process more convenient
and to reduce the problem of continuances. See R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 206.
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One type of reform that seems new is the suggestion that small claims
court hours be set so that unrepresented litigants need not lose time
from work in order to appear, and that the courts sit in neighborhood
locations rather than at a central courthouse to make them more ac-
cessible. In some states, small claims courts are staffed by judges who
are not lawyers. This is sometimes perceived as reducing respect for
the courts and as increasing the appeal rate. Some commentators,
however, believe that the use of nonlawyers as small claims court
judges is a good idea. 50 4 An obvious continuing problem with small
claims courts is controlling the appeal rate. 50 5
V. LEGAL PROBLEMS
Several legal impediments exist to compulsory use of methods of
dispute resolution other than the jury trial. Considerable litigation
over these impediments has occurred in recent years, especially over
programs that single out one category of civil disputes for special
handling.
A. Equal Protection in Compulso;y Dispute Resolution Procedures
If disputing parties are required to use nontraditional dispute
resolution procedures, the procedures must meet constitutional re-
quirements, including the seventh amendment right to a jury trial
(for claims otherwise cognizable in federal court) and the fourteenth
amendment right to equal protection.50 6 For the purposes of this sec-
504. See R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 199. Justice Neely points out that the skills
needed in an effective small claims court are human skills, not legal skills. Id. at 201.
505. The question of appeals from small claims courts concerned Roscoe Pound
in 1940. See generally R. POUND, supra note 9. The appeal question is addressed by the
ABA standards for trial courts. See notes 602-05 and accompanying text nfra. See also
Nejelski, supra note 468.
506. Whether Congress could establish a federal scheme of mandatory adminis-
trative adjudication of private disputes is open to question. The Supreme Court ex-
pounded on Congressional ability to create "legislative courts":
The distinction between public rights and private rights has not been defin-
itively explained in our precedents. Nor is it necessary to do so in the pres-
ent cases, for it suffices to observe that a matter of public rights must at a
minimum arise "between the government and others." In contrast, "the lia-
bility of one individual to another under the law as defined," is a matter of
private rights. Our precedents clearly establish that only controversies in the
former category may be removed from Art. III courts and delegated to leg-
islative courts or administrative agencies for their determination.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69-70 (1982)
(emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted). However, such a scheme possibly
could succeed if the administrative action were not final, and parties could invoke de
novo review of the federal courts, much as state courts hear medical malpractice suits
de novo after parties go through a screening panel. See, e.g., E.D. PA. R. 8 (require-
ment of arbitration for certain cases, with right of trial de novo). See also Schweiker v.
1315
95
Perritt: And the Whole Earth Was One of Language - A Broad View of Dispute
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tion, only the equal protection questions will be discussed. The right
to jury trial is discussed in the next section.
The fourteenth amendment's requirement that no state deny its
citizens the equal protection of the laws has grown to be a major
means of attacking alternative dispute resolution methods. 50 7 Well-
drafted equal protection challenges have been able to strike down
schemes requiring one class of litigants to go first to one forum before
taking their complaint to courts. Cases where litigants were denied
the right to go to court at all have also been invalidated on equal
protection grounds. 508
Generally, equal protection challenges to such programs have fo-
cused on the legislative division of litigants into two classes: those re-
quired to utilize such procedures, and those not so required. Courts
generally use the rational relationship test to examine such statutes,
rather than the compelling state interest/fundamental interest test. 50 9
No-fault auto insurance has been challenged numerous times,
and has sometimes been upheld and sometimes struck down. The
Supreme Court of Kansas, in Manzanares v. Bell,510 upheld a statute
against a claim that its threshold amount for recovery for nonpecu-
niary damages violated equal protection. The court held the differen-
tiation was "reasonably related to problems that affect the public
welfare," and bore a rational relationship to a proper legislative ob-
jective - prompt compensation for accidental injuries. 5"1
Other states have used this rationale as well to uphold statutes
against equal protection attacks based on the differentiation between
classes of motor vehicle tort victims. 51 2 But some state courts have
McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) (procedure utilized by Department of Health and
Human Services using private insurance carriers to decide whether certain Medicare
claims were payable without right of review not violative of due process).
507. For cases concerning equal protection challenges to no-fault auto insurance
statutes, see notes 512-16 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the case law
concerning equal protection challenges to medical malpratice claims statutes, see
notes 517-45 and accompanying text btfta. For a discussion of the case law generally
rejecting equal protection challenges to workers' compensation statutes, see notes 546-
52 and acccompanying text infra.
508. See, e.g., Grace v. Howlett, 51 Il. 2d. 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972) (invali-
dating state no-fault insurance law), Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825
(1980) (invalidating state medical malpractice statute).
509. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAi. LAW ch. 16,
§I(C) (2d ed. 1983) (describing different standards used for judging equal protec-
tion) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
510. 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).
511. Id at 611, 522 P.2d at 1309.
512. See, e.g., Bushnell v. Sapp., 194 Colo. 273, 571 P.2d 1100 (1977) (legislative
requirement that injured parties must reach a threshold for pain and suffering in
order to recover is rationally related to government's goal of eliminating minor
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rejected no-fault for a variety of reasons. In Kluger v. White,513 the
Florida Supreme Court overturned a law abolishing tort claims for
auto accidents, holding that the law failed to provide a reasonable
alternative when abolishing the cause of action.51 4 The law did not
require motorists to carry property damage insurance. In Illinois, the
supreme court struck down the state's no-fault law because it did not
require coverage for commercial vehicles.515 The court held the law
invalidly treated plaintiffs injured by private vehicles differently than
those injured by commercial vehicles, since those injured by commer-
cial vehicles were subject to a statutory limit on recovery while not
protected by compulsory insurance, whereas those injured by private
vehicles had the protection of a statutory provision requiring private
owners to purchase compulsory insurance.51 6
Medical malpractice claims statutes have had a difficult time in
the courts, 51 7 having been invalidated on a number of grounds. For
instance, the basic legislative division of plaintiffs into medical mal-
practice and nonmedical malpractice was upheld by the Arizona
Supreme Court in Eastin v. Broomfield5"8 in 1977. The court found the
different treatment accorded the two classes was rationally related to
a legitimate legislative purpose, 519 citing the rising cost of malpractice
insurance and the increasing number of cases. The law, said the
court, provided a system "whereby the meritorious claims could be
separated from the frivolous ones prior to trial. '5 20 Likewise, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court upheld the two-class scheme in Carter v. Spark-
man.521 The court found the statute burdensome for the parties, but
within the limits of equal protection. 522 It noted the legislative find-
claims for pain and suffering); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971)
(legislature has employed criteria rationally related to seriousness of injury in general,
and thereby to seriousness of pain and suffering).
513. 281 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
514. Id at 4.
515. Grace v. Howlett, 51 111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
516. Id at 488, 283 N.E.2d at 479. The court found that "to the extent that
recovery is permitted or denied on an arbitrary basis, a special privilege is granted in
violation of [the state constitution]." Id (quoting Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill.
2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1965)).
517. See Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Cnses. Con-
stitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REv. 759 (1977).
518. 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977).
519. Id at 583, 570 P.2d at 751.
520. Id
521. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
522. Id at 805. The statute provided for the submission of malpractice claims to
"an appropriate medical liability mediation panel before th[e] claim may be filed in
any court in th[e] state." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44, repealedby 1983 FLA. LAWS 214,
§ 15 (West Supp. 1984). It permitted the panel's determination to be admitted into
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ings in the field of medical malpractice, and found that the police
power justified such measures for the public welfare.523 Nevertheless,
the Florida program was later invalidated on other grounds, and it
was subsequently repealed. 524
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Carson v. Maurer,525 in-
validated the state's medical malpractice scheme in an equal protec-
tion attack. The court decided the test to use was whether the
classification of plaintiffs bore a "fair and substantial relation" to the
legislative goal, 526 and found the law unfairly burdened malpractice
plaintiffs in all but one of its sections. 52 7 Similarly, the Illinois
Supreme Court overturned the state's scheme in Wright v. Central
DuPage Hospital Association,528 holding that the law's restraint on re-
coveries for malpractice plaintiffs was a "special law" in violation of
the state constitution. 529 The court also found the law's failure to reg-
ulate claims arising under policies written before the act became ef-
fective violated equal protection. 530
In contrast, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a restriction on
recovery in Everett v. Goldman,53 1 holding that the law's proscription of
ad damnum clauses merely prevented a plaintiff "from praying in his
pleadings for a specified sum of money, usually vastly inflated. ' 532
The enactment was "rationally related to an appropriate governmen-
tal interest, the guarantee of continued health care services for our
citizens at reasonable cost." '533 The court also upheld the law's volun-
tary nature, which permitted those claiming against nonstate plan
evidence at trial if both plaintiff and defendant participated in the mediation, but
was silent on admissibility if only the plaintiff participated. Id
523. SeeAldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980); 1983 FLA. LAWS 214, § 15.
524. Carter, 335 So. 2d at 806. The Everett court, which stated that there was no
fundamental right or suspect classification present, found the provisions were a rea-
sonable response to the malpractice problem. See Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d
1256, 1266 (La. 1978). The Florida Supreme Court later held the scheme violated
due process. See Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
525. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
526. Id at 932-33, 424 A.2d at 831.
527. The court found the section granting defendants the privilege to not give
expert opinion testimony against themselves valid, but invalidated the entire statute.
Carson, 120 N.H. at 935, 946, 424 A.2d at 832, 839.
528. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
529. Id at 331, 347 N.E.2d at 743. The Illinois constitutional prohibition of a
"special law" is similar to the equal protection clause. See Turkington, Equal Protection
of the Laws in Illinois, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 385 (1976). See also Howlett, 51 11. 2d at
488, 283 N.E.2d at 479.
530. Wrtght, 63 111. 2d at 331, 347 N.E.2d at 744. See also Simon v. St. Elizabeth
Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976).
531. 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978).
532. Id at 1266.
533. Id
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health care providers unlimited recovery, while limiting those claim-
ing against plan participants to a $500,000 recovery. 534
The courts' tests for equal protection violations vary slightly, but
appear to have a common core of federal case law. In Manzanares v.
Bell,535 the Kansas Supreme Court cited Williamson v. Lee Optical536
and Reed v. Reed5 37 in laying out its test of "whether such differentia-
tion is reasonably related to the public purpose sought to be accom-
plished. ' 538 The Louisiana Supreme Court cited Chicago Police
Department v. Mosel 539 in declaring its test of "whether the discrimina-
tory treatment is supported by any rational basis reasonably related
to the governmental interest sought to be advanced by it. ' ' 5 4° The
New Hampshire Supreme Court chose the intermediate scrutiny test
of Lalliv. Lallz54 I and Reedy. Reed.542 The classification "must be rea-
sonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion. '543 The Idaho Supreme Court utilized a "means-focus" test in
Jones v. State Board of Medicine,544 directing a lower court to make fac-
tual findings in order to determine "whether the legislative means
substantially furthers some specifically identifiable legislative end. '5 4 5
Although workers' compensation statutes have been attacked on
equal protection grounds, courts consistently have upheld their valid-
ity.546 For instance, in Miller v. Hyoe,5 4 7 the intermediate appellate
court of Louisiana held that the state's requirement that public em-
ployees be restricted to workers' compensation remedies while permit-
ting private employees to elect coverage did not violate equal
534. Id The court's description of the act earlier in the opinion, however,
seemed to indicate that no damages in excess of $500,000 could be recovered. Id. at
1262. The health care providers, if they ligned up with a state plan requiring insur-
ance of at least $100,000, were statutorily protected from claims in excess of $500,000.
Id
535. 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).
536. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
537. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
538. Manzanares, 214 Kan. at 610, 522 P.2d at 1308.
539. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
540. Goldman, 359 So. 2d at 1266.
541. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
542. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
543. Maurer, 120 N.H. at 932-33, 424 A.2d at 831 (1980)(emphasis supplied by
court).
544. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1976).
545. Id at 867, 555 P.2d at 407. A discussion of the development of the "means-
focus" test with relation to medical malpractice cases can be found in Redish, supra
note 517.
546. See A. LARSON, 2A WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 65.20 (1983).
547. 328 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 1976).
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protection. The court found that the differing treatment was "ration-
ally designed to further legitimate state interests. ' 548 In an early case,
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island found the state's law excluding
certain workers from the scope of coverage comported with equal pro-
tection.549 The court stated that there was a "substantial difference"
between covered and noncovered employees, and found the classifica-
tion reasonable. 550 Of course, what courts view as "reasonable"
changes over the years, as shown by the Michigan Supreme Court in
Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Co.55' The court found the law exempting
agricultural workers from the scope of coverage violative of equal pro-
tection, and remanded a claim to the compensation board.552
B. R'ght tojuy Tr'al
A major constitutional obstacle to removing private disputes
from the courts for adjudication is the guarantee of a trial by jury
found in the seventh amendment to the Federal Constitution 553 and
in forty-eight of the fifty state constitutions. 554 Many state workers'
compensation statutes, no-fault insurance schemes, and medical mal-
practice screening laws have been attacked on the grounds that they
abridge or deny the right to a jury trial, with varying results.
For instance, some courts have held that the right to a jury trial
exists only when a common law cause of action exists, and that legis-
lative abolition of the cause of action makes the lack of jury trial con-
stitutional. 555  In Gentile v. Altermatt,556 the Supreme Court of
548. Id at 761. The court found that the state requirement encouraged private
employers to use the system to cover their employees and simplied agency adminis-
tration. Id
549. Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484, 494, 96 A. 340, 345 (1916).
550. Id at 492, 96 A. at 344.
551. 388 Mich. 654, 202 N.W.2d 786 (1972).
552. One justice found the law "clearly discriminatory," without writing clearly
his reasons for so finding. Id at 688, 202 N.W.2d at 791 (Adams, J.). Another found
the law would be valid only if a compelling state interest existed, since the persons
affected were of minority racial groups. Id at 674, 202 N.W.2d at 794 (Kavanaugh,
Cd.).
553. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment provides as follows:
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversey shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ....... Id See Stanley, The Resolution of
Minor Disputes and the Seventh Amendment, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 963 (1977) (suggesting
flexible interpretation of seventh amendment and similar state provisions, possibly
even encompassing a 3-5 member arbitration panel within the word "jury"). Mr.
Stanley was president of the ABA from 1976-77.
554. Colorado and Louisiana do not guarantee the right to a jury trial in civil
cases. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, app., Alternative to Litigation,
IT The Constitutionality of Arbitration Statutes 318 (1973).
555. See Redish, supra note 517, at 797.
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Connecticut held that while the right to jury trial could not be cur-
tailed for those seeking to redress legal injury, it was within the power
of the legislature to define legal injury.557 The court then noted that,
while the constitution barred abolition of rights existing at the time
the constitution was adopted, it permitted the legislature to provide
for "reasonable alternatives to the enforcement of such rights. 558 The
court found the no-fault provisions a reasonable means of redress, cit-
ing federal and state investigation of the auto insurance problem and
the state legislature's "detailed cost-benefit analysis" of the statute in
question. 559 The court breezed through the plaintiffs basic objection,
saying that the right to jury trial in a cause of action could not be
abridged, except if the cause were abolished or limited in duration.560
Other courts have held that required pretrial arbitration in med-
ical malpractice claims significantly infringes on the right to a jury
trial.561 In Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center,562 an Ohio court found
a statutory provision permitting the arbitrators' findings to be sub-
mitted to the jury to be an infringement of the right to jury trial.5 63
The court held the arbitrators' findings would reduce the strength
and persuasiveness of a party's case, noting that juries traditionally
accord added weight to the testimony of experts. 564
The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, however, upholding a
statute similar to that of Ohio in Eastin v. Broomfield. 565 The jury re-
mained "the final arbiter of the issues raised and the facts
presented, ' 566 the court said. The court considered the medical liabil-
556. 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), app. dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976). See
also Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 291 Ill. 167, 125 N.E. 748 (1919)
(legislative abolition of common-law cause of action for work-related injuries also
abolishes right to jury trial for same).
557. 169 Conn. at 285, 363 A.2d at 11.
558. Id. at 286, 363 A.2d at 12. The court cited a Florida Supreme Court case as
an example of a finding that the legislature could restrict common-law rights when it
provided for reasonable alternatives for redress. Id. (citing Kluger v. White, 281 So.
2d 1 (Fla. 1973)).
559. Id at 290, 363 A.2d at 13.
560. Id. at 298-99, 363 A.2d at 17.
561. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the administrative delays in the
pretrial screening program burdened the right so much as to make it practically un-
available. Mattos v. Thompson, 191 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980). The court has-
tened to reassure the legislature that "arbitration is still a viable alternative that can
be effective in many areas." Id at 397, 421 A.2d at 196.
562. 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976).
563. Id at 168, 355 N.E.2d at 908.
564. Id The court also mentioned that arbitration would create added pressure
and expense for the party losing at arbitration, for that party then would be required
at trial to persuade the jury of the incorrectness of the arbitrator's findings. Id
565. 166 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977).
566. Id at 580, 570 P.2d at 748.
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ity review panel's decision, which could be admitted into evidence at
trial, as merely evidence "which the jury may reject or accept as the
case may be."' 56 7 The court distinguished the Ohio statute as permit-
ting individual arbitrators to be called, stating that to do so would
bolster the panel's findings. 568
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Paro v. Longwood
fospital,569 held that the state's medical malpractice law, requiring
the plaintiff to post a $2,000 bond in order to obtain a trial de novo
after a screening procedure, did not abridge the right to a jury trial.
"The right to a jury trial is not absolute, '5 70 the court stated, calling
the bond requirement a "limited obstruction" not impairing the sub-
stance of the jury trial right.571
Mandatory arbitration of wrongful dismissal claims under the
Railway Labor Act has been held not to infringe the right to a jury
trial.
5 7 2
C. Delegation
Another potential legal impediment to employing new methods
for dispute resolution is the prohibition on delegating governmental
power to persons or institutions not subjected to traditional political
constraints. Sometimes the delegation concern is expressed in separa-
tion of powers terms. 573 The delegation doctrine probably represents
the major obstacle to creation of new administrative agency proce-
dures for the resolution of interest disputes, because of the legacy of
the Schecter case. 574
567. Id
568. Id at 581, 570 P.2d at 749.
569. 373 Mass.,645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977).
570. Id at 654, 369 N.E.2d at 991.
571. Id at 655, 369 N.E.2d at 991.
572. See Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717 F.2d 1045, 1049 n.6 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1000 (1984) (citing Essary v. Chicago & N.W. Transp.
Co., 618 F.2d 13, 17 (7th Cir. 1980)).
573. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408, 420 (9th
Cir. 1978), af'd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (statutory one-house veto violates separation
of powers doctrine "because it is a prohibited legislative intrusion upon the executive
and judicial branches"). See Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(one-house legislative veto
contravenes separation of powers principle by authorizing legislature to share powers
properly exercised by other two branches); Pierce v. Parratt, 666 F.2d 1205, 1206-07
(8th Cir. 1981) (Nebraska habitual criminal statute does not violate separation of
powers doctrine since it neither gives the prosecutor the power to sentence nor dele-
gates legislative power of defining criminal conduct to prosecutor).
574. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). In Schechter,
the United States Supreme Court invalidated § 3 of the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act (NIRA) as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Presi-
dent of the United States. Id at 542. The Court found that Congress could not
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In addition, delegation constrains the diversion of cases from the
courts to noncourts for final resolution under Northern Ptpehe Construc-
tzon Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.5 75 This problem is avoided in most
judicial reference schemes by providing for judicial review after the
initial decision. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has approved
the diversion of relatively minor administrative claims involving pub-
lic rights to arbitration. 576 Generally, private disputes may be re-
ferred to nonjudicial bodies for resolution only where there is a
provision for adequate judicial review of the initial decision. 577
D. Procedural Due Process
Challenges to compulsory dispute resolution procedures not
made on equal protection, deprivation of jury trial, or delegation
grounds, conceivably could be made on the grounds that the proce-
dures followed do not comport with constitutional guarantees of pro-
cedural due process. 578 It is reasonably clear that a right to bring a
lawsuit is a property right protected against deprivation without due
process. 579 Accordingly, the argument would be that requiring a
plaintiff to assert a tort or breach of contract claim in an alternative
forum with simplified adjudicatory procedures violates procedural
process. 580 An unsuccessful defendant, of course, would assert that en-
delegate legislative authority to the President of the United States to "exercise unfet-
tered discretion" in approving and adopting trade codes to benefit the nation's indus-
tries. Id. at 538 (citig Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)). The Court
concluded that the NIRA's broad delegation of authority left the President's discre-
tion "virtually unfettered." Id at 542.
575. 458 U.S. 50, staled, 103 S. Ct. 200 (1982); United States v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 103 S. Ct. 200 (1982). In Northern Pipeline, the United States Supreme Court
decided that article III precluded Congress from establishing legislative courts having
jurisdiction over all matters arising under the bankruptcy laws. 458 U.S. at 76.
576. Northern P'iehhe, 458 U.S. at 70. The Supreme Court noted that controver-
sies involving public rights may be removed from article III courts and delegated to
legislative courts or administrative agencies for their determination. Id (citing Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450
(1977); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932)). Private rights disputes, on the
other hand, remain within the sole jurisdiction of the "historically recognized judicial
power." Id
577. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69 n.23.
578. See notes 579-82 and accompanying text infra.
579. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) ("right of access to courts
is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied
the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of funda-
mental constitutional rights"). Accord Mitchum v. Purvis, 650 F.2d 647, 648 (5th Cir.
1981).
580. This argument has been raised by some litigants but has not been ad-
dressed by the courts. See Association of Investment Brokers v. Securities and Ex-
change Comm'n, 676 F.2d 857, 862 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (since association did not
have standing to challenge commission's revision of personnel form, allegation that
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forcing a judgment rendered in an alternative procedure would de-
prive him of property without due process of law.5 1 Assuming that
state courts interpret state due process guarantees similarly to the way
federal guarantees were interpreted in Mathews v. Eldridge,58 2 substan-
tial flexibility should be available for innovative procedures. The
marginal increase in accuracy resulting from the use of more formal
procedures should be assessed in light of the stakes involved.
VI. PROPOSALS & CONCLUSION
A. General Princzles
Alternative dispute resolution has been under discussion for at
least a century in the United States. The body of knowledge respect-
ing the theory of dispute resolution and the empirical results of par-
ticular alternatives has been enhanced by the recent movement.
Constructive public policy now requires permanent implementation
of some of the features derived from this discussion and knowledge.
Recognition of several principles should enhance the policy result.
First, "alternatives" to the traditional trial function by promot-
ing pretrial settlement. The mystery and complexity of ADR analysis
can be reduced by understanding that court-annexed "mediation"
and "arbitration" are not new ideas, but are merely new names for
roles long performed by judges attempting to promote settlement and
by parajudge personnel enlisted through a reference process to engage
in fact finding. The attractiveness of the alternatives should be mea-
sured by (1) their efficacy in promoting settlement (2) on terms not
disadvantageous to the party with weaker bargaining power. The sec-
ond criterion is derived from the essential purpose of the civil judicial
compulsory arbitration is a denial of due process never addressed); Kuenzer v. Local
507 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 66 Ohio St. 2d 201, 204, 420 N.E.2d 1009, 1011 (1981)
(argument on appeal that compulsory arbitration provision violates due process fore-
closed where not raised below). But see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin, 388
U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (suggests possibility that compulsory arbi-
tration without jury trial and right to appeal may be a denial of due process).
581. For a discussion of what types of rights and benefits the Supreme Court has
considered to be property, see generally NOWAK, supra note 509, at 546-53; H. PER-
RITT, supra note 137, § 6.9 (property interests in the public employment context).
582. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Supreme Court enunciated three fac-
tors to be considered and balanced in determining what procedural protections are
required for any specific interest: the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail. Id at 335.
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system to equalize bargaining power. Without the second criterion,
this bargaining equalization function would be lost.
Second, preference should be accorded those alternatives that
function as adjuncts to the court system, except for defined classes of
disputes that occur within the framework of an economic or social
interdependence sufficient to provide incentives to resolve disputes
privately. These classes are limited in number, probably to (1) labor-
management disputes, where the parties continue in the collective
bargaining relationship; (2) marital disputes, where the parties will
continue to deal with each other over questions of child rearing; (3)
commerical disputes involving a continuing relationship; and (4)
landlord-tenant disputes where the tenancy is likely to continue. All
other disputes need the coercive power of the court to force participa-
tion because the parties are strangers to each other or because at least
one nonstranger party can avoid dispute settlement by walking away
from the dispute.
Third, preference should be accorded to changes in existing judi-
cial procedures rather than introduction of entirely new types of pro-
cedural alternatives. 58 3 New procedural alternatives require
583. The American Bar Association Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs
and Delay (1984) described a series of experiments involving changes in civil proce-
dure and case handling, without resort to alternative dispute resolution techniques:
The Commission's experimentation combined two parallel efforts: de-
lay reduction through judicial control over the pace of litigation and cost
reduction through procedural simplification.
Our primary test site was in Kentucky, where combined judicial con-
trol and simplification rules were put into effect in late 1980. As a result of
the new procedures, the average time from filing to disposition has been
reduced from sixteen months to five months, cases involve less discovery
and fewer motions, and attorneys spend less time on each case.
We looked at variations of this basic program in Vermont, Colorado,
and California and found that without both judicial control and procedural
simplification, programs did not accomplish as dramatic results. Judicial
control alone may increase discovery and motion activity. Simplification
alone will not reduce delay. In addition, procedures left entirely to attor-
neys' choice will likely be underutilized.
Interviews with lawyers and judges found no perceptions that the qual-
ity of the litigation process had been adversely affected by the limitations
and deadlines . ...
The Commission decided to experiment modestly with an old and fa-
miliar technology - the telephone. ...
In 1981 telephone conferencing was introduced in several trial courts
in Colorado and New Jersey. Its almost immediate success confirmed its
expansive potential.
The range of matters that proved feasible for handling by telephone
was wide in both civil and criminal cases: all types of non-evidentiary mo-
tions, pretrial and settlement conferences, arraignments, criminal pretrial
motions, bail settings.
Both attorneys and judges found it equally satisfactory to do business
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additional overhead, present the potential for collateral attack of de-
cisions or settlements in other forums, and increase potential delay
before a resolution is obtained. Familiar procedures, in contrast, pro-
mote bar acceptance and enhance the perceived legitimacy of deci-
sions rendered hereunder. When a class of disputes can be identified
that does not lend itself to handling within a reformed civil judicial
system, consideration should be given to establishing an administra-
tive agency to replace the trial function, with limited judicial review
of the trial outcome. New forms of administrative adjudication can be
developed that avoid shifting the entire cost burden of litigation to
the public sector.
Fourth, additional fact finding procedures should be established
primarily within the framework of the traditional master/referee con-
cept, rather than through entirely new institutions. The only excep-
tion should be court-annexed arbitration, which really is a type of
reference with a special name. "Arbitration," by that name, already
enjoys a measure of acceptance and identification within the legal
community that can be built upon.
Fifth, the role of small claims courts should be enhanced rather
than reduced by the creation of new, parallel institutions. The ways
to strengthen the small claims process are obvious: creation of disin-
centives to seek trial de novo and the geographic dispersion of court
locations to make them more accessible.
Sixth, more attention needs to be given to the role of discovery in
a simplified dispute resolution procedure. Too many of the popular
ADR experiments ignore discovery and permit it to take place in par-
allel with the ADR process. One basic approach is to permit discov-
ery to begin the ADR procedure. Under this approach, discovery
by telephone as in person. Judges found it gave them additional scheduling
flexibility.
Careful attention to detail in allocating responsibility for initiating and
conducting the actual telephone hearing was essential to its success ....
Bar cooperation is indispensable to the success of delay reduction ef-
forts. The bench and bar should involve each other in new programs from
the start. Our experience also demonstrates that active judicial participa-
tion and encouragement of new programs is a high visibility factor in their
acceptance by the bar.
ABA ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COSTS AND DELAY, FINAL REPORT vii-x
(1984).
Another example is the Cook County Illinois Pretrial Mediation Division of the
local court system. In an oral presentation, before the annual meeting of the ABA,
the presiding judge of the division summarized the success of that system. Judge
Machor stated that all cases stating a claim for money damages in excess of $15,000
are required to go through mediation. He noted that the system has produced a 58%
settlement rate. Oral presentation of Presiding Judge Machor, Cook County Pretrial
Mediation Division, before the Annual Meeting of the ABA (August 6, 1984).
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management should be integrated to a greater degree with the ADR
procedure, and the fruits of discovery should be used more explicitly
by the ADR body. Another basic approach is to recognize that many
ADR procedures serve a discovey function, and that there is no rea-
son to incur the costs of two discovery procedures simultaneously.
Under this approach, typified by the small claims procedure, no dis-
covery would be permitted until after a party elects to appeal from the
outcome of a preliminary ADR procedure.
B. ABA Stdndards for Civil Trial Courts
In 1976, the American Bar Association published standards for
trial courts.584 The standards development project was the third in a
series sponsored by the Department of Justice and private founda-
tions.585 The report reflected comments from the bench, the bar, and
the public.58 6 Of the forty-eight standards contained in the report,
about a dozen are of particular interest in connection with the subject
of alternative dispute resolution. Each of these will be summarized
and commented upon in this section.
1. Procedure tn Ct'vd Cases
Standard 2.02 proposed the merger of law and equity, simplified
pleadings, liberal joinder of claims and parties, discovery, and sum-
mary judgment, an approach substantially similar to that taken by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 58 7
2. Caseftow Management
Standards 2.50-2.56 proposed active management by the court of
the flow of cases.5 8 The comments identify the disadvantages of rely-
ing on the bar to control the pace at which cases are handled, through
devices such as: "notice[s] of issue," "certificate[s] of readiness," and
584. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 430.
585. The first report in the series, Standards Relating to Court Organizatzon, was pub-
lished in 1974 after approval by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion. Id at preface. The second report issued was Standards Relating to Appellate Courts.
Id The three-part project was funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration of the Department of Justice, the American Bar Endowment, and the Ford
Foundation. Id.
586. Id
587. Id § 2.02.
588. Id § 2.50 ("Caseflow Management: General Principle"); § 2.51 ("Caseflow
Management Program"); § 2.52 ("Standards of Timely Disposition"); § 2.53 ("Iden-
tifying and Managing Protracted Cases"); § 2.54 ("Managing Potentially Disruptive
Cases"); § 2.55 ("Managing 'Short Cause' Dockets"); § 2.56 ("Firm Enforcement").
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"request[s] for setting." 589 On the other hand, the comments discour-
age overuse of hearings and conferences to the point that judges,
counsel, and parties spend undue time waiting.590 Other comments
point out that there are advantages and disadvantages to individual
and master calendaring systems, rather than evidence that either is
inevitably superior. They noted that the calendaring and case assign-
ment system should meet the particular needs of the court, and
pointed out that a hybrid system may be desirable. 59 1 In any event,
caseflow managment should be under the "continuous supervisory di-
rection of the presiding judge .... ",592 Standard 2.52 proposes the
following standards for disposition of civil cases: thirty days from fil-
ing for cases using summary hearing procedures, such as small claims;
forty-five days for cases involving child custody, or support of
dependants; and six months for other cases unless they involve excep-
tionally complicated discovery, stabilization of injury in personal in-
jury cases, or settlement of financial affairs in probate cases.593
Standard 2.56 calls for firm and uniform enforcement of caseflow
management procedures, by providing for request for, and grants of,
continuances and reporting them to the presiding judge.594 This
standard recognizes the importance of deadlines in promoting negoti-
ated settlement. 595
3. Speci'alized Procedures
Standards 2.70-2.78 propose specialized procedures for handling
classes of cases. Five of these relate to involuntary commitment, juve-
nile matters, traffic violations, arrests for inebriation, and probate
matters. 596 Three others relate to subjects frequently addressed under
the heading of alternative dispute resolution. 59
7
Standard 2.71 proposes special handling of disputes concerning
family relationships. Independent investigation by the court of facts,
promotion of conciliation, and referral to counselling all are en-
couraged.5 98 The standard itself is framed in terms of judicial atti-
589. Id § 2.50 commentary at 84.
590. Id
591. Id § 2.51 commentary at 89-90.
592. Id § 2.51 commentary at 90.
593. The comments propose that, where injury stabilization in a personal injury
case seems necessary, suspension of the progress of a case be deliberately arranged by
the court, for a fixed time period. Id § 2.50 commentary at 85.
594. Id § 2.56.
595. d § 2.56 commentary at 101-02.
596. Id §§ 2.72, 2.78, 2.76, 2.77, 2.73, respectively.
597. See notes 598-607 and accompanying text infra.
598. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 430, § 2.71(b)-(a).
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tudes. The comments suggest particular institutional arrangements,
including provision of mediation in divorce, custody and visitation,
child support and alimony disputes; and availability of judicial and
nonjudicial staff to hear and make preliminary fact determinations
and to perform counselling.5 99 This standard recognizes that adjudi-
catory techniques are ill-suited for dealing with interest disputes aris-
ing from domestic relationships.
Standard 2.74 proposes that "[c]ivil cases in which the amount in
controversy is substantial enough to make assistance of counsel advis-
able, but sufficiently modest that litigation cost is a major factor in
prosecuting or defending them, should be subject to determination by
procedures that reduce costs and expedite final disposition. 600 The
standard suggests a bracket for the amount in controversy, ranging
from $2500 as a minimum, to $10,000, or some higher figure, as a
maximum. All cases within this bracket would be handled under a
special procedure, which would include limitations on discovery and
one or more of the following procedures for determination:
Nonjury trial before a designated judge or judges;
Trial by a judicial officer, subject to a right to a de
novo jury trial;
Nonbinding mediation by stipulation;
Arbitration by a panel of three attorneys, subject to de
novo jury trial;
Expedited presentation of evidence through written ex-
pert testimony, eliminating the requirement of authentica-
tion of previously disclosed documents, more liberal
allowance of leading questions, and establishment of non-
controversial matters by recital of counsel;
No appellate review, except on issues of law of substan-
tial precedential importance, either certified by the trial
judge, or as to which leave is granted by the appellate
court.601
The comments suggest measures to discourage requests for de
novo trial by imposing a requirement that the costs of arbitration be
paid as a precondition to a trial de novo6 0 2 if the trial de novo does
not result in a judgment ten percent more favorable than the first-
599. Id § 2.71 commentary at 116-20.
600. Id § 2.74
601. Id § 2.74(b).
602. Id § 2.74 commentary at 133. This is the system employed in the Philadel-
phia Common Pleas Arbitration program.
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step decision. 60 3 This standard encompasses both court-annexed arbi-
tration 60 4 and innovations like the California "Economic Litigation"
initiative. 60 5
Section 2.75 proposes a mandatory procedure for small claims
(those below $1000), involving simple forms for statements of claim,
assistance of court staff in preparation of documents, and trial before
a judicial officer involving relaxed procedure and without regard for
the formal rules of evidence. The standard also suggests provisions for
holding trials in evening hours or on Saturdays. Appellate review
would not be permitted, consistent with constitutional rights to jury
trials, except on questions of law certified by the trial officer, or as to
which leave to appeal is granted by the appellate court.60 6 This stan-
dard goes a bit further than most contemporary small claims proce-
dures, especially in restricting appeals. 60 7
C. Specific Recommendati'ons
The dispute resolution policy dialogue is being made more com-
plex by a failure to address general issues and by a tendency to con-
centrate on specific types of dispute resolution procedures as though
each represents a unique way to deal with disputes.
The dialogue can be improved by classifying disputes into four
major categories and considering which of the various private, admin-
istrative, and judicial resolution methods are well suited to dealing
with them.
The first category includes interest rather than rights disputes. It
must be recognized that these disputes are not addressed satisfactorily
by an adjudicatory process, and more needs to be done to channel
interest disputes into institutions that can promote resolution. Gener-
ally speaking, a mediation approach is the most suitable method,
although there are instances in which legalized coercion is prefera-
ble. 60 8 When the disputing parties' relationship is characterized by
economic or social interdependence, as in labor-managment relations,
603. Id. This system is employed in the Detroit mediation program, and in the
Philadelphia federal court arbitration program.
604. For a discussion of court annexed arbitration, see notes 426-47 and accom-
panying text supra.
605. For a discussion of California's Economic Litigation Initiative, see notes
306-13 and accompanying text supra.
606. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 430, § 2.75.
607. For a discussion of small claims procedures, see notes 475-505 and accom-
panying text supra.
608. For a discussion of mediation as a method of dispute resolution, see notes
165-78 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of coercion as a method of dispute resolution, its application to
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family relations, or continuing business relations, three basic possibili-
ties exist. The first, and most desirable, is for the parties themselves to
establish by contract a dispute resolution procedure involving an es-
calating series of steps, proceeding from negotiation, through media-
tion, to fact finding, and possibly to arbitration. Many examples exist
in collective bargaining agreements, and these can be applied with
little modification to the other categories of disputes. The second pos-
sibility, where interdependence is low, thereby making agreement on
private dispute resolution methods unlikely in advance before specific
disputes arise, is to ensure that administrative or court-annexed pro-
cedures exist to deal with these disputes in an appropriate manner.
Efforts to do this are relatively new, but Mr. Harter's negotiated rule
making, 60 9 the Massachusetts siting statute,610 and court-annexed
conciliation for family disputes6" are promising innovations. Each of
these methods is better than adjudication, and each permits party
representatives to be identified where necessary, 612 the fairness of rep-
resentation to be policed, and good faith bargaining to be
encouraged. 6'3
The second major category involves rights disputes between par-
ties with substantial economic or social interdependence. Examples
include labor and management administration of an existing collec-
tive bargaining agreement, administration of long-term commercial
contracts involving continuing performance, administration of judi-
cial decrees or agreements related to child custody and visitation, and
employment or workplace-injury disputes involving a single em-
ployer.614 Additionally, sufficient interdependence may exist, at least
in small communities, between institutional defendants and groups of
personal injury plaintiffs' attorneys to permit the establishment of
permanent arbitration arrangements that could be offered as an op-
tion to individual plaintiffs when a claim arises. In each of these cases,
costs and delays can be reduced, and procedures designed for the
optimum handling of the type of claim if the parties agree in advance
to private arbitration of claims that arise between them.
The Uniform Arbitration Act provides sufficient statutory au-
different types of disputes and the advantages and disadvantages of its use, see notes
113-35 and accompanying text supra.
609. See Harter, supra note 108, at 52-57.
610. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 15 (West 1981 & 1984-1985 Supp.).
611. See Kraut, supra note 111.
612. See notes 610-12 supra.
613. See MASS. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 21D, § 15 (West 1981) (arbitration in good
faith); Harter, supra note 108, at 73-74 (negotiation in good faith); Kraut, supra note
111, at 1386-90 (conciliation in good faith).
614. See generally H. PERRITr, supra note 137.
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thority for the enforcement of such agreements, though statutory or
judicial modification of existing law may be required to permit work-
place injury claims to be arbitrated rather than handled in govern-
mental forums. 61 5 In addition, more thought needs to be given to the
potential problem raised by Justice Neely. Increased popularity of
private arbitration may lead to contracts of adhesion 616 that unfairly
require consumers to arbitrate claims against the other party to the
contract on unfavorable terms. Of course a doctrine can be developed
that permits relief from such agreements when the adversely affected
party can show lack of knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights to
access to the courts.61 7
Government can do little else that is useful with respect to the
second category of disputes. Funding for private programs tends to
distort operation of the market for dispute resolution services. I be-
lieve that entrepreneurial initiative by enterprises like the AAA, En-
Dispute and Judicate will publicize adequately the availability of
private services and that their use will spread.
The third and fourth categories include the residue of claims
that for one reason or another do not warrant the full-blown features
of modern civil procedure. The difference between the categories is
the size of the claim. The third category includes "small claims." The
fourth category includes claims of "medium size." I see no principled
615. For a discussion of the administrative adjudications under state workmen's
compensation statutes, see notes 180-200 and accompanying text supra.
616. An adhesion contract is generally defined as a "[s]tandardized contract
form offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially a take it or leave it
basis without affording consumer realistic opportunity to bargain and under such
conditions that consumer cannot obtain desired product or services except by acqui-
escing in form contract." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 38 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). It can be
distinguished as a contract in which the weaker party has no real choice as to the
contract's terms. Id
The California courts have led the way for other jurisdictions to hold arbitration
clauses unenforceable as part of a contract of adhesion. Two California courts have
found arbitration clauses to be unenforcable provisions in a contract of adhesion
where the arbitrator was associated with one of the contracting parties. Graham v.
Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981) (per
curiam); Hope v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 147, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 (1982). The courts in Scissor- Tail and Hope reasoned that the
arbitrator was presumptively biased in favor of one party. Id
See generally Note, Graham v. Scissor- Tail, Inc.: Unconsctonabhity of Presumpiwely Biased
Arbitration Clauses Within Adhesion Contracts, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1014 (1982).
617. This may be similar to the exception to the duty to read rule in contract
cases. Where one party can show that the contract is unconscionable under the cir-
cumstances, the party trying to enforce the contract has the burden of proving that a
given provision was explained to the party and that the latter understood and agreed
to such provision. SeeJ. CALIMARI & J.PERILLO, CoNmrRACTS 336-43 (2d ed. 1977).
If the party seeking to enforce the contract cannot meet his burden of proof, then the
provision may be unenforceable. Id. at 336-37.
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reason why society need elect judicial as opposed to administrative
methods for resolving such claims. Modern administrative law really
distinguishes very little between administrative and judicial proce-
dure except in the nomenclature used. The discussion addressing the
third and fourth categories focuses on judicial methods, but the sug-
gestions could be applied to administrative procedure with few
modifications.
In essence, the choice between administrative and judicial dis-
pute resolution methods should be made on two grounds. First, a
large volume of similar claims, where the legal and factual issues are
similar, can be adjudicated more efficiently in specialized forums. Ad-
ministrative forums traditionally are more specialized than judicial
forums. The second ground for choosing an administrative forum re-
lates to the question of who bears the cost of prosecuting a claim.
Traditionally, the claimant faces lower transaction costs for pursuing
a claim in an administrative forum than in a judicial one. This is so
because society provides more resources to the administrative agen-
cies than to the courts and permits the decision makers to engage in
an inquisitorial, as opposed to an adversarial, mode of finding facts.
Choosing the administrative option raises a number of risks. The first
is that lower transaction costs lead to more claims being presented.
The second is that administrative agencies tend to take on a life of
their own and seek more jurisdiction. On balance, it is unlikely that
any very aggressive moves will be made to establish new administra-
tive dispute resolution institutions mainly because of conservatism in
the plaintiffs' bar and current public hostility to growth in govern-
ment. This suggests that attention be focused on judicial dispute reso-
lution methods.
Judicial methods for handling disputes that do not fall into the
first or second category should be different, depending on the size of
the dispute. This creates the third and fourth categories.
The third category of disputes involves what has come to be
known as "small claims." These are claims in which the social or
party costs are too great6" relative to the size of the claim to permit
them to be resolved through a method that requires attorney partici-
pation. Dispensing with the need for attorneys implies certain proce-
dural characteristics that generally are represented by small claims
618. The American Bar Association has defined "small claims" cases as those
"in which the amount in controversy is so small that the parties would not ordinarily
employ counsel." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 430, § 275. For a discussion of small
claims courts and their use in the United States, see notes 475-505 and accompanying
text supra.
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court procedures. The ABA Standards619 represent a useful baseline
from which to evaluate such procedures, and the 1977 national study
of small claims courts62 0 includes additional useful reform proposals.
In particular, attention should be given to greater use of evening and
weekend hours for court operation,62 1 and to the problem of
appeals.
6 2 2
If state constitutional provisions inhibit direct limitations on the
right to a de novo jury trial, statutory changes or rule modification
should be made to permit appellate review of an electronically pro-
duced "record, ' 623 or to permit the decision of the small claims tribu-
nal to be introduced as evidence before the jury in a subsequent de
novo trial.624
Questions also continue to exist regarding the identity and quali-
fications of small claims tribunal decision makers. Good results ap-
parently are obtained with the use of lawyer-arbitrators to
supplement small claims court judges, 625 and impressionistic evidence
suggests that the absence of a law degree is not necessarily a serious
619. Section 2.75 proposes a special procedure for use in small claims courts.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 430, § 2.75.
620. J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, supra note 237.
621. Both the ABA Standards and the National Center Study propose adding
evening and weekend hours for small claims trials in order to eliminate plaintiffs'
absences from work and thereby reduce the costs to individuals of litigating in small
claims courts. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 430, § 2.75(0, J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER,
supra note 237, at 194-95.
622. Most states which have small claims courts also provide either for a review
of the decision by a trial de novo or a review of the record. J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER,
supra note 237, at 159. The 1977 study discusses the relative advantages and disad-
vantages of these two types of appellate review. Id at 155-61. Several courts, however,
try to limit appeal to keep the small claims process simple and inexpensive for all
participants. Id at 160. The ABA has suggested that appellate review should only be
allowed where "questions of law certified by the trial judge as being of general signifi-
cance" are concerned or where leave is granted by the appellate court. ABA STAN-
DARDS, supra note 430, § 275(g).
623. The 1977 study recommended the Wyoming procedure, in which the cas-
sette recording of the small claims trial was sent to the district court when a party
appealed. J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, supra note 237, at 160. The authors explained
the procedure followed in Wyoming as follows:
The reviewing court listened to the recording of the trial, checked the
pleadings and summons, the list of witnesses testifying, and any exhibits. If
the district court felt the trial and decision was sound, the parties and court
were notified. If they found problems, then a trial de novo was granted.
Id
624. See note 505 supra. For a discussion of the use of recorded records on appeal,
see J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, supra note 237, at 159-60.
625. Lawyer-arbitrators try small claims cases in Minneapolis, Manhattan and
Harlem. See J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, supra note 237, at 143. On the whole, the
National Center found these attorneys competent and effective in working out agree-
able settlements between the parties. Id at 144. For a discussion of the alternatives to
the use of judges at small claims trials, see id. at 143-47.
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impediment to effective performance of judge duties. 626 The dollar
threshold is problematic for disputes in the third category. Typical
limits are in the $2000 range,627 and this seems sensible, in light of
average attorney costs of $500 and upwards.62 8 A lower threshold
would give the parties an incentive to refer to more complex dispute
resolution methods when their claims involved disproportionate at-
torney's fees. A high threshold, however, might force litigants to refer
major disputes to a procedure that is too simplified for their needs. In
either case, the result is undesirable.
The fourth category of disputes includes "civil cases in which the
amount in controversy is substantial enough to make assistance of
counsel advisable, but sufficiently modest that litigation cost is a ma-
jor factor in prosecuting or defending them. '' 62 9 The ABA standards
provide a good starting point for dealing with these types of claims. In
particular, some form of judicial reference is attractive. The Philadel-
phia common pleas arbitration model works well. In jurisdictions
where this model is not attractive, some form of reference to screening
panels or "parajudges" would be appropriate.
Two open issues still need to be addressed respecting the han-
dling of fourth category disputes: appeals and discovery. Appeals can
frustrate the cost and the time saving objectives of specialized dispute
resolution methods for fourth category disputes. The rate of appeal
for de novo trial is low in Philadelphia Common Pleas Court, but it is
high in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and in the California
arbitration system. If the problem of state constitutional guarantees
of jury trial can be avoided, one way to deal with the appeal problem
is to generate a low-cost electronic record of the reference proceeding
and to limit appeals to a review of the record for manifest legal error
or factual decisions unsupported by the evidence. If jury trial guaran-
tees are a problem, then statutory or rule changes should be made to
permit introduction of the initial decision into evidence before the
jury in a subsequent de novo trial.
The literature does not identify discovery as a particular prob-
lem in the use of reference alternatives. 630 Nevertheless, permitting
626. Id at 144.
627. The ABA's procedure for small claims is intended to cover cases where the
amount in controversy is between $0 and $1000. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 430,
§ 2.75. For a compilation of claim limits in jurisdictions around the country, see J.
RUHNKA & S. WELLER, supra note 237, at 201-13 (app. A).
628. Where no fee-charging attorney was employed, the costs to most litigants
was less than $25 per case. J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, supra note 237, at 91.
629. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 430, § 2.74. For a discussion of standard 2.74,
see notes 601-04 and accompanying text supra.
630. In the cases on which I have sat as an arbitrator in the Philadelphia Coin-
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ordinary discovery in this category of claims poses the threat that cost
burdens and delay can be increased at the initiative of one of the
parties in a manner compatible with the basic objective of a special-
ized procedure for this category of cases. Accordingly, more attention
needs to be given to the amount and scope of discovery that should be
permitted in advance of the reference hearing. One possibility is to
prohibit depositions, which are the most expensive form of discovery
ordinarily used in this category of disputes, and to limit the number
of interrogatories that could be exchanged. The recent California ex-
periment suggests that such limitations can have substantial cost re-
ducing effects. 63' Collateral proceedings to compel discovery could
be avoided by permitting the drawing of adverse inferences at the
reference hearing against the party declining to cooperate in
discovery.
Whether or not any of these recommendations is adopted, judi-
cial reform is underway. More purposeful use of pretrial conferences,
and greater use of consensual arbitration and mediation and of refer-
ence on an ad hoc basis is desirable. These are contemplated by the
recent changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which un-
doubtedly will be copied by the state court systems, as appropriate.
D. Pohti'cs and Practt'cah't of Change
The history of Anglo-American dispute resolution institutions
should not lead anyone to suppose that a neat package of proposals
will be accepted in any jurisdiction, supplanting existing institutional
arrangements. Rather, it is likely that new institutions and procedures
will be superimposed on old ones, filling the interstices sometimes
and overlapping sometimes. This form of development has much to
recommend it in terms of acceptability and perceived legitimacy.
Self-interest is likely to further some changes and to inhibit
others. Justice Neely has made some astute observations about the
politics of judicial reform.632 It is not an issue that captures the public
imagination because most citizens do not anticipate becoming in-
volved in civil litigation.633 This lack of public involvement magnifies
the influence of interest groups that are interested in dispute resolu-
mon Pleas mandatory arbitration program, relatively little discovery had been at-
tempted before the arbitration hearing. In more than half the cases, there had been
no discovery at all. In about a third of the cases, a few interrogatories had been
served and answered.
631. For a discussion of the California experiment, see notes 306-13 and accom-
panying text supra.
632. See R. NEELY, supra note I.
633. Id
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tion: the bench, the bar, and institutional defendants such as insur-
ance companies. The direction and pace of change can be anticipated
to some degree by considering the probable position of each of these
groups on the major recommendations set forth above.
Movement away from adjudicatory processes for dealing with in-
terest disputes does not diminish the influence or earning power of
any of these groups. The bench, at least, may favor getting judges out
of the business of dealing with complex interest disputes with ill-
suited procedures. On the other hand, it is difficult to identify any
group likely to give energetic support for broad-based reform of inter-
est dispute resolution procedures, except perhaps in the administra-
tive area, where the Administrative Conference already has given
limited endorsement to the negotiated rulemaking idea.634 Outside of
federal administrative law, what is likely is piecemeal experimenta-
tion, with special procedures for plant and hazardous waste disposal
siting disputes, as has already occurred in Massachusetts.
New private procedures for resolving rights disputes between in-
terdependent parties can benefit from momentum that already has
developed because of promotion by the AAA, EnDispute, Judicate
and other private groups. The bar can be expected to support, or at
least not to oppose, such measures, once it becomes sufficiently clear
that legal representation will be required for participation in these
procedures. In addition, these procedures may enjoy a measure of
support from the bench because of the growing practice of using re-
tired judges as decision makers. Institutional defendants are likely to
support innovation in this area because of the lower cost and greater
convenience of specialized, party-designed dispute resolution
procedures.
Change is likely to come slowly respecting the third category of
disputes - those that ought to be resolved in small claims forums. 63 5
The bar is unlikely to take much interest in promoting procedures
that do not require lawyers, and the bench generally is more inter-
ested in reforming the courts of general jurisdiction. Nevertheless, as
long as the dispute resolution dialogue gives attention to this category
of dispute, change in this area may occur as a collateral result of
change in other areas.
Substantial change already is occurring with respect to the
634. See Harter, supra note 108. The Harter article was premised on a report
prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States. Id. at 1. Based on
the report, the conference recommended "Procedures for Negotiated Rulemaking."
Id (citing Recommendation No. 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,701-10 (1982)).
635. For a discussion of the small claims courts and their functional problems,
see notes 475-505 and 620-30 and accompanying text supra.
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fourth category of disputes. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have been amended, 636 and considerable experimentation is going on
with court-annexed arbitration and mediation, as the other sympo-
sium papers demonstrate. There is little reason that any of the major
groups should oppose changes in this area. The greatest risk is that of
intellectual confusion resulting in poorly designed and implemented
and excessively promoted mechanisms that will fail. It is desirable for
everyone to be as precise as possible about the goals of new programs
and the types of disputes with which they are intended to deal.
I hope this article has made a modest contribution toward pro-
moting clarity of analysis.
636. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(amended 1983)(amended to reduce excessive dis-
covery); 26(b)(amended to give court authority to reduce amount of discovery); 26
(g)(certification requirement added to impose on attorney duty to engage in only
responsible pretrial discovery).
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